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ABSTRACT 
An Exploration of Major Existential Elements 
in the Principal Novels of Joseph Conrad 
This study attempts a more detailed and comprehensive consideration of Conrad's 
existential affinities than has previously been done. Without narrowly 
adopting any rigid critical stance, it provides a close reading of Heart of 
Darkness, Lord Jim, Nostromo, Under Western Eyes, The Secret Agent and Victory 
in the light of a broad range of texts by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, 
Marcel, Heidegger, Sartre and Camus, as well as (more briefly) Berdyaev, 
Tillich and Buber. Centering on the primary works themselves and engaging the 
secondary literature when necessary, it also surveys Conrad's letters, 
prefaces, notes, essays and short stories. 
Amid the tangled problem of authorial intent, the study argues that 
philosophically (and at times stylistically) Conrad displays a distinctly 
existential attitude, especially towards the self and the world. It explores 
how Conrad, adopting the dominant existential view that the world has no 
purpose beyond what the individual ascribes to it, shares the existential 
position that man must quest to create his own authentic self, a rigorous 
endeavour closely tied to the sheer freedom of 'abandoned' man that leaves each 
individual wholly responsible (to himself and others) for his decisions and 
actions in a world into which he has been 'thrown' by chance. In this quest 
man must strive to rebel against and overcome a condition of mere functionalism 
induced by circumambient obstacles, which include other people--who should be 
made a means to enhancing one's life through commitment and genuine 
communication and through being fully present to others in an existential sense. 
The work further considers how in the interplay of self and world Conrad evokes 
an existential awareness of life's tragic quality in the tension between 
limited, subjective man and the absurd, indifferent universe he inhabits, and 
how Conrad points in an existential way to the supremacy of emotional life over 
abstract rationality, with particular emphasis on feelings such as alienation, 
despair, anxiety and nausea--and their conquest by personal resolve and action 
that transcend nihilism and offer a sense of self-justification. 
Rather than discussing all these notions with the hindsight of current but 
evanescent critical approaches, the study primarily allows the proponents of 
these existential views to speak for themselves instead of through the 
deli~erate filter of the work's own perspectives--attempting to catch echoes 
that have largely done unsounded, thereby revealing an important aspect of 
Conrad's influential literary modernism. 
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Preface 
1 
'If you want to be a philosopher, write novels', declared Camus, who along 
with Sartre first consciously gave fictional form to expressly existential 
thought. The two were anticipated in many ways by the incipient modernists 
of the late nineteenth century, who infused their work with a remarkably 
similar philosophical outlook -- though not of course under the avowed 
banner of the word existentialism. And not least among these literary 
modernists is Joseph Conrad, who so presciently anticipated what Arturo 
Follico describes as 'the nihilism, the vacuity, the despair, and deathly 
mechanization and depersonification of the existing man in our time'. 2 
Yet Conrad the existentialist has received surprisingly modest critical 
attention. Not that his existentialism -- or his adumbration of 
existentialism -- is a 'strangely neglected topic', to use Kingsley Amis's 
mocking phrase from ~ucky !im. But though it has indeed been broached in a 
clutch of articles and in longer works, there remains room for a more 
detailed and wide-ranging consideration of Conrad's existential affinities, 
which so powerfully reveal the extraordinary degree of his modernist 
. 3 perspectives. 
This is not to say that Conrad exhibits his existential strain as 
nakedly or formally as the fiction of Sartre and Camus reveal theirs: he is 
more subtle, less overtly philosophical. Even so, he is unquestionably open 
to a more sustained existential reading than are most of the other major 
writers before him who at times reveal a kindred intellectual outlook, from 
the Old Testament prophets to Aeschylus to Shakespeare. In Conrad's case 
the congruence between his own views and those of existentialists from 
Kierkegaard to Camus is pervasive and unstrained, leaving little inducement 
to manipulation. Existential ideas, though new and subterranean, were not 
entirely unknown in the intellectual life of Conrad's period (1857-1924), 
thanks mainly to Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and Nietzsche (1844-1900), and 
later to Jaspers (1883-1969), Marcel (1889-1973) and Heidegger (1889-1976), 
before the wider spread of existentialism through the works of Sartre 
(1905-80) and Camus (1913-60). Some of the correspondences between Conrad 
and twentieth-century French existentialism have been noted often enough 
before, but too little has been said of Conrad's thorough affinities with 
the German existentialists and with Kierkegaard (though Conrad's atheistic 
outlook does not always comport with the Dane's Christian approach). 
Sartre came to view the word existentialism to have been 'so loosely 
applied to so many things that it no longer means anything at all' 
(Humanism 25-6). This is exaggerated of course, but it does point to the 
existential conviction that existence cannot be trimly fashioned into a 
system, particularly not an abstract one (which falsifies and constricts). 
As Nietzsche declares in Twilight of the Idols (25), 'I mistrust all 
systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity'. 
In consequence, no two existentialists (just as, say, no two High Romantics) 
posit precisely the same views. But in spite of the variance among them of 
vi 
their individual pronouncements, the major existentialists do share a common 
ground firm enough to support a consideration of it in Conrad that is both 
rigorous and internally consistent without being dogmatic. It is on the 
bedrock of this common ground rather than its surface rifts that the ensuing 
study rests, seeking as it does to demonstrate the ways in which Conrad 
approximates, rather than diverges from, existential perspectives. 
Naturally such a reading does not claim a definitive understanding of what 
Conrad's ultimate intentions are but simply offers one interpretation among 
many. By concentrating on certain aspects of Conrad I by no means wish to 
stereotype him and negate his other dimensions; they simply lie beyond my 
intentions. Ian Watt's Conrad in the Nineteenth Century has already 
supplied an admirable consideration of the novelist's broader intellectual 
position. 
My exploration focuses on six notable works -- Heart of Dar~ness, Lord 
!im, Nostromo, Jhe Secret Agent, Under Western Eyes and Victory --
considering the varying degrees to which they exhibit particular existential 
concerns. Since I do not make a case for any programmatic development of 
existentialism in Conrad, these novels are not examined in strict 
chronological order. Instead, individual works are discussed according to 
the extent to which they illustrate the topics under review, with constant 
cross-reference to the other major novels. I also survey broadly the 
letters, prefaces, notes, essays and short stories. Though there is de 
rigueur assessment of previous critical opinion, I try to bypass the bosky 
cul-de-sacs it often entails. In addition, I strive to circumvent jargon 
vii 
and 'critspeak' as far as possible in order to be plain, which necessarily 
entails some loss of sophistication. 
viii 
Although this study has as its main concern Conrad's philosophical 
outlook, it does not altogether skirt more purely literary issues. Hence my 
liberal-humanist stance attempts close attention to the text amid the 
tangled problem of authorial intent, all the while bearing in mind that to 
present an existential reading of Conrad is simply to highlight one vein of 
his work without any assertion that it is the pre-eminent artery. I 
emphatically do not wish to foist a literary classification on Conrad, who 
considered himself beyond categorisation, unlike lesser novelists who 'try 
voluntarily to discover the fettering dogmas of some romantic, realistic, or 
naturalistic creed' (Notes 7-8). 'The aim of art ••• ', he writes in 
the preface to The Nigger of the 'Narcissus' (xliii), 'like life itself, is 
inspiring, difficult--obscured by mists. It is not in the clear logic of a 
triumphant conclusion; it is not in the unveiling of one of those heartless 
secrets which are called the Laws of Nature'. Thus, the artist 'cannot be 
faithful to any one of the temporary formulas of his craft' (xlii). 
Certainly an emphasis on his existential qualities by no means leads to a 
skewed picture of Conrad. With his credo 'Never state: present', he depicts 
a Nietzschean world of multifarious perspectivity, and it comes as no 
surprise that he has defied precise pigeonholing. 
Though Conrad makes this remark in the context of literary method 
relating to his argument in the preface to The Nigger of the 'Narcissus', 
according to which psychological states should not be overtly catalogued but 
be expressed through some sort of external correlative, his idea spills over 
into his conviction that any presentation of a situation remains a 
subjective view, not an indisputable assertion of fact. Hence his use of 
multiple narrators (unreliable at times), each with his own perspective, 
which is often articulated in speech full of ellipses and uncertain 
h . . 4 es1tat1ons. In Heart of Darkness Marlow's stories are characterised as 
'inconclusive' (1:51), and his account in Lord Jim is considered an 
'incomplete story' (36:253); his narratives have no closure. Conrad 
frequently juxtaposes his narrators' contrasting points of view and employs 
digressions, time shifts, and oblique circumlocutions (as various critics 
have amply pointed out, though seldom in an existential context). There is 
also an existential quality in Conrad's treatment of repeated motifs such as 
nature, the sea, ships, cities, jumps, flight and disguise. 
The ensuing four chapters closely chart the existential attitudes most 
fully discernible in Conrad, some of which have been so thoroughly absorbed 
by our modern perspective as to seem obvious at times. But they were by no 
means an accepted part of mainstream nineteenth-century ideas. These 
attitudes in brief are Conrad's approach to the tragic tension between 
limited man and the indifferent universe he inhabits 5 ; to the supremacy of 
emotional life over rationality, focusing on man in the whole range of his 
existing as a subjective interpreter of the world; to the role of feelings 
ix 
such as alienation, despair, nausea, and anxiety; to man's quest for 
authentic selfhood (with its attendant questions of freedom, decision, 
action and responsibility); and to interpersonal relationships and the 
qualities they demand. Some of these are of course commonplaces of Conrad 
criticism, but they have not been adequately explored in their existential 
dimensions -- particularly those of the German existentialists. 
X 
One is constantly tempted to consider all these notions with the 
hindsight of present-day critical vantage points, but to do so at every turn 
would unnecessarily impede discourse. It is therefore not my intention to 
argue the soundness of the existential attitudes I explore. Nor do I 
deliberately filter them through my own perspectives, preferring in most 
cases to let their proponents speak for themselves -- the dominant voices 
being those of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger, Sartre 
and Camus, as well as (more briefly) Berdyaev, Tillich and Buber. Let us 
now turn to them and Conrad without further delay -- which I do with a debt 
of gratitude to generations of commentators on Conrad and on existentialism, 
and with warmest appreciation to all who offered me encouragement and 
advice, in particular Eve Bertelsen at Cape Town and Mark Wollaeger at Yale. 
List of Abbreviations 
I did not have access to complete collected editions of Conrad's 
works, and in-text references to part, chapter and page numbers (as the 
case may be) for the six novels most frequently cited in this study are to 
the following editions: 
.!!_eart of Darkness, in Youth, Heart of Darkness, The End of ~he Tether. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, The World's Classics Series, 
1984. 
Lord Jim: A Tale. Harmondsworth: Penguin Modern Classics, 1957. 
Nostromo: A Tale of the Seaboard. Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1986. 
The Secret Agent. Harmondsworth: Penguin English Library, 1984. 
ynder Western Eyes. Harmondsworth: Penguin English Library, 1985. 
Victory: An Island Tale. Harmondsworth: Penguin Modern Classics, 1963. 
The following short titles are used for in-text references to frequently 
cited existential texts; references are to volume, section and page 
num~ers, as the case may be: 
Dread: S~ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957. 
Essays: Jean-Paul Sartre, Literary and Philosophical Es~s. New York: 
Collier Books, 1962. 
Evil: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973. 
~xistence: Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence. London: Harvill 
Press, 1948. 
Humanism: Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and H~manism. New York: Haskell, 
1948. 
Idols: Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1968 
Love: S~ren Kierkegaard, Works of Love. London: Collins, 1962. 
Morals: Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1967. 
Mystery: Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, Vol. 1. South Bend, Ind.: 
Gateway Editions, Ltd. n.d. Vol. 2. Chicago: Gateway Edition, Henry Regnery 
Company, 1960. 
Nothingness: Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1956. 
Postscript. Spren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1941. 
Power: Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power. New York: Random House, 1967. 
Reason: Jean-Paul Sartre, The Age of Reason. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971. 
Science: Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science. New York: Random House, 1974. 
Time: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 
1977. 
Tragedy: Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy. New York: Vintage Books, 
1967. 
Zarathustra: Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra. New York: Random 
House Modern Library, n.d. 
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1 Being in the World 
Axel Heyst, we are told by the narrator of Victory, sought 'detachment from 
the world' (1:4:40). But, as any major existentialist would be quick to 
point out, man is inextricably a 'being-in-the-world', existing in 
unavoidable contingency with all that surrounds him. As Sartre's 
Roquentin emphasises in Nausea (131), 'Contingency is not a delusion, a 
probability which can be dissipated; it is the absolute' condition of man. 
Heyst, as he himself painfully discovered, was ineluctably a physical part 
of his encircling world, a world that the Sartre of Being and 
Nothingness (555) regards as offering man little support, leaving him 
'abandoned' to his own resources. 'I carry the weight of the world by 
myself alone without any person or thing being able to lighten it'. Like 
Professor Mathieu in Sartre's Age of Reason (320), every man is ultimately 
'alone' and 'without assistance' in 'a monstrous silence', his presence 
simply what Heyst calls "'an unforeseen accident"' (3:3:167) in a Sartrean 
universe where everything is 'superfluous' (Nausea 131). It is a world the 
Hamlet of Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy (7:60) considers to be filled with 
'horror or absurdity', part of 'an irrational necessity 1 • 1 As Marlow puts 
it in Heart of Darkness, 'We live, as we dream--alone' (1:82), our life a 
'mysterious arrangement of merciless logic for a futile purpose' (3:150). 
To most existentialists the world has no absolute meaning, and (as an 
early reviewer observed) Conrad is a great novelist precisely because he 
also has 'no theory as to the purpose of life 1 • 2 Ian Watt too has stressed 
that Conrad has no rigidly systematic philosophy, that he pretends to offer 
no more than partial glimpses of any universals -- rather like Hardy, who 
2 
frequently denied the presence of any formal philosophy in his work and saw 
himself as 'humbly recording diverse readings of phenomena as they are 
3 forced upon us by chance and change'. The world, after all, as Conrad 
declares in The Mirror of the Sea (ix), 'seems to be mostly composed of 
riddles'. "'The whole world is inconceivable to the strict logic of 
ideas'", remarks Natalia Haldin to the professor of languages who narrates 
Under Western Eyes. '"And yet the world exists to our senses, and we exist 
in it"' (2:1:135-6). This contingent relation of lonely man and absurd 
world is indissoluble. In Heidegger's words from Being and Time (78), 'The 
compound expression "being-in-the-world" indicates in the very way we have 
coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon'. 
Conrad's sense of the nature of this inextricable condition is in 
extraordinary agreement with the interpretation of it offered by the most 
influential of the existentialists, whose positions are in turn often 
darkened adaptations of Romantic ideas and are a powerful exponent of 
modernism. Both they and Conrad regard the individual as a solitary being 
hurled by chance into an irrational world, battling -- and sometimes 
transcending -- the indifferent obstacles that stalk his pursuit of a fuller 
life and induce in him an alienating state of anxiety amid his tragic 
awareness of his own finitude. 
The existential flavour in Conrad's evocation of man's relation to the 
world will be readily evident in the wide sampling of parallels offered in 
the next several pages, which are intended as an orientating prelude to a 
somewhat fuller consideration in subsequent chapters of related matters 
such as man's quest for what existentialists call 'authentic' existence; 
man's radical freedom that makes him terrifyingly responsible for his 
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actions; and the sense of redemptive self-justification that comes with 
successful interpersonal bonds. 
* 
The world, says Sartre, is the sum of animate and inanimate 'obstacles' 
encountered by the individual self in the wider realm of being, which 
Heidegger characterises as something indefinite that we can have no mental 
picture of. Being is what Marlow in Lord Jim calls the 'one colossal 
Presence' (35:251) that man is 'open' to, as Heidegger's 'Letter on 
Humanism' puts it (Basic Writings 228-9). For Sartre, being simply 'is' 
and has two fundamental forms: being-in-itself, or l'~tre-en-soi, and 
being-for-itself, or l'~tre-pour-soi. (I hope to limit convoluted use of 
such neologisms.) Being-in-itself is the self-contained, non-conscious 
being of an entity, its material being -- a stone is a stone, 'simply 
there, wholly brute' (Nothingness 506), obdurate with what Jim's Marlow 
terms 'the stubborn soul of things' (27:201-2). Being-for-itself, on the 
other hand, is the mode of existence man achieves by separating himself 
from sheer being-in-itself through fashioning his desired self in a world 
into which he has gratuitously been 'thrown', as Sartre and Heidegger 
phrase it. 
Thus Jim initially finds himself among men 'who, like himself, [were] 
thrown there by some accident' (2:16). Only later (as we shall see in the 
next chapter) does he manage to create for himself an identity that 
surmounts the insensate world around him. 4 His starting position, though, 
is one of being 'thrown there'. 'To exist', remarks Sartre's Roquentin, 
'is simply to be there' (Nausea 131), so that Heidegger describes an 
4 
individual's fundamental existence as 'being there', or Dasein, a mode of 
being (sein) that derives from a particular position (Da) which the existent 
occupies at a particular time a view Conrad held long before Sartre and 
Heidegger, illustrating as he does that man (as William Bysshe Stein has 
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observed) is basically an historical being immersed in a flux of impermanence. 
This is the shared condition of all men. 'What men have in common', 
writes Sartre in Anti-Semite and Jew (60), 'is not a "nature" but a 
condition, that is, an ensemble of limits and restrictions: the 
inevitability of death, the necessity of working for a living, of existing 
in a world already inhabited by other men. Fundamentally this condition is 
nothing more than the basic situation, or, if you prefer, the ensemble of 
abstract characteristics common to all situations'. There is, as he puts 
it in Existentialism and Humanism (46), a 'human universality of 
condition', made up of 'all the limitations which a priori define man's 
fundamental situation in the universe'. And Conrad's many international 
locales, as Adam Gillon mentions, represent microcosms of this 'universal 
human condition' with its 'divided human soul' and man's search for 
6 
values. In Marcel's words from the appendix to his Metaphysical Journal 
(322), the only thing 'given to me beyond all possible doubt is the 
confused and global experience of the world inasmuch as it is existant'. 
Clearly, then, the existentialist considers man to be physically part 
of an absurd world, unable to avoid engaging it. 'Without the world', says 
Sartre, 'there is no selfness, no person' (Nothingness 104). Yet in the 
same breath he insists also that 'without the person, there is no world': 
the very notion world as the individual experiences it rests on man. The 
Heidegger of Being and Time (417, 75) agrees. 'If no Dasein exists, no 
5 
world is "there" either'; essentially, 'life ••• is accessible only in 
Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative 
Interpretation'. 
This is so because any individual's conception and experience of the 
world derive from his own particular, limited point of view. When a 
person speaks of the world he means only what he is aware of in connection 
with it, and he can never claim to mean everything that is. Indeed, 
linguistically world stems from the Old English compound weor-old, in which 
weor means man and old means~ or era. Thus, etymologically world means 
era of man. This implies that there is no world (as humanity understands 
it) without man, but not of course in the sense of esse est percipi: the 
absolute existence of material objects is not dependent on the mind that 
perceives them, and the sheer corporeal world would continue without the 
presence of men although the Marlow of Lord Jim had the distinct feeling 
that Patusan would indeed cease to exist without his presence: 'I felt that 
when tomorrow I had left it for ever, it would slip out of existence, to live 
only in my memory till I myself passed into oblivion' (33:243). And David 
7 Daiches has broadly remarked that the Marlow of Heart of Darkness too 
leaves the impression that there is no reality beyond individual 
experience. 
Spelling out for a moment longer the existentialists' emphasis on 
perspectivism, we find them claiming that man can know only so much and no 
more about the world, that each individual projects his own viewpoints into 
it beyond the material evaluations offered by science. As Tillich observes 
in his Systematic Theology (1:62), an individual's 'only possible approach 
to existence itself' is through 'his own existence', through his own 
interpretation of the world. The world as men experience it is thus no one 
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thing but something wholly dependent on perspective. That Conrad shares 
this belief (as C. B. Cox has claimed) 8 is clear from his remark in 
Chance (289) that 'each of us arranges the world according to his own 
notion'. As Sartre asserts, 'There is no sense in life a priori • it 
is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing else but the 
sense that you choose' (Humanism 54). 
Conrad further suggests this perspectivism in his use of narrators who 
acknowledge the circumscribed nature of their interpretation of things. 
Our views of Jim and Kurtz, for example, are filtered through the human 
perspective of Marlow, which is perforce limited, since -- as Sartre puts 
it -- 'man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity' (Humanism 29). No 
omniscient perspective is possible. Not even the narrators who frame 
Marlow's accounts in Heart of Darkness and Lord Jim provide an omniscient 
interpretation; their voices enter only occasionally, and then mainly to set 
the scene. Marlow often mentions his uncertainty about the accuracy of his 
views and freely admits to his limitations, stressing that he was 'fated 
never to see [Jim] clearly' (23:184). He constantly hoped for glimpses 
from Jim's own point of view (5:43) -- as well from Jewel's -- and he 
recounts the later events as seen 'mostly through Tamb' !tam's eyes' 
(42:293). We also get divergent views of Jim from Brierly, the French 
officer, Egstrom, Chester, Cornelius and Brown. Besides which, as a Conrad 
letter remarks, language filters reality through a 'veil of inaccurate 
words' (Notes 83), rendering any narrative all the more suspect. 
The version of events offered by a particular raconteur, Marlow tells 
his listeners in Lord Jim, is open to still further interpretations by the 
hearers. Marlow contends that his account contains 'no message, unless 
7 
such as each of us can interpret for himself from the language of facts, 
that are so often more enigmatic than the craftiest arrangement of words' 
(36:255-6). 'For facts ••• ', comments the narrator of Victory, 'can be 
only tested by our own particular suspicions' (2:8:135). 'There is a 
quality in events which is apprehended differently by different minds or 
even by the same mind at different times' (3:8:205). Like the loathsome 
Martin Ricardo, every man sees things 'in the light of his own experience 
and prejudices' (2:8:135). What one man may find soothing, another may 
find terrifying, for the 'sentiment' of safety 'depends not on extraneous 
circumstances but on our inward conviction' (2:2:79). And "'What is a 
conviction?"' asks Martin Decoud in Nostromo. Merely "'a particular view 
of our personal advantage either practical or emotional"' (2:5:179). 
The professor of languages who narrates Under Western Eyes also admits 
to his own 'limitations' (2:1:131) and 'the corrupt frivolity of a Western 
mind' (2:2:151). And much of his narrative is in turn based on Razumov's 
confessional journal. Again Conrad avoids an omniscient narration, 




This perspectivism is further underlined in Conrad's descriptions of 
natural phenomena, presented as they so often are to reflect how a 
particular individual experiences them and endeavours to infuse them with 
meaning, as Hermann Stresan has observed. 9 Thus, when Marlow speaks of the 
storm Jim encountered on his very first training voyage, he says that it 
'seemed' to Jim as if 'the brutal tumult of earth and sky' were 'directed 
at him •••• It seemed to him he was whirled around' (1:12), suggesting 
Jim's own sense of the storm as attacking him personally. 'Now and then', 
Marlow continues, 'there appears on the face of facts a sinister violence 
of intention -- that indefinable something which forces it upon the mind 
and the heart of a man, that this complication of accidents or these 
elemental furies are coming at him with a purpose of malice' (2:14), an 
appearance which has no objective basis. An altered frame of mind brings 
a commensurately different view of things. Accordingly, in their love for 
each other Jim and Jewel experienced nature as benign when they walked 
together in 'a lovely night that seemed to breathe on them a soft caress' 
(31:225). Likewise, on Marlow's last day with Jim 'the diffused light from 
an opal sky seemed to cast upon a world without shadows and without 
brilliance the illusion of a calm and pensive greatness' (32:230). 
This view of nature as reflecting human moods in a manner akin to 
Ruskin's pathetic fallacy is also suggested on several occasions by the 
Marlow of Heart of Darkness. So too is the world's inscrutability. As 
Ruth M. Stauffer observed in her early assessment of Conrad, his dominant 
strain is an abiding sense of the mystery that shrouds life. lO The sea, 
comments Marlow, is 'as inscrutable as Destiny' and, like a Roman of old, 
the modern pioneer 'has to live in the midst of the incomprehensible' 
(1:48, 50). The jungle of the Congo was a 'colossal body of ••• fecund and 
9 
mysterious life' (3:136), and as he talked to the company's station manager 
Marlow wondered whether 'the stillness on the face of the immensity looking 
at us two were meant as an appeal or as a menace' (1:81). Amid the 
harlequinesque Russian's effusions about Kurtz, Marlow felt that 'never, 
never before, did this land, this river, this jungle, the very arch of this 
blazing sky, appear to me so hopeless and so dark, so impenetrable to human 
thought, so pitiless to human weakness' (3:127). 
This hostile impenetrability of the world was felt too by Nostromo's 
Decoud. Alone in Sartre's 'monstrous silence' on the Great Isabel, 'he 
beheld the universe as a succession of incomprehensible images' 
(3:10:413-14), experiencing what we have seen Marcel call a 'confused' 
apprehension of the world. Earlier, while he was aboard the silver-laden 
lighter with Nostromo, the Placid Gulf's 'blackness seemed to weigh upon 
Decoud like a stone. 
'"This is overpowering," he muttered' (2:7:231). Yet the Capataz de 
Cargadores considered this same darkness '"our friend"', a response Decoud 
later shared, finding it 'a shelter. He exulted in its impenetrable 
obscurity' (2:8:244, 247) -- pointing to a sea-change in his mood, which 
had wholly altered his interpretation of phenomena that had themselves 
remained unchanged. 
Subject as they are to perspectives of the moment, individual 
experiences of the world can often be thoroughly unreliable. Captain 
Mitchell, 'during his long vigil on the wharf', had 'thought that there 
had been much more wind than usual that night in the gulf; whereas, as a 
matter of fact, the reverse was the case' (3:2:291). When in Under 
Western Eyes the professor saw Natalia Haldin several days after their 
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previous meeting, she remarked that it was "'a glorious day'". Yet, 
comments the professor, 'all the glory of the season must have been within 
herself', given what he regarded to be the 'cold cruel blue' of the sky and 
'the ugly, dark wall of the Jura' (2:4:163). As Marlow says of Jim's later 
mood of self-fulfilment in Patusan, 'Felicity ••• is quaffed out of a 
golden cup in every latitude: the flavour is with you -- with you alone, 
and you can make it as intoxicating as you please' (16:135). 
When Natalia subsequently announced that she would be leaving Geneva, 
the professor betrays his regret by presenting his surroundings in terms 
that mirror his own feelings: 'The emptiness of the quays, the desert 
aspect of the streets, had an air of hypocritical respectability and of 
inexpressible dreariness' (4:2:310-11). The Boulevard des Philosophes 
seemed 'the very desolation of slumbering respectability' (4:2:313). He 
later records that the soon-to-be-deserted Haldin appartement 'presented 
the dreary signs of impending abandonment. It looked desolate and as if 
already empty to my eyes' (4:5:342). But on the first occasion he had 
entered it, under circumstances happier for him, 'the motes danced in the 
sunshine' (2:1:139). In The Secret Agent, Adolf Verloc's anguished 
condition made him view 'this fair earth' as 'a vast and hopeless desert' 
(8:174); Sir Ethelred's vacuous secretary Toodles, on the other hand, 
'believed [it] to be a nice place to live on' (10:201). As we recall 
Sartre insisting, 'There is no sense in life a priori • the value of 
it is nothing else but the sense that you choose' (Humanism 54). No two 
individuals evaluate the world alike, and a single individual may apprehend 
the same objects differently at different times. Thus, in her horror at 
her husband's having killed her brother Stevie in the Greenwich bombing, 
Winnie Verloc's thought was capable of 'altering even the aspect of 
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inanimate things' (11:225). 'I am condemned •• ' . ' says Sartre, 'to see 
the world modified at the whim of the changes of my consciousness' 
(Nothingness 482-3). Accordingly, when Hervey's wife came back to him in 
'The Return', 'it seemed to him that the walls were coming apart, that the 
furniture swayed at him; the ceiling slanted queerly for a moment, a tall 
wardrobe tried to topple over' (Unrest 128). 
We find these varying interpretations of the world in Victory's Axel 
Heyst as well. The disillusioned early Heyst declared to Captain Davidson 
that "'this world is evil upon the whole'", a "'bad dog'" (1:6:57, 59). 
But in his contentment with Lena the later Heyst found even a volcano 
friendly: "'Our neighbour is generally well behaved -- just smokes quietly • 
• • • He's a good-natured, lazy fellow"' (3:3:164). Once the sinister 
Jones and Ricardo intruded on the scene, Heyst again saw the world as 
distasteful. He pronounced the forest "'gloomy'", and Lena 'perceived the 
shades of the forest surrounding [them] ••• with a sullen, dumb, 
menacing hostility' (4:8:284). Looking at the stormy sky, 'her eyes 
reflected the sombre and violent hues of the sunset. 
'"That does not look much like a sign of mercy," she said slowly' 
(4:8:286). 
Clearly, then, Conrad shares the existential view that any 
interpretation of the world simply reflects an individual's experience of 
it at a particular moment. For man, as Sartre says, there is only 'the 
universe of human subjectivity' (Humanism 55). In itself, the world has 
no intention, either malign or benign; it is wholly indifferent. Man, 
declares Sartre, feels himself 'abandoned in the midst of indifference' 
(Nothingness 508) -- in a world as indifferent as the cold stars in Chance 
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or the snowy dome of Higuerota in Nostromo, which Cox sees as the 
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embodiment of nature's silent, unmoved response to the anguish of men. 
'The spirit of the land ••• ', remarks the Marlow of Lord Jim, 'is careless 
of innumerable lives' (21:170). To Jewel, Marlow represented 'all the world 
that neither cared for Jim nor needed him ••• the indifference of the 
teeming earth' (33:233). When Natalia Haldin said her final goodbyes to 
the professor in Under Western Eyes, she lamented that "'the stifled cry of 
our great distress ••• may be nothing to the world"' (4:5:345). To 
Conrad, as Albert J. Guerard has commented, man alone brings any sense of 
caring or grace into an unfeeling world. 12 
This indifference of circumambient being produces in man a sense of 
cosmic alienation. In Tillich's words, 'Whenever man has looked at his 
world, he has found himself in it as a part of it. But he also has 
realized that he is a stranger in the world of objects, unable to penetrate 
it beyond a certain level' (Systematic Theology 1:62). In consequence, it 
is up to the individual alone to decide about his own response to his 
situation in the world. 13 As Wilfred Desan remarks, to Sartre it is an 
individual's free choice that mostly decides about the coefficient of 
adversity or utility in the world. 'To be in a situation ••• ', argues 
Sartre, 'is to choose oneself in a situation, and men differ from one 
another in their situations and also in the choices they themselves make of 
themselves' (Anti-Semite and Jew 60). 
Yet such choices can be crushingly difficult in an individual's 
awareness of his own finitude and limitations amid constrictive external 
objects. Even Victory's treacherous Ricardo 'was human enough to suffer 
from the discovery of his limitations' (4:1:234). Existentialists convey 
this limiting aspect of existence by the coinage facticity (expressed as 
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Faktizitat in German and facticit~ in French). As John Macquarrie points 
14 f · · d h h. f 1 · h. h out, act1c1ty oes not meant e same t 1ng as actua 1ty, w 1c 
designates the more objective state of affairs observable in the world. 
Instead, facticity is the inner side of factuality, one's inward, 
existential awareness of one's own being (with its limitations) as a fact 
to be accepted. None of us has chosen to be: we simply find ourselves in 
Heidegger's condition of 'thrownness' (Geworfenheit), like Jim and his 
fellow seamen who (as we have seen) were 'thrown' into the East 'by some 
accident' (2:16), or like Victory's Lena and Ricardo, "'chucked out into 
this rotten world of 'yporcrits"' (4:2:242). As Stein remarks to Marlow, 
'"A man that is born falls into a dream like a man who falls into the sea"' 
(20:163). 'I am plunged', comes the echo in Sartre, 'in a world like that 
of a dream' (Nothingness 482). 
The sea in this case suggests the factical given and givenness of our 
existence. From an existential point of view, each of us is born by chance 
into a particular historical situation in a particular society, whose 
forces operate to shape our individual lives and affect our projects for 
realising our possibilities. Facticity is thus the opposite of 
possibility, its limiting situational element -- which includes the limits 
of subjectivity that render man's understanding incomplete and so make him 
a stranger to nature and social mechanisms, which frequently assault him. 
Any of man's possibilities is therefore always a factical possibility. 
In life, remarks the nameless 'Professor' of The Secret Agent, one is 
"'surrounded by all sorts of restraints and considerations"' (4:93). To 
most of us, as Marlow comments in Heart of Darkness, 'the earth 
is a place ••• where we must put up with sights, with sounds, with 
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smells ••• -- breathe dead hippo, so to speak, and not be 
contaminated' (2:117). Charles Gould in Nostromo, however, found that 'it 
was impossible to disentangle one's activity from ••• debasing contacts' 
(3:3:308). 
Indeed, the debasements of circumambient being often induce a sense of 
the world conspiring against one, as we saw in the case of Jim during his 
first storm at sea, which to him 'seemed directed at him' (1:12). Marlow 
describes the Jim of the Patna trial as appearing to be 'bound and gagged 
by all the invisible foes of man' (15:134). His existence was 'blurred 
by crowds of men as if by clouds of dust, silenced by the clashing claims 
of life and death in a material world' (20:165). All too frequently -- as 
when Marlow brought up the subject of Cornelius -- Jim felt himself 'a 
victim, crushed like a worm' (34:245-6), battered by what Marlow earlier 
terms 'unreasonable forces' like 'the unthinking might of nature, or the 
stupid brutality of crowds' (7:72). It comes as no surprise that critics 
such as Wilson Follet 15 have long pointed to Conrad's pervasive stress on the 
conflict between man and his world with its Sartrean 'limits and restrictions'. 
Marlow repeatedly suggests this conflict by pointing to the menacing 
aspects of nature. The Patna inched across a sea that was 'viscous, 
stagnant, dead', 'lonely under a wisp of smoke, held on her steadfast way 
black and smouldering in a luminous immensity, as if scorched by a flame 
flicked at her from a heaven without pity' (2:18, 19), by a sun of the 
sort that blazed down on Heyst's bungalow in Victory, 'hot and dry, with 
a devouring glare like the eye of an enemy' (3:3:158). As the Patna 
foundered, Jim saw a cloud of vapour produced by a 'silent black squall' of 
the kind that 'confounds sea and sky into one abyss of obscurity' (9:81), 
even though it was a pygmy compared to the elemental fury famously depicted 
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in Typhoon and The Nigger of the ''Narcissus'', a fury that -- as Cox has 
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remarked -- was nevertheless capable of being transformed by the crew's 
heroism, which transcended the forces of a threatening universe. Terra 
firma is often no safer than the unpredictable sea: the jungle of the 
Congo with 'the profound darkness of its heart' contained 'lurking death' 
and 'hidden evil' (2:92). The Samburan jungle in Victory, 'more jealous of 
men's conquests than the ocean', constantly overwhelmed human endeavour and 
had "'choked the very sheds in Black Diamond Bay'" (1:4:38, 39). 
Even when the universe appears benign it carries unsuspected 
catastrophe. Prior to its collision, the Patna had sailed under stars that 
'seemed to shed upon the earth the assurance of everlasting security •••• 
The propeller turned without a check, as though its beat had been part 
of the scheme of a safe universe •••• Jim ••• was penetrated by the 
great certitude of unbounded safety and peace that could be read on the 
silent aspect of nature like the certitude of fostering love upon the 
placid tenderness of a mother's face' (3:19). This reading offered no 
hint of impending disaster. Yet when the ship struck its unseen foe, 
'suddenly the calm sea, the sky without a cloud, appeared formidably 
insecure in their immobility, as it poised on the brow of yawning 
destruction' (3:26). Later, while Jim and Marlow were in conversation 
following the onset of the trial, Jim stood 'as if admiring the purity and 
the peace of the night' (12:104). But 'the night seemed to wait for him 
very still, as though he had been marked down for its prey', and when he 
departed 'the night swallowed his form' (13:120). Still later, on Patusan, 
we find night settling 'silently on all the visible forms • like a steady 
fall of impalpable black dust' (32:230). Even the tranquil sheen of the moon 
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'has all the dispassionateness of a disembodied soul' (24:187); sunshine is 
'passionate' but 'unconsoling' (36:254). 
In Heart of Darkness the quiet of the jungle 'did not in the least 
resemble a peace. It was the stillness of an implacable force brooding 
over an inscrutable intention' (2:93). And when Nostromo's Decoud sank to 
his death in the Placid Gulf, the silent water's 'glittering surface 
remained untroubled by the fall of his body'; he was 'swallowed up in the 
immense indifference of things' (3:10:416). Like Jim, Decoud inhabited 'a 
world indifferent to his failing and his virtues' (43:296), epitomised in 
The Mirror of the Sea (141) by the ocean's 'cynical indifference'. 
Conrad's Dickens-like 17 urban constructs are no less indifferent. 
Beyond Verloc's house in The Secret Agent stretched an 'inhospitable 
accumulation of bricks, slates, and stones, things in themselves unlovely 
and unfriendly to man' (3:84). Avrom Fleishman has pointed out 18 that the 
confused London streets and house numbers suggest the irrationality of the 
social order, whose larger absurdities Verloc lamely accepts. The confused 
city landscape also suggests the irrationality within man, since -- as 
J. Hillis Miller has remarked 19 -- civilisation in Conrad's depiction of it 
is merely an arbitrary creation that rests on no source of value outside 
humanity. When the nihilistic Professor left Comrade Ossipon after they 
had dined together, the sale of newspapers to the scurrying foot traffic 
had an 'effect ••• of indifference, of a disregarded distribution' 
(4:101). As the Assistant Commissioner emerged from the Italian 
restaurant, he entered 'into an immensity of greasy slime and damp plaster 
••• enveloped, oppressed, penetrated, choked, and suffocated by the 
blackness of a wet London night' (7:152). After murdering Verloc, Winnie 
considered 'the vast world created for the glory of man' to be 'only a vast 
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blank'; 'the whole town ••• rested at the bottom of a black abyss from 
which no unaided woman could hope to scramble out' (12:240). Soon after 
she had given Verloc's banknotes to Ossipon, he walked through 'the 
enormous town slumbering monstrously on a carpet of mud under a veil of raw 
mist ••• through monotonous streets with unknown names where the dust 
of humanity settles inert and hopeless' (12:261-2). The London evoked in 
Victory is equally desolate: to the young Heyst after his father's 
funeral, 'the London houses began to look like the tombs of an unvisited, 
unhonoured, cemetery of hopes' (3:1:150). 
In Under Western Eyes Ziemianitch, the sledge-driver whom Razumov 
sought to aid Victor Haldin's escape after his assassination of de P----, 
lived in 'an enormous slum, a hive of human vermin, a monumental abode of 
misery towering on the verge of starvation and despair' (1:2:75). Even 
affluent Geneva, the very antithesis of a slum, was 'indifferent and 
hospitable in its cold, almost scornful, toleration' when Razumov and the 
professor of languages called on Natalia Haldin and her mother (4:3:316). 
It tendered 'the same indifferent hospitality to tourists of all nations 
and to international conspirators of every shade' (4:4:330). Razumov was 
just as alienated there as he had been in St Petersburg, where he had 
'felt the hard ground of Russia, inanimate, cold, inert ••• his native 
soil ••• without a heart' (1:2:78). 
Included of course in this indifferent universe are one's fellow men, 
whom Heidegger regards as the abstract public mass that 'dissolves one's 
own Dasein' (Time 164). We are all, as Sartre puts it in Being and 
Nothingness, 'existences-in-the-world-in-presence-of-others'. And these 
others, with the social mechanisms they devise, are frequently inimical to 
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one's attempts at gaining a sense of personal fulfilment. 'To battle 
against princes and popes ' . . . , says Kierkegaard in his Journals (502), 
'is easy compared with struggling against the masses'. Marlow repeatedly 
points to exactly such struggles with 'others', with 'the world' (23:180), 
waged by Jim during and after the Patna incident. At the trial, for 
example, he was subjected to society's 'rules of the game' (7:66), 
surrounded by 'the pale blotches of faces' in the gallery (8:80) who formed 
part of 'international opinion' (14:123), that 'public opinion' which we 
find the Assistant Commissioner in The Secret Agent regarding as a 'strange 
emotional phenomenon' with an 'irrational nature' that 'weighed upon his 
spirits' (5:116). Mass opinion had also probably led to the separation of 
Jewel's mother and father, assailed as they were 'by the merciless pressure 
of conventions' (28:209). 
Jewel herself was at the doubtful mercy of Cornelius, whom Jim viewed 
as 'the hateful embodiment of all the annoyances and difficulties he had 
found in his path' (30:221), and Marlow describes Brown as 'a blind 
accomplice of the Dark Powers' (38:266) -- much like Jones in Victory, who 
announced himself to Heyst as "'the world itself, come to pay you a visit"' 
(4:11:303). The kind of corrupt and threatening world 'Jones and Co.' 
represent has an even more destructive countenance in Nostromo, where the 
conduct of men is a 'story of oppression, inefficiency, fatuous methods, 
treachery, and savage brutality' (1:8:119). 'A close-meshed net of crime 
and corruption lay upon the whole country' (3:3:308). 'At no time of the 
world's history', comments the narrator, 'have men been at a loss how to 
inflict mental and bodily anguish upon their fellow-creatures' (3:4:317). 
Political systems, Marcel argues in Man against Mass Society (see 27-56), 
all too often entail 'techniques of degradation'. / To Father Roman, 'the 
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working of the usual public institutions presented itself ••• most 
distinctly as a series of calamities overtaking private individuals and 
flowing logically from each other through hate, revenge, folly, and 
rapacity' (3:6:337). Nostromo despises the hombres finos who 'invented 
laws and governments and barren tasks for the people' (3:10:411), and he 
considers their economic power as embodied in the San Tom~ silver mine to 
be 'hateful and immense, lording it by its vast wealth over the valour, the 
toil, the fidelity of the poor' (3:10:417). In The Secret Agent the 
'ticket-of-leave-apostle' Michaelis describes "'the nature of the present 
economic conditions"' as "'cannibalistic'" (3:80), the product of a social 
system that the cynical Professor finds personified in Inspector Heat: 'the 
force of law, property, oppression, and injustice' (5:104). 
For an individual to oppose such social constructs is more perilous 
still in the world of Under Western Eyes: Russia is 'a country where an 
opinion may be a legal crime visited by death or sometimes by a fate worse 
than mere death' (l:prologue:1:57). The chains riveted on to Peter 
Ivanovitch's limbs by an 'Administrative' order were 'an appalling assertion 
of the divine right of autocracy' (2:2:147), and the professor of languages 
decries the 'ruthless working of political institutions' (4:3:328) amid his 
growing awareness of 'the horrors from which innocent people are made to 
suffer in this world, only in order that governments might exist' (2:4: 
169-70). The revolutionary Sophia Antonovna rails against the crushing 
inflexibility of the man-made institutions that destroyed her father: 
'"What had society to say to him? Be submissive and be honest. If you 
rebel I shall kill you"' (3:3:257). In an indifferent Sartrean universe 
20 
neither elemental nature nor societal constructs assure man any consolation. 
* 
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Even more terrifying than such universal indifference is man's experience 
of the world as absurd, a prime theme of existentialism. Camus, for 
example, begins The Myth of Sisyphus (2) by announcing, 'The pages that 
follow deal with an absurd sensitivity that can be found widespread in the 
age'. In The Rebel (10) he asserts, 'I proclaim that I believe in nothing 
and that everything is absurd'. To Camus the world is utterly without 
absolute meaning, and man is left to invent his own personal meaning for 
his existence, which he leads as an isolated stranger beset by conditions 
that restrict and thwart him. As we recall, Sartre shares Camus's 
sentiment: the obstinate world of sheer brute objects -- being-in-itself 
has no reason, no cause. It simply 'is'. The individual identity that 
man creates for himself -- his being-for-itself -- is constantly in a state 
of chance contingency with all that surrounds him, and both he and his 
circumambient world are wholly ungrounded, making for a condition of 
'fundamental absurdity', as Roquentin puts it in Nausea (129). 'I hadn't 
the right to exist', he muses. 'I had appeared by chance' (84). 
Furthermore, 'the total character of the world ••• is in all 
eternity chaos', declares Nietzsche in The Gay Science (109:168), a 
disorder that Conrad gives emblematic form to in The Secret Agent through 
Stevie's febrile drawing of 'a coruscating whirl of circles that by their 
tangled multitude of repeated curves ••• and confusion of intersecting 
lines suggested a rendering of cosmic chaos, the symbolism of a mad art 
attempting the inconceivable' (3:76). As D. A. C. Maclennon has said, 20 
Conrad's major works show that there is only bland, neutral disorder at 
the centre of things. Chance is the most powerful force in an indifferent 
world where all value, imposed by man, is relativist. The human mind alone 
imposes a specious sense of order, or kosmos, on a world that the Nietzsche 
22 
of The Will to Power (1067:550) regards as an enigmatic 'monster of energy' 
incomprehensible to the rational mind. The narrator of The Secret Agent 
knows that 'true wisdom ••• is not certain of anything in this world of 
contradictions' (5:105). 'The world', says Nietzsche (521:283), 'seems 
logical to us because we have made it logical', whereas it is actually 
characterised by 'change, becoming, multiplicity, opposition, 
contradiction, war' (584:315). It is full of 'horror or absurdity' 
(Tragedy 7:60). 
This absurdity is only too evident in the worlds of Conrad's fiction, 
whether as a pervasive sensation or a momentary one induced by personal 
crisis. When in 'The Return' Hervey read his wife's note announcing that 
she had left him, 'he was stunned by a noise meaningless and violent, like 
the clash of gongs or the beating of drums; a great aimless uproar •• 
This absurd and distracting tumult seemed to ooze out of the written 
words, to issue from between his very fingers that trembled, holding the 
paper' (Unrest 118). Marlow's narratives frequently go beyond such a 
purely subjective response and suggest a more outwardly observable 
absurdity in things. Though in Lord Jim Stein might marvel at "'the 
accuracy, the harmony''' of a butterfly as the product of '''the mighty 
Kosmos in perfect equilibrium"' (20:158), Marlow remorselessly shows that 
the world as most men experience it is 'a crazy maze of plans, hopes, 
dangers, enterprises' amid a 'fantastic existence' in which death is the 
only certainty (2:16). As he comments after seeing Jim off to Patusan 
aboard the brigantine with its mulatto master, 'the absurd chatter of the 
half-caste had given more reality to the miserable dangers of his path than 
Stein's careful statements' (23:183). Jim's world was not the one imagined 
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by his father, whom Marlow describes as 'equably trusting providence and the 
established order of the universe' in his 'undisturbed rectitude' (36:257). 
Nor was the world of Jim's father the one Marlow encountered in 
Heart of Darkness, a jungle world he remembers as 'one immense jabber, 
silly, atrocious, sordid, savage, or simply mean, without any kind of 
sense' (2:115). Brussels was no better. Visiting Kurtz's Intended, Marlow 
felt he 'had blundered into a place of cruel and absurd mysteries not fit 
for a human being to behold' (3:157). Her 'sepulchral city' and its 
denizens who dreamed 'insignificant and silly dreams' (3:152) were as 
impervious to rational explanation as the jungle, 'that dumb thing, 
that thing that couldn't talk, and perhaps was deaf as well', ready 'to 
to sweep every little man of us out of his little existence' (1:81, 86). 
The station, always 'in a muddle, -- heads, things, buildings' (1:68) 
was more 'unreal' than anything else Marlow had ever seen, a 'cleared speck 
on the earth' surrounded by 'something great and invincible ••• waiting 
patiently for the passing away of this fantastic invasion' by European 
outsiders (1:76). The station manager was 'a chattering idiot' (1:75), and 
the arrival of various caravans produced 'a violent babble of uncouth 
sounds' (1:69) attended by an 'absurd air ••• an inextricable mess of things' 
(1:87). And the French naval gunship Marlow saw firing gratuitously on to 
the mainland seemed a particularly potent image of pervasive absurdity: 
'in the empty immensity of earth, sky, and water, there she was, 
incomprehensible, firing into a continent' 1:61-2). 
As Marlow inched up the river towards Kurtz, his 'little begrimed 
steamboat' crept along 'like a sluggish beetle crawling on the floor of a 
lofty portico' (2:95), toiling slowly 'on the edge of a black and 
incomprehensible frenzy' of whirling bodies (2:96). During the assault by 
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the jungle populace as he approached Kurtz's outpost with the young 
Russian, whose 'very existence was improbable, inexplicable, and altogether 
bewildering' in 'the essential desolation of his futile wanderings' 
(3:126), Marlow 'resented bitterly the absurd danger of [their] situation' 
(3: 133). 
Similar resentment at being thrown into 'absurd danger' was 
experienced by Razumov in Under Western Eyes when he found himself a 
suspect in the assassination of de P----: 'he stared in dreary 
astonishment at the absurdity of his position' (1:3:118). This sensation 
was felt by Decoud as well while aboard the lighter with Nostromo when he 
feared Hirsch might betray their presence to Sotillo's ship. 'What if 
Hirsch coughed or sneezed? To feel himself at the mercy of such an idiotic 
contingency was too exasperating to be looked upon with irony' (2:8:248). 
Gould too 'was not amused at the absurdities that prevail in this world. 
They hurt him in his innate gravity' (3:4:321) unlike the engineer in 
charge of constructing the railroad, who found that 'the humours of railway 
building in South America appealed to his keen appreciation of the absurd' 
(2:5:183). 
The early Heyst of Victory also adopted the position that 'this world, 
for the wise, is nothing but an amusing spectacle' (3:1:153); "'it is by 
folly alone that the world moves"' (3:3:168). His bitterly ironic view of 
the world as "'the Great Joke'" (3:3:168) sprang from his sense that 'the 
general precariousness of human life' was 'not worth worrying about' (3:9: 
211). After his father's funeral he saw the mourners as 'fatuously 
jostling, nodding, spinning figures' swarming around him (3:1:151), and he 
observed that his father's death 'did not trouble the flow of life's 
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stream, where men and women go by thick as dust, revolving and jostling one 
another like figures cut out of cork and weighted with lead just 
sufficiently to keep them in their proudly upright posture' (3:1:150). Man 
has no absolute anchor in this Sartrean universe of sheer contingency. He 
'"drifts. The most successful men have drifted into their successes"' 
(3:3:167). 
Heyst later remarked to Lena that he had "'determined to remain free 
from absurdities of existence"', wondering how he would withstand life's 
assaults: "'It's difficult to resist where nothing matters'" (3:4:171). He 
considered '"this earth"' to be the '"hatching planet of calumny enough to 
furnish the whole universe. I feel a disgust at my own person, as if I had 
tumbled into some filthy hole"' (3:4:180). On reading his father's Storm 
and Dust he marvelled 'with what strange serenity, mingled with terrors, had 
that man considered the universal nothingness! He had plunged into it 
headlong, perhaps to render death, the answer that faced one at every 
inquiry, more supportable' (3:5:184). 
Death, Marlow tells his listeners in Heart of Darkness, is 'the last 
word of our common fate', the last of the 'ironic necessities that lurk 
in the facts of human existence' (3:155). And human existence, as 
suggested by his experience in the Congo, is ultimately impossible to 
describe. Trying to capture the sensation of what he experienced, says 
Marlow, is like trying to convey a dream -- 'a vain attempt, because no 
relation of a dream can convey the dream-sensation, that commingling of 
absurdity, surprise, and bewilderment in a tremor of struggling revolt, 
that notion of being captured by the incredible which is of the very 
essence of dreams' (1:82), a sensation Francis Ford Coppola skilfully 
evokes when the young conscripts get high on drugs in Apocalypse Now, which 
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substitutes Vietnam for Conrad's Congo. 
The dying Decoud in Nostromo, too, ultimately experienced the world as 
a fantastic 'succession of incomprehensible images' (3:10:414). Like Ossipon 
in The Secret Agent he was 'incapable ••• of judging what could be true, 
possible, or even probable in this astounding universe' (12:253). To 
Ossipon the Greenwich Park explosion was a thing of 'utter inanity' 
(12:245), what Conrad's prefatory note speaks of as an 'absurd cruelty' 
(41) that the foreign embassy's Mr Vladimir intended to be '"an act of 
destructive ferocity so absurd as to be incomprehensible, inexplicable, 
almost unthinkable ••• [with] all the shocking senselessness of 
gratuitous blasphemy"' (2:67) in a Sartrean world where, in itself, all is 
'superfluous' (Nausea 131). 
* 
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The bombing's main victim, Stevie, lived a life of constantly being 
'afraid to look about him at the badness of the world' (8:165), 
experiencing 'horror at one sort of wretchedness having to feed upon the 
anguish of the other' (8:168). Yet, 'like the rest of mankind, perplexed 
by the mystery of the universe, he had his moments of consoling trust in 
the organized powers of the earth' (8:169). Indeed, Nietzsche sees a 
desire for consolation as being at the very root of all man's beliefs that 
the universe is harmoniously rational. 'The conceptual understandability 
of existence • ', he asserts in The Gay Science (370:328), 'calms and 
gives confidence -- in short, a certain warm narrowness that keeps away 
fear and envelopes one in optimistic horizons'. 
It is an assertion shared by the Marlow of Lord Jim. Relating his 
apprehension of Nietzsche's Heraclitean view of universal chaos as he 
listened to Jewel's account of her mother's death, Marlow records that he 
was 'troubled ••• profoundly with the passive, irremediable horror of the 
scene. It had the power to drive me out of my conception of existence, out 
of that shelter each of us makes for himself to creep under in moments of 
danger, as a tortoise withdraws within its shell. For a moment I had a view 
of a world that seemed to wear a vast and dismal aspect of disorder, while, 
in truth, thanks to our unwearied efforts, it is as sunny an arrangement of 
small conveniences as the mind of man can conceive' (33:236). Marlow's 
contention here that man fashions a 'sunny' view of things parallels 
Nietzsche's contention in The Will to Power (521:283, 602:326) that 'the 
world seems logical to us because we have made it logical •••• The more 
superficially and coarsely it is conceived, the more valuable, definite, 
beautiful, and significant the world appears'. 
Accordingly, one of Conrad's major themes is what he terms in 
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Almayer's Folly (x) 'the curse of facts and the blessing of illusions, the 
d h f folly ,.21 bitterness of our wisdom an t e deceptive consolation o our In 
a letter of 31 January 1898 to Cunninghame Graham he laments, 'If we could 
only get rid of consciousness. What makes mankind tragic is not that they 
are the victims of nature, it is that they are conscious of it' (Letters 
2:30). 22 As Watt observes, Conrad shares the existential view that 
individual consciousness is inevitably separate from its environment. In 
Jaspers's estimation, 'the more determined I am to comprehend the world, 
the more homeless it will make me feel' (Philosophy 2:4). Miguel de 
Unamuno, Conrad's contemporary, goes so far in The Tragic Sense of Life as 
to say that 'man, by the very fact of. possessing consciousness, is 
a diseased animal. C . . d• I 23 onsc1ousness 1s a 1sease. Yet individual 
human existence is inextricable from consciousness. 'The I', says Sartre 
in The Transcendence of the Ego (51, 44-5), 'manifests itself as the source 
of consciousness'; 'in so far as my reflecting consciousness is 
consciousness of itself, it is non-positional consciousness'. And as a 
consciousness, each man is aware of his 'otherness' in relation both to 
non-conscious entities and to his fellow consciousnesses. 
Hence Winnie Verloc's 'tragic suspicion' in The Secret Agent 'that 
"life doesn't stand much looking into'" (author's note:41; cf. 8:172, 
11:219), and Axel Heyst's contention in Victory that "'man on this earth 
does not stand close investigation"' (3:3:167). As Jerome Thale has 
24 
remarked, Conrad suggests that illusion and ignorance in fact save us from 
knowledge that paralyzes. In Nietzsche's words, the 'lie -- and not the 
truth -- is divine' (Power 1011:523). Thus Marlow lets Kurtz's Intended 
remain ignorant of what he had found in the Congo; she lacked the strength 
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for such terrifying knowledge. The psychologically fragile, Nietzsche 
warns, dare not look too deeply into things, because 'the deeper one looks, 
the more our valuations disappear -- meaninglessness approaches' (Power 602: 
326). 'Woe to the fatal curiosity which should once be able to look through 
a crack out and down from the chamber of consciousness, and which should 
then divine that man rests, with the unconcern of his ignorance, on the 
25 pitiless, the ravenous, the insatiable, the murderous'. 
Woe indeed, as we see in the case of Nostromo's Decoud, who became 'a 
victim of the disillusioned weariness which is the retribution meted out to 
intellectual audacity' (3:10:416). Heyst's father in Victory, that 
'destroyer of systems, of hopes, of beliefs' (3:1:150), was similarly 
wearied by his piercing assessment of life -- yet he did ultimately manage 
(as existentialists claim we all can) to achieve '"mastery of despair"' 
(3:3:167). Heyst the younger had been used to 'seeing life outside the 
flattering optical delusion of everlasting hope, of conventional 
self-deceptions, of an ever-expected happiness' (2:2:80). But his life with 
L d d f h . . · . 11 b'd 'h'l' 26 ena encourage transcen ence o is initia y mor i ni i ism, a movement 
towards that pessimism of strength which Nietzsche counsels -- something 
very different from Decoud's 'affectation of careless pessimism' (2:8:247) 
or 'the air of moral nihilism' that the narrator of The Secret Agent regards 
as 'common to keepers of gambling hells and disorderly houses' (2:52). 
Those of us who, like Winnie Verloc, lack the strength of pessimism 
would do well to follow Marlow's Nietzschean view of 'the wisdom of life' 
in Lord Jim, 'which consists in putting out of sight all the reminders of 
our folly, of our weakness, of our mortality' (15:134). Nietzsche argues 
that we ultimately do not wish to uncover the actual character of our 
cruel, contradictory, senseless world, so that we experience a conflict 
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between our surface curiosity and our submerged longing to avoid awesome 
knowledge -- what he epitomises in The Birth of Tragedy as the antagonism 
between science and art. 
Not that we can trust reason as a guide to an accurate apprehension of 
the world. Like the Romantics, existentialists decry reliance on narrow 
rationalism that employs abstraction; emotions and intuitive thought, they 
contend, offer a more trustworthy disclosure of man and the world (as we 
shall see in just a moment). This is not to say that they utterly abjure 
reflective thought -- they simply insist that it should reflect on the 
intimations offered by emotions. Yet, as Marlow comments in Lord Jim, 'very 
few of us have the will or the capacity to look consciously under the 
surface of familiar emotions' (21:169). If we did, we would discover that 
emotions reveal much about us as beings-in-the-world. Much more than 
Hegelian Idealism for example can, since in Marcel's view it is a sort of 
'sand castle' that alienates us from a sense of life as lived and so fails 
to bring us closer to a comprehensive understanding of our existence. Thus, 
Heidegger champions the pre-Socratics like Parmenides and Heraclitus with 
their insights into the connection between being and thinking, rather than 
subsequent Western philosophy with its 'forgetting of being' and its 
emphasis on calculative thought. As E. R. Dodds points out, 'The men who 
created the first European rationalism were never -- until the Hellenistic 
Age -- "mere" rationalists: that is to say, they were deeply and 
imaginatively aware of the power, the wonder, and the peril of the 
irrational 1 • 27 
Hence Jaspers in The Origin and Goal of History (2) sees the roots of 
existential thought in the worldwide emergence in about 500 B.C. of the 
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kind of thought in which man first becomes 'conscious of Being as a whole, 
of himself and his limitations. He experiences the terror of the world and 
his own powerlessness. He asks radical questions. Face to face with the 
void he strives for liberation and redemption. By consciously recognizing 
his limits he sets himself the highest goals. He experiences absoluteness 
in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence'. 
Rather than being primary, abstract reasoning is to the existentialist 
simply something that the self may use as one of its tools in its attempts 
to achieve its possibilities. As such, reason should focus on concrete 
experiences rather than devise abstract speculations and formulaic systems. 
As Marcel declares in Man against Mass Society (1), 'The dynamic element in 
my philosophy, taken as a whole, can be seen as an obstinate and untiring 
battle against the spirit of abstraction'. It is a battle even more 
virulently waged by Nietzsche, who asserts that in order to understand 
ourselves we must 'start from the body and employ it as guide. It is the 
much richer phenomenon, which allows of clearer observation' (Power 532: 
289). 'Our most sacred convictions, the unchanging elements in our supreme 
values, are judgments of our muscles' (314:173). 'Man', he says, 'like 
every living thing, thinks continually without knowing it; the thinking 
that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this -- the 
most superficial and worst part -- for only this conscious thinking takes 
the form of words, which is to say signs of communication' (Science 
354:299). As a result, we now 'cease to think when we refuse to do so 
under the constraint of language' (Power 522:283) -- hence our limited 
explanation of the world in terms of subject, predicate, object, and our 
attendant notions of cause and effect. 
The brain, Nietzsche points out, is merely an organ of the body, and 
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the knowledge it produces is purely of the world 'appropriated and made 
manageable' (Power 423:227). 'What first created any basis for logic. I . . , 
he argues in The Gay Science (111:171), was man's tendency 'to treat as 
equal what is merely similar -- an illogical tendency, for nothing is really 
equal •••• It was ••• necessary that for a long time one did not see nor 
perceive the changes in things. The beings that did not see so precisely 
had an advantage over those that saw everything "in flux"'. Logic thus 
contains 'an imperative concerning that which should count as true', so as 
to help man endure existence (Power 516:279). Logic makes the world seem 
'valuable, definite, beautiful, and significant' (602:326), rather than a 
chaos of what Marlow in Lord Jim terms 'unreasonable forces' (7:71-2). A 
surface view ultimately produces a vapid conception of things -- as even 
blithe Michaelis in The Secret Agent recognised: "'All idealization makes 
life poorer. To beautify it is to take away its character of complexity'" 
(3:73). And yet he himself adopted a facile optimism that smacked of just 
such idealisation, in that he claimed himself to be 'so far from pessimism 
that he saw already the end of all private property coming along logically, 
• · , Cold reason, he boasted, was the basis of his optimism' (3:74-5). 
Razumov in Under Western Eyes on the other hand, musing before the statue 
of Rousseau -- the great Romantic antithesis to Voltaire and his smile of 
reason -- pessimistically proclaimed that "'life is just • a dream and a 
fear"' (4:2:298). Yet (as Ted E. Boyle observes) 28 it was at this point 
that Razumov, like the Captain in The Shadow-Line, intuitively recognised 
his moral obligations and accepted his duties towards his fellow men. 
The Romantic insistence on intuitive thought is echoed by Jaspers, who 
recommends that we should go beyond narrow logic and develop a definition 
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of reason that views everything in relation to a comprehensive whole, to 
all spheres of our experience. Thus Marlow repeatedly speaks of Jim as 
'romantic' or 'imaginative', making him (as Peter Ure has claimed) 29 the 
touchstone of Conrad's attempts to endow his heroes with dreams and 
passions rather than intellect, and to have them transform such passions 
into achievement. Marlow mentions that his bachelor friend who had hosted 
Jim wrote approvingly that Jim 'was not clever by any means, thank 
goodness' (18:143). 'Ideas ••• ', Marlow tells his listeners, 'are 
tramps, vagabonds, knocking at the back-door of your mind, each taking a 
little of your substance' (5:38-9). The 'black fellows' who paddled the 
boats in Heart of Darkness were marvellously free of rationality's sapping 
influence: 'they had bone, muscle, a wild vitality, an intense energy of 
movement, that was as natural and true as the surf along their coast. They 
wanted no excuse for being there' (1:61) -- unlike the white 'pioneers' 
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who, as Bruce Johnson observes, vainly attempted to 'read' nature. In 
An Outcast of the Islands (4:2:226) Babalatchi remarks to Lingard: "'You 
white men ••• are stronger than the wild beasts, but not so wise. A 
black tiger knows when he is not hungry -- you do not"'. 
In short, the less rational a man is, the more 'natural' his 
experience of life tends to be. And since we respond to our experiences 
with changing moods, feelings and affects, participating in the world 
through the senses of our bodies that stimulate our emotions, we can 
discover through emotions things about the world and ourselves that remain 
closed to so-called objective, 'scientific' beholding. Whereas rational 
philosophy views the emotions as suspect, existentialists regard them as 
valuable registers of our being-in-the-world. Therefore even 'negative' 
emotions such as anxiety, ennui and nausea are seen as a reliable means to 
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explaining the human condition. These emotions suggest that an individual 
who experiences them is not 'at home' in the world, elucidating him as 
existing in an alienating situation that he should attempt to change or 
from which he should extricate himself. Thus Verloc the secret agent, 
compelled to commit the Greenwich bombing in the face of his inner 
imperatives, 'felt the latent unfriendliness of all out of doors with a 
force approaching to positive bodily anguish' (3:84), which revealed the 
alienating nature of his undertaking and the threatening quality of the 
circumstances he was in. Yet he failed to heed the message his anxiety was 
sending to alter his circumstances -- unlike Jim, who ultimately 
transformed his tormented condition to fashion 'an Arcadian happiness' for 
himself in Patusan (16:135). 
Emotions such as joy, confidence and hope are equally reliable 
indicators, revealing that the individual who experiences them has a sense 
of belonging, a favourable reaction to the situation he finds himself in or 
has created for himself. As Heidegger points out, we do not 'have' moods 
in the way we have objects. Moods penetrate an individual's being-in-the-
world, defining his response to the world. Heidegger speaks of man's 
response to the world as Stimmung, the root sense of which suggests 
attunement, the way one is attuned to existence. If we relect upon our 
feelings and inward experiences as part of the larger fabric of our 
existence, we gain deeper insights into man as a psychosomatic unity rather 
than a mere object open to observation and rational explanation. 
Conrad suggests this most forcefully in Under Western Eyes, where 
Razumov's experiences clearly reveal rationality's precarious shortcomings. 
His very name (like Razumikhin's in Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment) has 
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as its root razun, Russian for reason. Razumov is thus intended as a 
representative of restraining, calculating rationalism, and his 
distintegration shows the limitations of sheer reason as a means to 
understanding and dealing with existence in a world where, as the professor 
of languages puts it, 'there is little logic to be expected' (2:4:189). 
Though Razumov initially regards society as rational, after his experience 
with General T---- he views it as an absurd comedy of errors. Conrad may 
sympathise with Razumov' s desire "' to guide my conduct by reasonable 
convictions'" (1:3:113), but he plainly demonstrates that reason cannot 
master the complexities of a fundamentally non-rational world. "'The more 
intelligent one is,'" Razumov later concedes in Geneva, "'the less one 
suspects an absurdity"' (3:1:207), and Peter Ivanovitch was grateful to 
find while a fugitive prisoner that he had 'developed an unsuspected genius 
for the arts of a wild and hunted existence ••• he was glad to discover 
that there was so much of a brute in him' (2:2:148). 
Razumov is associated from the very beginning of the novel with trust 
in the value of reason. He sets himself the task of achieving an 
intellectual reputation (1:1:63), and Haldin considers his '"judgement"' to 
be '"more philosophical"' than his own, praising his '"superior mind"' 
(1:1:64, 67). "'Men like me"', says Haldin, "'are necessary to make room 
for self-contained, thinking men like you"' -- though he does warn Razumov 
against his "'arrogant wisdom"' (1:1:68, 70). 
Part of that 'wisdom' was to regard the 'present institutions' of 
Russia's autocratic political system as 'rational and indestructible • 
• • • They had a force of harmony' (1:1:69). Their representative, 
Councillor Mikulin, had an 'accurate middle-parting of glossy hair above a 
rugged Socratic forehead' (1:3:123) -- and Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy 
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(12:82) disdains the 'altogether newborn demon ••• Socrates' for his 
condemnation of instinctual thought, the kind of intuitive thought that 
eventually led Razumov to uncover Nikita as a double agent "'by a sort of 
inspiration"' (4:5:348). Mikulin's mode of intellectual activity was not 
of the kind that yields the comprehensive wisdom Nietzsche finds in 
pre-Euripidean Greek tragedy. For Mikulin, "'the principal condition 
[was] to think correctly"' (1:3:123), which in his case meant to follow 
unquestioningly the established wisdom of the police state. 
Razumov's violent emotional upheaval in the wake of the Haldin affair 
soon led him to reassess his original view of the world as rational -- a 
turmoil which incontrovertibly illustrates that emotions are far more 
powerful than reason and that they are ultimately the surer guide to 
discovering what one's true imperatives are, to discovering what one needs 
to alter in one's life to achieve a more authentic existence. His 
emotional distress brought him to a revaluation of his values and finally 
made of him what we can regard as a 'saved' character. As Conrad wrote to 
Cunninghame Graham in a postscript to his letter of 14 and 15 January 1898, 
'Salvation lies in being illogical' (Letters 2:17). 
In his disturbance over Haldin's assassination of de P----, Razumov 
saw 'his mind become an abject thing' (1:1:69) unable to control his 
emotions, which produced 'a tumult of thoughts -- the faithful reflection 
of the state of his feelings' (1:2:71-2). These feelings impelled him, 
against his rational judgement, to aid Haldin by going in search of 
Ziemianitch. Trudging through the blizzard, he found himself unconsciously 
driven forward; 'no rational determination had any part in his exertions' 
(1:2:73). Yet still he clung to his 'arrogant wisdom'. Thinking of Haldin 
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he said to himself, "'What are the luridly smoky lucubrations of that 
fellow to the clear grasp of my intellect?"' (1:2:80). But although he 
asserted that Haldin had committed "'a crime my reason -- my cool superior 
reason -- rejects'" (1:2:80), his emotional turmoil pointed to his far more 
deeply seated sense that he supported Haldin's actions against the 
autocratic state. Had he heeded his feelings thoroughly, he would not have 
betrayed Haldin to men he loathed (1:2:87), in what he eventually realised 
was a betrayal of himself. His later experience of remorse at having 
beaten Ziemianitch underscores his emotional identification with the 
oppressed. Even in his 'remorseful tenderness' for the sledge-driver, 
however, he desperately tried to rationalise his beating of him in what 
amounted to no more than evasions of his own inner admonitions. 
Razumov similarly tried to reason away his sleepless misgivings over 
Haldin's assured torment at the hands of the authorities to whom he had 
betrayed him. Despite his feeling that his fellow student was suffering, 
he reasoned that 'Haldin in the fortress was sleeping that night. It was a 
certitude which made him angry because he did not want to think of Haldin, 
but he justified it to himself by physiological and psychological reasons. 
The fellow had hardly slept for weeks on his own confession, and now every 
incertitude was at an end for him. No doubt he was looking forward to the 
consummation of his martyrdom' (1:3:107). Nostromo's Dr Monygham likewise 
'consoled the misery of his soul with acute reasonings' (3:4:318); as the 
narrator of Victory asserts, 'The use of reason is to justify the obscure 
desires that move our conduct, impulses, passions, prejudices, and follies, 
and also our fears' (2:2:80). 
It was not until Razumov reflected deeply on his own emotions that he 
discovered the fatuousness of his earlier reasonings -- and opened himself 
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to the healing quality of Natalia Haldin's love. He initially fought his 
affection for her, but the professor of languages early on recognised that 
Razumov was being false to himself by denigrating the value of emotions: 
"'He puts on the ••• insensibility to common emotions of a man devoted 
to a destructive idea"' (2:5:200). 
Conrad time and again points to the destructiveness that attends such 
unswerving adherence to an idee fixe. Charles Gould in Nostromo, having 
succumbed to what Decoud terms '''the seduction of an idea''' (2:7:219), lost 
much of his humanity as a result. His 'fits of abstraction depicted the 
energetic concentration of a will haunted by a fixed idea. A man haunted 
by a fixed idea is insane. He is dangerous even if that idea is an idea of 
justice; for may he not bring the heaven down pitilessly upon a loved 
head?' (3:4:322). Dr Monygham too is described as 'terrible in the pursuit 
of his idea' of serving Emilia Gould (3:8:364), and he and the other '"fine 
men of intelligence"' are castigated for their callousness by the 
non-intellectual Nostromo (3:9:383), whose 'instinctive mood of fierce 
determination ••• had never failed him before the perils of this life' 
(3:12:441). 
Decoud, on the other hand, whose 'complacent superiority analyzed 
fearlessly all motives and all passions' (2:8:241), found his cold 
rationality useless in the face of an irrational world -- symbolised by 
Nostromo's extinguishing the candle aboard the lighter, plunging them into 
darkness. Decoud 'had recognized no other virtue than intelligence' 
(3:10:413), a belief that proved worthless in his final isolation. His 
speculations were futile, since the actions of men (as in Pedrito Montero's 
behaviour) are 'usually determined by motives so improbable in themselves as 
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to escape the penetration of a rational person' (3:5:328). Accordingly, 
Conrad suggests, one is misguided in trusting systematised, abstracted 
views of the world. Thus, the intellectually backward Stevie of The Secret 
Agent, 'though apt to forget mere facts, ••• had a faithful memory of 
sensations' (8:165), which offered a far more accurate apprehension of the 
world than did the so-called rational arguments of Michaelis, whose lack of 
passion prevented him from turning his highflown words into deeds. 
'"Without emotion there is no action"', remarked Ossipon to Verloc 
(3:80), a dictum that Conrad elaborates on in his prefatory note to 
Victory (12): 'Heyst in his fine detachment had lost the habit of 
asserting himself ••• the trick of the thing, the readiness of mind 
and the turn of the hand that come without reflection and lead the man to 
excellence in life, in art, in crime, in virtue, and, for the matter of 
that, even in love. Thinking is the great enemy of perfection. The habit 
of profound reflection, I am compelled to say, is the most pernicious of 
all the habits formed by the civilized man'. So is it that Conrad depicts 
Nostromo when he awoke after his removal of the silver as being 'as natural 
and free from evil in the moment of waking as a magnificent and unconscious 
wild beast' (3:7:347), and Razumov's fellow student 'Madcap Kostia' as 
filling 'the bare academy corridors with the joy of thoughtless animal 
life' through 'his elated voice and great gestures' (1:3:114). 
Axel Heyst, by contrast, had under his father's guidance 'learned to 
reflect, which is a destructive process, a reckoning of the cost. It is 
not the clear-sighted who lead the world. Great achievements are 
accomplished in a blessed, warm mental fog, which the pitiless cold blasts 
of the father's analysis had blown away from the son' (2:3:87). As 
Granville Hicks has stressed, 31 Conrad plainly shows that the intellect 
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interferes with heroic qualities, so that Heyst languished in the withering 
ennui produced by his rationality until his meeting of Alma/Magdalen 
(whom he was to rename Lena) stirred him 'deep down, where our unexpressed 
longings lie', her words thrilling him 'like a revelation' (2:1:74, 75). 
He experienced 'the awakening of a tenderness, indistinct and confused as 
yet, towards an unknown woman', and 'his sceptical mind was dominated by 
the fulness of his heart' (2:2:80, 81). Though Heyst may ultimately have 
been destroyed by an absurd universe, his emotional attachment and 
subsequent commitment 32 to her provided him (as we shall see in chapter 4) 
with a sense of authentic being unknown to him while he saw life 'outside 
the flattering optical delusion of ••• an ever-expected happiness' 
33 (2:2:80). 
Indeed, Heyst warned Lena that "'if you begin to think you will be 
unhappy'" (3:3:165). This echoes Conrad's retort to Cunninghame Graham when 
he suggested that Conrad make the simpleton of the Narcissus an educated 
man. 'Cultivate in that unconscious man the power to think? Then he would 
become conscious and much smaller -- and very unhappy' (Letters 1:422). 
As Robert Morss Lovett and Helen Sard Hughes have remarked in a general 
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way, for Conrad (as for Hardy) the supreme tragedy is that of 
consciousness. 'Reason is hateful ••• ', says Conrad, 'because it 
demonstrates (to those who have the courage) that we, living, are out of 
life -- utterly out of it. Life knows us not and we do not know 
life' (Letters 1:222). 35 Which is why (as H. Strawson has observed) Conrad 
repeatedly stresses the value of instinctive feeling -- as when the 
narrator of Victory makes plain that it was Lena's unthinking actions which 
served her best. In choosing to go with Heyst she had placed her trust 
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'where her woman's instinct guided her ignorance' (2:3:89), and during 
Ricardo's attack on her she had 'defended herself ••• from the force of 
instinct which is the true source of every great display of energy' 
(4:2:239). It was thanks to her emotions, not her reason, that she was 
exalted 'with a sense of an inconceivable intensity of existence' (4:9:293). 
* 
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Such 'intensity of existence' is all too often the exception rather than 
the rule in a world whose encircling forces need not be overtly violent to 
be destructive. The weight of the merely mundane also tends to pull the 
individual down to the level of what Macquarrie calls 'subhuman, 
b 'bl b · ' 36 h h · · su existent, unreflective, irresponsi e eing, rat er tan permitting 
attainment of authentic existence (which we shall explore more fully in 
later chapters). The Heidegger of Being and Time (as at 164ff.) too 
stresses these deadening pressures of the everyday world, including the 
habitual activities that relate us to the world in countless ways beyond 
merely spatial relation, so that in Sartre's estimation 'it appears that 
the world has a kind of drain hole in the middle of its being and that it 
is perpetually flowing off through this hole', taking us with it 
(Nothingness 256). The world has a tendency, like Russia in Under Western 
Eyes, to be what Conrad calls 'a bottomless abyss that has swallowed up 
every hope of mercy, every aspiration towards personal dignity, towards 
freedom, towards knowledge' (Notes 100). 
This is particularly true for what Marcel terms the 'functional' man, 
such as the mass-production worker. As he remarks in The Philosophy of 
Existence (2), 'The rather horrible expression "time table" perfectly 
describes his life. So many hours for each function'. 'Concentration on 
mere technical functioning', he says in Man against Mass Society (53), 
causes a 'flinching of the human spirit'. Such a rote life, rule by the 
masses, Jaspers complains in Man in the Modern Age (43), 'is life without 
existence, superstition without faith. It may stamp all flat; it is 
disinclined to tolerate independence and greatness, but prone to constrain 
people to become as automatic as ants'. 
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It is a condition that Conrad evinces in novel after novel. 
Michaelis's 'lady patroness' in The Secret Agent, for example, finds 
'industrialism ••• singularly repulsive in its mechanical and 
unfeeling character' (6:124), oppressing the Londoners whom the surly 
Professor considers 'industrious like ants' (5:103). Even the Assistant 
Commissioner led a straitened life amid 'the futility of office work' 
(5:116), 'chained to a desk in the thick of four millions of men' (6:125). 
Like any man 'engaged in a work he does not like', he felt 'the distaste, 
the absence of glamour, extend from the occupation to the personality' 
(6:125). The mine workers in Nostromo occupied themselves with 'barren 
tasks' (3:10:411); the fishermen in Lord Jim led 'trifling, miserable, 
oppressed lives' (35:253); most of the 'countless millions' in Under 
Western Eyes (1:2:78) had rote lives as peasants, urban poor or manacled 
prisoners. The labourers in Heart of Darkness 'moved about like ants' 
(1:63), some forced to dig 'a vast artificial hole' just so as to be given 
'something to do' (1:65), while others shuffled along as bearers in a 
monotonous routine of 'camp, cook, sleep, strike camp, march' (1:71). 
The Congolese were the victims of the supposed material progress 
professed by the Eldorado Exploring Expedition, which had less to do with 
exploration than with plundering -- plundering that had 'no more moral 
purpose at the back of it than there is in burglars breaking into a safe' 
(1:87). The main object of plunder was of course the acquisition of ivory, 
evidencing that obsession for 'having' which Marcel rails against in 
Being and Having (as at 164-5). An overweening desire for possession, 
Marcel contends, dehumanises the possessor, since in a 'having' mode of 
existence an individual becomes anxious about the object he has and it in 
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a sense begins to have him. Fear of losing the possession leads it to 
tyrannise over the possesser, making him its slave. Kurtz is a 
particularly graphic instance of the lengths to which men will go when in 
the grip of such an obsession for having: '"My Intended, my ivory, my 
station, my river, my----"' he intoned to Marlow. 'Everything belonged 
to him -- but that was a trifle. The thing was to know what he belonged 
to, how many powers of darkness claimed him for their own' (2:116). 
Such preoccupation with having is even more central in Nostromo, which 
remorselessly depicts the ravages of 'material interest' through the 
baleful effects of the San Tom~ mine and its silver. Critics have long 
pointed to this as a crucial theme in the novel, which, remarks Martin 
Seymour-Smith, 'is about nothing if it is not about "material interests"', 
revealing a hatred of technology and commerce that is 'very close to the 
heart of literary modernism 1 • 37 To the Europeans of Costaguana it was as if 
the mine were 'the symbol of the supreme importance of material interests' 
and of the wider belief in material progress (2:7:230), a belief Conrad 
repudiates, as Nino Ern~ and later critics have stressed. 38 
The mine had completely obsessed Charles Gould's father, whose letters 
to his son away in England for his schooling 'came at last to talk of 
practically nothing but the mine. He groaned over the injustice, the 
persecution, the outrage of that mine. 
••• claim any part of his inheritance 
• He implored his son never to 
• tainted by the infamous 
Concession' (1:6:79). Yet even though Charles was convinced that San Tome 
had killed his father, he resolved to "'pin my faith to material 
interests'" (1: 6: 100) -- despite Emilia Gould's scepticism at "'the 
religion of silver and iron'" (1:6:90). Gould himself momentarily sensed 
that 'the silver mine, which had killed his father, had decoyed him further 
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than he meant to go' (1:6:101), and Emilia later decried her husband's 
"'most awful materialism"' (1:6:99). 
As the novel proceeds, Gould's surrender to his possession becomes 
more and more pronounced, causing Decoud to remark to Antonia Avellanos: 
"'[He] thinks of nothing apart from his mine"' (2:5:179), so that Decoud 
considers it Emilia's '"mission ••• to save him from the effects of 
that cold and overmastering passion'" (2:7:219). Emilia 'had watched it 
with misgivings turning into a fetish, and now the fetish had grown into a 
monstrous and crushing weight' that formed 'a wall of silver-bricks 
between her and her husband' (2:6:204-5). 'Was it for this that her life 
had been robbed of all the intimate felicities of daily affection ••• ?' 
(3:11:423-4). She thought Charles 'incorrigible in his hard, determined 
service of the material interests to which he had pinned his faith' 
(3:11:431). Even though, unlike the purely 'avaricious, greedy, and 
unscrupulous' Madame de S---- in Under Western Eyes (2:4:179), he had sought 
to use San Tome for higher purposes, 'the mine had got hold of Charles 
Gould with a grip as deadly as ever it had laid upon his father' (3:6:338). 
As Marcel would clearly recognise, Gould (along with Holroyd, Montero, 
Sotillo and Hirsch) had become enslaved -- and dehumanised -- by a 'having' 
disposition, by his 'hard, determined service' to a 'crushing' 'fetish' 
that held him in a 'deadly' 'grip'. 
This was true also of Nostromo, whom the narrator in fact calls 'the 
slave of the San Tome silver [who] felt the weight as of chains upon his 
limbs' (3:12:445); the silver had in the Capataz de Cargadores 'a faithful 
and lifelong slave' (3:10:416). It had caused him to desert both old 
Teresa Viola on her sickbed and suicidal Decoud on the Great Isabel: 
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'first a woman, then a man, abandoned each in their last extremity, for the 
sake of this accursed treasure' (3:10:416). Yet even when his stolen 
silver threatened to jeopardise Giselle Viola's love for him, 'the shining 
spectre of the treasure rose before him, claiming his allegiance in a 
silence that could not be gainsaid' (3:12:438). It was enslavement even 
unto death: "'The silver has killed me. It has held me. It holds me 
yet"', he whispered in his final moments (3:13:460). 
Not surprisingly, the oppressive effects of material objects give man 
much occasion for pessimism and despair, which arise, says Kierkegaard in 
The Sickness unto Death (see 147ff.), from the disruptive polarity between 
necessity (embodied in the obdurate world) and possibility (embodied in 
human potential). Man's despair is a 'disproportion in his inmost being'. 
It is a difficult task to achieve one's possibilities in a 'concrete world' 
that Karl Barth characterises as 'ambiguous and under crisis' amid 'the 
insecurity of our whole existence, the vanity and utter questionableness of 
all that is and of what we are 1 • 39 As Pascal phrases it in his Pens~es 
(61:22), 'Man's condition' is one of 'inconstancy, boredom, anxiety' --
which Marlow witnessed only too graphically in the Congo, where 'black 
shapes crouched, lay, sat • in all the attitudes of pain, abandonment, 
and despair' (1:66). The very mangroves 'seemed to writhe at us in the 
extremity of an impotent despair' (1:62). Even the face of the omnipotent 
Kurtz betrayed 'an intense and hopeless despair' (3:149). The mysterious 
sound of the whistle on Marlow's boat elicited from his jungle attackers 
'such a tremulous and prolonged wail of mournful fear and utter despair as 
may be imagined to follow the flight of the last hope from the earth' 
(2:112). 
There is little wonder that in this Nietzschean world of 
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'multiplicity, opposition, contradiction, war' (Power 584:315) man does 
not feel 'at home', as R. D. Laing in The Divided Self 40 describes man's 
presiding sense of alienation in knowing that he is 'left alone', as Sartre 
says, to create his own values without 'any means of justification or 
excuse' (Humanism 34). 41 Critics like Alan Reynolds Thompson have long 
noted in broad terms that Conrad views man as feeling himself separate from 
the world he is physically part of, and we find the Marlow of Heart of 
Darkness characterising his party -- consisting of men with whom he 'had no 
point of contact' (1:61) -- as being alienated 'wanderers • on an 
earth that wore the aspect of an unknown planet', 'cut off from the 
comprehension of our surroundings' (2:95, 96). The rampant African jungle 
'made you feel very small, very lost' in its dwarfing power (2:95), just as 
did the Indonesian jungles of Almayer's Folly and An Outcast of the 
Islands. 
In Lord Jim Stein remarks that "'man is come where he is not wanted, 
where there is no place for him"' (20:159). Thus it is, comments Marlow, 
that 'we wander in our thousands over the face of the earth' (21:169), 
'amongst graves and pitfalls' (20:164), each of us in a condition of 
'exile', as old Giorgio Viola says of himself in Nostromo (1:4:60). Conrad 
himself was of course an exile, a Pole wandering in foreign lands -- though 
by choice, rather than subjected to forced exile as his imprisoned father 
had been. Zdzislaw Najder records a poem that Apollo Korzeniowski wrote on 
the occasion of Joseph's birth, 'To My Son Born in the 85th Year of 
Muscovite Oppression': 
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Baby son, tell yourself 
You are without land, without love, 
42 Without country, without people. 
Giorgio Viola, as a transplanted Italian, was doubly aware of his isolation, 
and his friend the Capataz -- who regularly experienced feelings of 
'profound isolation' (3:8:355) came to find even his own most familiar 
surroundings to be alienating: 'his home appeared to repel him with an air 
of hopeless and inimical mystery' (3:9:388). Dr Monygham too felt 
alienated. Socially, he had no fellowship with the other ~migres and 
adopted a 'manner of cold detachment from the rest of the Europeans' 
(3:3:294), the sort of detachment that led to Victory's Axel Heyst being 
'generally considered a "queer chap"' (2:3:86). Heyst thought himself 
"'uprooted'" (3: 5: 182); like Captain Morrison during his trip to London, 
he was "'as lonely as a crow in a strange country'" (1:3:33). Jones also 
deemed himself '"an outcast"', "'hounded out from society'" (4:11:303, 305) 
a condition of alienation shared by Razumov in Under Western Eyes, who 
was 'at home' neither in St Petersburg nor in Geneva. Razumov had no 
kinship with anyone until his love for Natalia, and even then he initially 
felt that 'the beauty of women and the friendship of men were not for him' 
(2:4:183). 'The frankness of intercourse with his kind' was 'forbidden to 
him' (4:1:288). In general, Conrad's characters are alienated circles of 
43 insularity, which Robert Wooster Stallman sees symbolised by Stevie's 
circular drawings in The Secret Agent. Like Sartre's Mathieu, they find 
themselves 'alone' in a 'monstrous silence' (Reason 320). 
* 
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This lonely sense of alienation from all that surrounds one is exacerbated 
by an awareness of one's precariousness in an indifferent universe. One is 
assaulted by a general apprehension of threat that promotes anxiety, or 
angst, understood by existentialists not as something that derives from any 
particular quotidian care but as a pervasive uneasiness or malaise of 
indeterminate origin. It is the 'vague terror of the world' experienced by 
Alma/Magdalen in Victory (2:2:78), the 'unnamed and despairing dread' felt 
by Razumov in Under Western Eyes (4:1:287). In Heidegger's words from 
Being and Time (231, 230), the source of anxiety 'is completely 
indefinite'; it is simply an intrinsic part of the basic condition one 
finds oneself in -- one's Grundbefindlichkeit. 'That in the face of which 
one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such'. Angst is thus not fear 
(Furcht) or dread of a specific, identifiable entity but a condition of 
general perturbation somewhat like the mood Coleridge evinces in 
'Dejection: An Ode'. It is not the fear which arises 'in the face of this 
or that particular being that threatens us in this or that particular 
respect', as Heidegger puts it in 'What Is Metaphysics?' (Basic Writings 
102). 'What is dread?' asks Kierkegaard in his Christian Discourses (80). 
'It is the next day', the unknown and thus uncertain future lurking in an 
'ambiguous' Barthian world of 'utter questionableness'. 
The professor of languages in Under Western Eyes articulates this in 
speaking of our 'secret fears' amid 'the dread of uncertain days', the 
'general dread' that filled the entire Russian populace (1:2:79, 72). 
Razumov's journal records 'a remarkably dream-like experience of anguish' 
following the Haldin episode (1:3:121), which filled him 'with a strange 
dread of the unexpected' (1:3:109), 'a suspicious uneasiness' allied to 
an 'absurd dread of the unseen' (1:2:80). 'Every alarming uncertainty 
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beset Razumov' (1:3:121). His general anxiety persisted in Geneva: 'in 
his incertitude of the ground on which he stood Razumov felt perturbed' 
(3:4:259). Natalia too was constantly '"anxious"', confiding to the 
professor that '"what I am afraid of is incertitude ••• of anything"' 
(2:1:137, 138). Tekla, Madame de S----'s dame de compagnie, was also always 
'anxious, tremulous' (3:2:223), displaying that same 'perpetual residue of 
anxiety' which Stevie suffered from in The Secret Agent (2:71). Even 
reckless Comrade Ossipon was prey to an 'abiding dread' (12:260), which was 
true as well of Brown's 'knot of bearded, anxious, sleepless desperadoes' 
in Lord Jim (39:275); the outwardly robust are by no means strangers to 
anxiety. 
Jim himself may initially have struck Marlow as 'unconcerned', 
exhibiting a 'blessed stiffness before the outward and inward terrors' of 
the Patna affair (5:36, 38). Yet Jim soon confided that his state was 
"'hell'", and Marlow detected that his eyes were 'full of pain, with a 
bewildered, startled, suffering face' (7:64, 68); later, 'convulsive 
shudders ran down his back' (15:132). In Jewel, 'every pretty smile was 
succeeded swiftly by a look of silent, repressed anxiety, as if put to 
flight by the recollection of some abiding danger' (29:213). 'She feared 
the unknown as we all do', comments Marlow, who himself 'felt ••• the 
dread of the unknown depths' even as he urged her not to indulge her 
'craving for incertitude, this clinging to fear' (33:233, 235, 236). 'Why 
should she fear? She knew [Jim] to be strong, true, wise, brave' (33:240). 
There was no 'determinate' reason for her anxiety. It sprang simply, as 
Heidegger would contend, from her condition of being-in-the-world. 
The same was true of Giselle Viola in her love for Nostromo. 'She was 
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full of inexplicable fear ••• -- fear of everything and everybody except 
of her Giovanni and his treasure' (3:12:447), that treasure which 'confused 
his thoughts with a peculiar sort of anxiety' (3:8:356). Captain Mitchell 
too experienced 'uneasiness ••• about things in general' (3:3:299), 
despite the promise of liberation made by Sotillo, who himself later felt 
an 'unfathomable dread that crept on all sides upon him' (3:9:373). His 
equally reckless counterpart Pedrito Montero suffered from a similar 
'feeling of insecurity and impermanence' as he roamed the sacked 
Intendencia of Sulaco (3:7:341). Even the stalwart Charles Gould 'fell a 
prey to distress, incertitude, and fear' when courting the young Emilia 
(1:6:84), whose unhappy marriage left her face 'blanched with anxiety and 
fatigue' (2:8:243). Mrs Schomberg's marriage in Victory generated in her 
too an abiding 'motiveless fear' (2:5:98) -- that pervasive angst which 
the French lieutenant in Lord Jim describes as a fear that '''is always 
there"' (13:113). 
As we noted earlier, existentialists view anxiety as a valuable 
indicator of an individual's need to modify the circumstances he finds 
himself in. It is also especially revealing about the human condition in 
general, a manifestation of man's sense of radical insecurity over his 
precarious and contingent existence. To Heidegger, anxiety offers 'one of 
the most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure' 
about man and his position in the world (Time 226). As Desan 
· d' 44 S h ' f h in 1cates, artre sees t e origin o anguis in the feeling of a being 
which is not responsible for its origin or the origin of the world but 
which, because of its dreadful freedom to choose one form of action over 
another, is responsible for what it makes of its existence and for the 
structuring of what Heidegger terms its 'field of concern'. 
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Since anxiety signals to the individual that he needs to change his 
mode of existence, it is a valuable stimulant to actualising his potential 
for a fuller life. 'Anxiety', says Heidegger, 'brings Dasein face to face 
with its being-free for (propensio in ••• ) the authenticity of its 
Being' (Time 232). Anxiety 'makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its 
ownmost potentiality-for-being -- that is, its Being-free for the freedom 
f h lf ' Ad . . 
45 h" . 1 h o c cosing itse • n, as Macquarrie points out, tis invo vest e 
forward thrust of the existent into his possibilities in tension with the 
factical conditions and limitations that he already brings with him -- to 
which is added what Heidegger terms his 'falling', the existent's 'fleeing' 
from himself by losing himself in inauthentic being-with-others through 
preoccupied busyness with the world of things in his obsession with 
'having' (Time 229). 
Although the tension between what one is at any single moment and one's 
sense of what one might be in the future produces anxiety, it is an anxiety 
that is capable of jolting us out of our illusions and pseudo-securities, 
summoning us to grasp our responsibility for achieving our own authentic 
selfhood. In consequence, Heidegger insists that we should have 'courage 
for anxiety', or Mut zur Angst (Time 298). Anxiety prepares the individual 
for authentic action since, as Kierkegaard writes in The Concept of Dread 
(142), 'it enters into his soul and searches it thoroughly, constraining out 
of him all the finite and the petty, and leading him hence whither he would 
go' in the 'dizziness' or 'vertigo' of his freedom. 'Dread becomes a 
serviceable spirit'. Such anxiety is 'the more exalted dread' that Jaspers 
speaks of in Man in the Modern Age (63), which controls the kind of dread in 
which 'the sufferer may feel himself to be nothing more than a lost point in 
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empty space'. 
It was this inferior, destructive form of dread that undid Nostromo's 
Decoud in his solitude on the Great Isabel, what Dr Monygham describes as 
the 'crushing, paralyzing sense of human littleness, which is what really 
defeats a man struggling with natural forces' (3:8:363). Jim on the other 
hand ultimately transcended the vapid malaise of his early merchant marine 
days that he had found 'strangely barren', full of 'prosaic severity' 
(2:14). Like Sartre's Roquentin in Nausea, Jim as a trainee seaman 
experienced what Heidegger in 'What Is Metaphysics?' considers to be 
'genuine boredom', a pervasive condition 'in the abysses of our existence' 
which is more than simply being bored with 'this book or that play, that 
business or this idleness' (Basic Writings 101). Such boredom is a 
disclosure of the self's nothingness before the individual strives to 
realise his own image of what he wishes to become (as we shall see more 
fully in chapter 2). Sartre identifies it as 'nausea', that 'insipid 
taste which I cannot place. A dull and inescapable nausea 
perpetually reveals my body to my consciousness' (Nothingness 338). And 
'how terrible tedium is -- ', remarks Kierkegaard in Either/Or (1:29-30), 
'terribly tedious. • I lie stretched out, inactive; the only thing I 
see is emptiness'. Thus Jim, 'disabled by a falling spar', lay 'stretched 
on his back, • hopeless, and tormented as if at the bottom of an abyss 
of unrest. He did not care what the end would be' (2:14, 15). 
But this malaise and the deeper anxiety that later accompanied the 
Patna episode eventually stirred in him an 'impalpable striving' to achieve 
a more authentic mode of existence (17:140). As Kierkegaard mentions in 
his Concluding Unscientific Postscript (85), our 'existence' is 'a 
constant striving' against the forces that would subject us to inauthentic 
54 
lives. So it was that Marlow's final glimpse of Jim was one of him at last 
in complete accord with his surroundings -- with the life of the forests 
and with the life of men' (16:135). 
Jim is thus testimony to Conrad's existential belief that, prompted by 
anxiety, man is capable of transcending what is inherently a tragic world 
of crushing external constraints -- a world he famously describes in a 
letter of 20 December 1897 to Cunninghame Graham as a huge knitting machine 
that 'has evolved itself ••• out of a chaos of scraps of iron •••• You 
cannot by any special lubrication make embroidery with a knitting machine. 
And the most withering thought is that the infamous thing has made itself: 
made itself without thought, without conscience, without foresight, without 
eyes, without heart. It is a tragic accident • and it is indestructible! 
'It knits us in and it knits us out. It has knitted time, space, 
pain, death, corruption, despair, and all the illusions, -- and nothing 
matters' (Letters 1:425). This is an excessively dark view that suggests 
less possibility of transcendence than Conrad's major novels cumulatively 
imply. But private voicings in letters tend to be more susceptible to 
moods of the moment, or to the personality of the person one is writing to, 
than are the considered views intended for public consumption. As we have 
seen in the case of Jim, and as we shall see further in just a moment, the 
predominantly bleak world of Conrad's fiction, like that in the works of 
the major existentialists, does not preclude a sense (however impermanent 
it may be) of individual self-fulfilment in the face of awesome odds. An 
individual can experience private value in a world where from an absolute 
point of view 'nothing matters', as Conrad's knitting-machine letter puts 
it -- a world that the Nietzsche of The Will to Power (12:12) also says 
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'aims at nothing'. The only way to overcome despair, Nietzsche asserts, is 
through an all-embracing Dionysian yea to existence, 'an ecstatic 
affirmation of the total character of life ••• that sanctifies ••• even 
the most terrible and questionable qualities of life' (1050:539). As Stein 
phrases it in Lord Jim, "'To the destructive element submit yourself, and 
with the exertions of your hands and feet in the water make the deep, deep 
sea keep you up"' (20:163). 
But if the sea represents what an early critic like Thomas Moult 
called 'the given set of circumstances' in which man exists, 46 it is often 
a stormy sea, so that in Macquarrie's estimation 'the tragic side of 
existentialism is already implied in its starting-point where human 
existence is set over against the being of the inanimate world •••• Man 
is never just part of the cosmos but always stands to it in a relationship 
of tension with possibilities for tragic conflict'. 47 John Wild points 
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out that Jaspers emphasises how suffering (Leiden) dominates many 
situations and threatens others, taking many forms that can never be 
altogether ignored: pain, illness, mental disease, old age and its 
weariness, torture, enslavement, hunger, starvation. There is ever the 
possibility for a shrinking of life; no one is wholly spared suffering, 
behind which lies death. As Heidegger observes in Being and Time (277, 
180), 'being-there' entails 'being towards death', and fear 'discloses' 
Dasein as 'endangered and abandoned'. 
The harsh worlds of Conrad's major novels bear remorseless testimony 
to this. The narrator of Nostromo describes the people of Costaguana's 
interior as 'suffering and mute, waiting for the future in a pathetic 
immobility of patience' (1:7:102). Like the fishermen Marlow remarks on in 
Lord Jim (35:253), they led 'trifling, miserable, oppressed lives'. To 
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Emilia Gould the 'flat, joyless faces' of the miners 'looked all alike, as 
if run into the same ancestral mould of suffering and patience' (1:8:112). 
As her husband looked at a group of wounded men on the patio of the Casa 
Gould, 'the cruel futility of things stood unveiled in the levity and 
sufferings of that incorrigible people; the cruel futility of lives and of 
deaths thrown away' (3:4:310). His mine was tied to the 'misery of 
mankind' (3:4:111). 'Worked in the early days mostly by means of lashes on 
the backs of slaves, its yield had been paid for in its own weight of human 
bones' (1:6:75). It contributed to what Monygham calls 'the general 
atrocity of things' (3:8:368). 
The narrator of The Secret Agent too speaks of 'poor humanity rich in 
suffering' and describes even Ossipon as having 'the face of a man who had 
drunk at the very Fountain of Sorrow' while he waited for Winnie outside a 
bar (12:260, 258). Conrad's prefatory note to the novel comments that his 
'tale' points to the 'criminal futility' of anarchistic activities which 
exploit 'the poignant miseries and passionate credulities of a mankind 
always so tragically eager for self-destruction' (note:39). The cabman 
who drove Winnie, Stevie and their mother to the Charity spoke to Stevie 
of 'the affairs of men whose sufferings are great', and his horse seemed 
the 'steed of apocalyptic misery' (8:165). When they later saw his cab 
again, 'its aspect was so profoundly lamentable, with such a perfection of 
grotesque misery and weirdness of macabre detail, as if it were the Cab of 
Death itself' (8:167). And death, as Sartre says, is but one more 
absurdity in a world without any absolute meaning. 'It is absurd that we 
are born; it is absurd that we die' (Nothingness 547). 
* 
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Although death may be absurd from an absolute point of view, no man ever 
experiences anything in an absolute sense. His experience of the world, as 
we have seen, is always coloured by his subjectivity. In consequence, 
Heidegger feels that it is possible for an individual to adopt a personal 
attitude towards death which casts it in a positive light. This is not to 
deny, as he points out in Being and Time (cf. 279-311), the appalling fact 
that death may at any time cut short one's individual being and convert it 
into nothing. Death is always present as an absolutely certain 
possibility, 'the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all' 
(307). As Marlow comments of the buccaneer types Jim used to encounter, 
'their death was the only event of their fantastic existence that seemed to 
have a reasonable certitude of achievement' (2:16). The constant certitude 
of inevitable death naturally heightens man's sense of his own 
precariousness. 'A being is fragile', says Sartre, 'if it carries in its 
being a definite possibility of non-being' (Nothingness 8). But Heidegger 
counsels that we ought not to brood morbidly on death. Instead, we should 
include it realistically among our life's projects and the way we evaluate 
them. We should embrace 'an impassioned freedom towards death a freedom 
which has been released from the Illusions of the "they", and which is 
factical, certain of itself, and anxious' (Time 311). 
There is something of this sentiment in Conrad too. We find Jim 
swearing to Marlow 'in a voice very fierce and low' that during the Patna 
incident 'he was not afraid of death' (7:70, 71). 'A certain readiness to 
perish is not so very rare', comments Marlow, 'but it is seldom that you 
meet men whose souls, steeled in the impenetrable armour of resolution, 
are ready to fight a losing battle to the last' (7:71). The novel ends 
with Marlow relating that Stein 'says often that he is "preparing to leave 
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all this; preparing to leave ••• "while he waves his hand sadly at his 
butterflies' (45:312). Nostromo's Dr Monygham 'had no sort of heroic idea 
of seeking death', but 'the risk, deadly enough, to which he exposed 
himself, had a sustaining and comforting effect' (3:8:368). And the 
Capata% seemed unperturbed by his realisation that Hirsch's execution in 
all likelihood foreshadowed his own: '"You seem much concerned at a very 
natural thing • • • "', he remarked to Monygham. '"It is very likely that 
before long we shall all get shot one after another"' (3:9:378). 
To Heidegger, as Macquarrie observes, 49 such acceptance of death as 
part of a factical condition in the world enables us to think of our 
existence as a finite whole. 'Anticipation' of 'the fact that death is not 
to be outstripped includes the possibility of taking the whole of 
Dasein in advance in an existentiell manner; that is to say, it includes the 
possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-for-Being' (Time 309). 
Acceptance of death makes possible a unity of existence, setting one free 
from the 'they', whose 'everyday falling evasion in the face of death is 
inauthentic Being-towards-death' (Time 303). The 'moment before death' 
allows a kind of eternity within time, when one's past, present and future 
are gathered into the unity of the resolute self. By accepting death we 
gain 'freedom towards death' (Time 311) -- as Nietzsche's Zarathustra 
concurs: 'My death, praise I unto you, the voluntary death, which cometh 
unto me because_!_ want it' (21:75). In Twilight of the Idols (144) 
Nietzsche advocates that 'out of love for life we should want death. 
free, conscious, without hazard, without sudden attack'. 
In Conrad this affirmative attitude towards death finds its most 
sustained evocation in Victory's Lena, for whom death is something freely 
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chosen and thereby 'vanquished' (4:13:323). With her life ebbing away, she 
'clung to her triumph convinced of the reality of her victory over death' 
(4:13:324). Although her conviction may ultimately have been just another 
illusion, it did free her from an oppressive view of death and provided her 
with a sense of exaltation. In such cases, as Leonard Unger has 
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remarked, the essential quality of the moment of death is also the 
essential quality of the individual in all his living. It often takes the 
moment of self-destruction for one to realise one's own worth -- as happens 
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with Camus's Meursault in The Outsider when facing his own execution. 
There is a far less positive dimension to the kind of freedom for 
death adopted by the nihilistic Professor in The Secret Agent, ready as he 
was to obliterate himself at any moment with his india-rubber explosive 
device. In his case death, though self-inflicted, would ultimately be 
dictated by external compulsion, with an absurd universe having the final 
say -- as in Winnie Verloc's suicide and Decoud's suicide in Nostromo. 
Death, comments Marlow in Heart of Darkness, is 'the last word of our 
common fate' (3:155), and it seldom carries Lena's extreme sense of 
exaltation. 'I have wrestled with death', says Marlow. 'It is the most 
unexciting contest you can imagine. It takes place in an impalpable 
grayness, in a sickly atmosphere of tepid scepticism, without much 
belief in your own right' (3:150). It is this flavour of death that is 
most evident in Conrad, who on balance shares Sartre's view that death has 
no truly positive role in establishing an authentic existence. 'We must 
conclude in opposition to Heidegger', writes Sartre, 'that death, far from 
being my peculiar possibility, is a contingent fact which, as such on 
principle escapes me and originally belongs to my facticity •••• Death is 
a pure fact as is birth; it comes to us from outside and it transforms us 
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into the outside' (Nothingness 545). 
In Conrad, death seldom offers anything more positive than the prospect 
of what Marlow in Lord Jim calls the 'relief' (10:90) of 'blessed finality' 
that 'makes the idea of death supportable': 'End! Finis! the potent word 
that exorcises from the house of life the haunting shadow of fate' (16:136). 
Given Jim's torment over the Patna affair, 'to bury him would have been such 
an easy kindness' (15:134). Although Brown was 'not afraid of death', this 
was merely because 'he was tired of his life' (38:267) -- like Kurtz, 
'"lying here in the dark waiting for death"' (3:149), or Decoud 
contemplating his death 'with pleasure, because he dreaded the sleepless 
nights' (3:10:414). Razumov, tormented by his Genevan existence, felt that 
'luckily life does not last for ever' (3:4:262); torture, remarks the 
professor of languages, can be worse than 'mere death' (l:prologue:57). 
Even if death may have the virtue of ending pain, Conrad's view of it 
is ultimately at one with Sartre's assessment of it as absurd, as 
meaningless nullity. Marlow relates how Jim experienced the stormy sea as 
arbitrarily threatening him with non-being, poised 'to sweep the whole 
precious world utterly away from his sight by the simple and appalling act 
of taking his life' (2:14). And in Heart of Darkness Marlow stresses that 
such potential nullification is ever present; he looks on the Congo's 
rivers as 'streams of death in life' (1:62) and imagines that a Roman in 
ancient England would also have found 'death skulking in the air, in the 
water, in the bush' (1:49). Even Lena felt in the forest surrounding her 
'the nearness of death breathing on her and on the man with her' 
(4:8:284). Decoud experienced the darkness enveloping the lighter as 
'part of a living world since, pervading it, failure and death could be 
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felt at your elbow' ( 2: 8: 247). '"Death"', Monygham observed to Nostromo, 
"'stands near behind us all'" (3:8:361) -- our fear of which is 
graphically embodied by Wait in The Nigger of the "Narcissus". Like 
Ransome in The Shadow-Line, who is constantly aware of his impending 
extinction, the narrator of The Secret Agent recognises that death is 'the 
companion of life' (12:255). But though death may be 'commonplace' 
(12:258), its 'catastrophic character cannot be argued away by 
sophisticated reasoning or persuasive eloquence' (11:210), as Verloc 
discovered when trying to mollify Winnie after Stevie had perished in the 
Greenwich explosion, the victim of what the narrator in Victory calls the 
'savage, sudden, irresponsible' aspect of death (4:12:315). 
This chance suddenness of death is especially absurd when visited upon 
the young, as Conrad reveals in Mrs Haldin's incomprehension at her son's 
execution in Under Western Eyes. 'The inconceivable that staggered her mind 
was nothing but the cruel audacity of Death passing over her head to strike 
at that young and precious heart' (2:1:143). 'Death is a remorseless 
spoliator', comments the professor of languages (2:1:140), and there is no 
reversing the sheer finality of the destruction it wreaks. Winnie Verloc 
fully perceived this finality and its utter nullity: the dead 'are as 
nothing' (12:237). She found no solace in the thought of extinction; 
rather, 'the fear of death paralyzed her efforts to escape the gallows' 
(12:239). 
Yet we do see in Winnie what Camus in The Rebel (100) regards as man's 
'prolonged protest against death', his 'metaphysical rebellion' at the 
world's absurdity. Winnie was 'full of revolt against death'; 'all her 
strong vitality recoiled from the idea of death' (12:243, 241). In her case 
rebellion of course came to nought, ending in suicide amid 'madness and 
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despair' (13:266). But Conrad at least testifies to the vigour of her 
protest, and elsewhere upholds the existentialist conviction that man is not 
utterly hopeless in the face of the world's assaults. Even though he may 
share Heidegger's and Sartre's belief that, as Marcel disapprovingly puts it 
in Philosophy of Existence (76), man is the 'victim of some cosmic 
catastrophe, flung into an alien universe to which he is bound by nothing', 
Sartre nevertheless insists that man has the potential to surmount the 
obstacles that assail him. This potential springs not from circumambient 
being but from within the individual himself: man 'is himself the heart and 
centre of his transcendence' (Humanism 55). As Emilia Gould remarks to 
Charles of Don Jos~ in Nostromo, '"He has suffered -- and yet he hopes"', 
even though Charles's father had felt that God did not let a single 'ray of 
hope fall through a rift in the appalling darkness of intrigue, bloodshed, 
and crime that hung over the Queen of Continents' (1:6:99-100). 
Embracing hope is naturally not easy in a Jaspersian world where men 
struggle and are in conflict, where there is always some forceful domination 
among them that denies complete agreement. Even that rare phenomenon, 
existential communication (which chapter 4 will consider further) in a sense 
takes the form of what Jaspers calls 'loving struggle' (Philosophy 2:59-60). 
Indeed, Nietzsche considers conflict to be at the root of all existence: 
'all events, all motion, all becoming' are 'a determination of degrees and 
relations of force ••• a struggle' (Power 522:299). 
Life in Costaguana, comments the narrator of Nostromo, was a 'struggle 
of lust between bands of absurd devils' (1:7:103), resulting in a picture 
of what Jocelyn Baines famously termed a 'monument to futility 1 , 52 what 
Conrad himself speaks of in a 1908 letter to John Galsworthy as 'the utter 
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futility of existence' (Jean-Aubry Letters 2:78). The world of The Secret 
Agent too is one of 'vain effort', in which the 'pieces of silver' paid to 
the cabman who drove Winnie, Stevie and their mother, 'appearing very 
minute in his big, grimy palm, symbolized the insignificant results which 
reward the ambitious courage and toil of a mankind whose day is short on 
this earth of evil' (8:156, 164). When in Under Western Eyes Razumov awoke 
after Haldin's confession, the burnt-out lamp on his desk stood as an 
'extinguished beacon of his labours ••• amongst the scattered pages of 
his notes and small piles of books -- a mere litter of blackened paper --
dead matter -- without significance or interest' (1:3:106). 
Yet despite such futility there is something tragically heroic in 
man's labours, which the Marlow of Lord Jim sees epitomised by the ocean. 
Recounting his arrival in Patusan, he remarks on 'the sea with its 
labouring waves for ever rising, sinking, and vanishing to rise again 
the very image of struggling mankind' (24:185). Though he may 'sink', man 
has the potential to 'rise again'. And since he himself is the source of 
his transcendence, it is incumbent on him to develop a frame of mind that 
passes beyond nihilism. 53 As John Cowper Powys has remarked, even if 
Conrad finds only meaningless, purposeless chance at the heart of things, 
he does glory (with Camus) in man's courageous resistance. As we recall 
Dr Monygham thinking in Nostromo, 'the most dangerous element' men have in 
common is 'the crushing, paralysing sense of human littleness, which is 
what really defeats a man struggling with natural forces' (3:8:363) --
like Jim's 'overwhelming sense of his helplessness' during the Patna m~lee 
(7:69). Man may indeed be, like Jim to the departing Marlow in Patusan, 
'a tiny white speck' (35:253) upon a beach in a world that is itself just 
'a restless mote of dust' against the sun's 'concentrated glare' (32:230). 
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But man does have within himself the potential to invent a sense of his 
own self as valuable to himself. As W. Y. Tindall has mentioned, 54 
Marlow implicitly suggests that however meaningless and hopeless things 
may be, we must fashion our own saving values to temper defeat. Nostromo 
avoided being defeated as Decoud was because of his sheer vitality; he 
'was possessed too strongly by the sense of his own existence' (3:12:434). 
Mankind's struggles are regarded as 'noble' by Marlow, who in Lord 
Jim asserts that amid 'tragic or grotesque miseries • the human heart 
is vast enough to contain all the world. It is valiant enough to bear the 
burden' (34:243). The 'terrors' of 'the Dark Powers', though 'always on 
the verge of triumph, are perpetually foiled by the steadfastness of men' 
(10:96). Jim, just short of so-called heroic height -- 'an inch, perhaps 
two, under six feet' (1:9) -- ultimately achieved 'an extraordinary 
success' in the face of the odds against him, and his dying glance was 
'proud and unflinching' (45:313). Even in an early storm at sea he had 
felt that 'he could affront greater perils' (1:13). Indeed, Raoul Cadot 
(rather too moralistically) sees Conrad employing the sea as a means to 
strengthening man's mettle. 55 Jim, comments Marlow, had the assertion of 
youth, 'and all assertion in this world of doubts is a defiance' (23:180). 
56 Thus, as J. Hillis Miller has observed, although Conrad evokes a 
nihilistic world, he offers a way beyond it. Even Kurtz's final whispered 
cry was 'an affirmation', with 'a vibrating note of revolt' amid 
perception of nothingness (3:151), and behind Winnie Verloc's 'white mask 
of despair there was struggling against terror and despair a vigour of 
vitality, a love of life that could resist the furious anguish which 
drives to murder' (13:267). 
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57 As C. N. Stavrou has remarked, Conrad shares Camus's assessment of 
man's capacity for triumph (however short-lived) over an absurd 
universe through his qualities of compassion, fidelity and courage 
attributes we shall explore further in the chapters ahead. Both Conrad and 
Camus may often begin with the isolation of the individual in a pessimistic 
and nihilistic world, but they advance to a position that expresses their 
faith in man as the successful arbiter of his destiny. Man's battle with 
58 indifferent forces leads, as Maurice David suggests, to the positive 
creation of man's individual morality in an amoral world. Though from an 
absolute perspective life may indeed be a tale signifying nothing, each 
individual has the potential to infuse his singular existence with his own 
private justifications for personal being. 
Hence Camus argues that we should search for ways that lead us beyond 
absurdity, just as Nietzsche looks beyond nihilism to put something new and 
purposeful in the place of mass conventions and standards by a 
transvaluation of all values. One is stronger, he says, for having looked 
into the abyss of nihilism through radical questioning that leads to 
transcendence. This provides a vibrancy that overcomes the dulness of 
nausea and despair, the vanquishing of which permits authenticity. As 
Sartre's Orestes says in The Flies, human life in a full sense begins once 
we pass beyond despair. And the potential for such transcendence is always 
present, since (as we remember Sartre insisting) man himself is the source 
of transcendence. Although H. L. Mencken 59 took the view that Conrad's 
heroes do not conquer fate, the Marlow of Lord Jim would disagree: Jim and 
Jewel may have led 'benighted lives', but 'they had mastered their fates. 
They were tragic' (33:238). 
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2 The Quest for Selfhood 
Man, says Kierkegaard in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript (84), is 
constantly 'in process of becoming', a notion Conrad gives a local 
habitation and a name to in a remarkable number of his fictional personages. 
The tormented Razumov in Under Western Eyes, for example, is clearly aware 
of such flux: "'A man goes out of a room for a walk. Nothing more trivial 
in appearance. And yet it may be momentous. He comes back -- he has seen 
perhaps a drunken brute, taken particular notice of the snow on the ground 
and behold he is no longer the same man'" (1 2:99). To Kierkegaard and 
Conrad, no man is a fixed entity with an immutable nature -- as one sees not 
only in Razumov but also in Jim and his attempts through the torments of 
conscience to gain what existentialists would term authentic existence. 
One sees it in the inauthentic being of the major figures in ~ostromo, 
enslaved to 'material interest', and of those in The Secret Agent, alienated 
by the functionalism of an urban desert; in the self-assertion of Victory's 
Heyst and Lena through their battle with external forces; and in Kurtz's 
radical self-discovery that leads to his perception of his own nothingness. 
In sweeping terms, an individual's existential 'process of becoming' 
should entail a passage towards authentic personal being, a quest for true 
selfhood, through his freedom for responsible choice (however oppressive the 
forces against him) and through his decisions and actions, hedged about by 
the dictates of conscience -- all of which occur within the wider world 
informed by being, which we recall Heidegger characterising as something 
indefinable that we can have no mental picture of, a pervasive presence that 
man as an existent is open to. We recall as well that Sartre divides being 
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into two fundamental forms: being-Jn-itself (en-soi) and being-for-itself 
(pour-soi). Being-in-itself is non-conscious, material being, whereas 
being-for-itself, applicable to man> emerges subsequently by separating 
1 itself from sheer being-in-itself through its freedom to choose itself. 
So it is that Sartre in Existentialism and Humanism (28) views 
existence as preceding essence. 'What do we mean by saying that existence 
precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, 
surges up in the world -- and defines himself afterwards. If man as the 
existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is 
nothing •• Man simply is'. In this instance the word existence is 
understood as a form of being that pertains solely to man. Heidegger's 
'Letter on Humanism' asserts that 'only man is admitted to the destiny of 
ek-sistence' (Basic Writings 204). A stone or plant or animal~. but it 
does not exist. Though to say that man alone exists does not of course mean 
that only man really is and that all other things are unreal or simply ideas 
of man. 
Pursuing the relationship of essence and existence for a moment longer 
before turning to Conrad, we find that in an even more rarefied sense 
existence applies to man only once he consciously attempts to distinguish 
himself from the masses and strives to realise his essence, or selfhood. 
Only then can he truly be said to exist. As Heidegger remarks in his 
'Letter on Humanism', 'Ek-sistence means standing out into the truth of 
Being. Existentia means in contrast actualitas, actuality as opposed to 
mere possiblity as Idea' (Basic Writings 206-7). Tillich emphasises how the 
Latin root exsistere contains the notion of such standing out, or 
emerging, 2 so that in Sartrean terms man's for-itself ~merges from brute 
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in-itself, achieving ecstasis. 
In consequence, as Heidegger puts it in Being and T~me (42, 32-3), '~he 
essence of Dasein lies in its existence' ('das "Wesen" des Daseins liegt in 
seiner Existenz'). Existenz is 'that kind of Being towards which Dasein 
can comport itself • in terms of a possibility of itself'. And 
essence is not open to discovery by 'objective' means; scientific 
understanding of the body will not yield knowledge of an individual's 
essence. As Japsers phrases it in Philosophy (2:32, 3), 'I am. what 
I find in myself', passing beyond a view of myself as just a mass of 
particular facts and deciding subjectively who I am. 'The possibility of 
Existenz is what I live by; it is only in its realization that I am myself'. 
For Sartre, man as sheer being-in-itself pre-exists any awareness he 
has of his possibilities. Only subsequently does he choose his essence, 
create his own desired image of himself. He has no permanent nature -- he 
is a becoming. Which brings us back to Kierkegaard, who states in The 
Sickness unto Death (163) that 'a self, every instant it exists, is in 
process of becoming, for the self is only that which it is to become'. 
Conrad agrees, but laments privately in a letter of 23 and 24 March 1896 to 
his editor Edward Garnett, 'If we are "ever becoming -- never being" then I 
would be a fool if I tried to become this thing rather than that; for I know 
well that I never will be anything' (~etters 1:268). As Sartre concurs in 
the final sentence of Being and Nothingness (615), 'Man is a useless 
passion'. 
Yet both Conrad and Sartre suggest that even if man fails in his 
attempts at authentic being, the very struggle to attain it lends intensity 
to an otherwise bland and inauthentic existence. We recall that for 
Kierkegaard existence is a 'constant striving' to realise one's essence 
69 
(Postscript 85), which, say Marcel and Sartre, means transcending the self 
one is at any particular point. This notion is also much stressed in On the 
Genealogy of Morals (3:27:161) by Nietzsche, who sees 'the necessity of 
''self-overcoming [SelbstUberwindung]" in the nature of life' as we strive to 
attain a 'higher self'. In George Allen Morgan's elaboration, we live 
through 'a series of temporary "selves". Finding oneself means 
attaining one's own standard of good and evil, a personal "legislator" 
derived from the ideal self'. 3 Hence Marcel's description of man as homo 
viator, perpetually travelling on the road to new selves. The narrator of 
An Outcast of the Islands (3:4:196) has this to say of 'the man of purpose': 
'Travelling on, he achieves great length without any breadth, and 
battered, besmirched, and weary, he touches the goal at last; he grasps the 
reward of his perseverance, of his virtue, of his healthy optimism'. The 
striving is all. 
Self-transcendence usually involves both inner strife and conflict with 
the world, and Sartre feels that one is never able fully to become oneself 
because one's being, stretching out beyond itself at any given moment, 
exceeds itself. One can never possess one's being in the way one possesses 
a thing, as William Barrett comments. 4 And the realisation that one's 
present self is never complete produces a sense of unease and anxiety, which 
should be used as a spur to the attainment of fuller selfhood. 
Conrad's earliest sustained depiction of this struggle for authentic 
selfhood is Lord Jim, which serves well as an expository model of how 
existential perspectives emerge in his work as a whole. With it, as Piero 
Rebora has commented, Conrad anticipated a century of literature that 
h . h . . 5 emp asises t e interior man. Until Jim embraced the cause of Patusan as 
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his own, he was a frightened slave to what Kierkegaard in The Point of View 
(see 112ff.) calls the 'untruth' of 'the crowd', his life a surrender to 
his delusive daydreams in what Sartre would term a flight in bad faith from 
his past and himself. 
To the existentialist, of course, no man's self can ever be wholly 
apparent to an outsider, and Conrad accordingly filters our view of Jim 
through the limited individual perspective of Marlow, who like any man (as 
Sartre says) 'cannot pass beyond human subjectivity' (Humanism 29). 
Although Marlow acknowledges that he was 'fated never to see [Jim] clearly' 
(23:184), Conrad never casts serious doubt on Marlow's presentation of Jim 
as a 'real life' figure within the fictional world of the novel. Whenever 
Marlow is uncertain about the accuracy of his view, this is clearly 
indicated. But whatever the limitations of this view, Jim as Marlow 
constructs him is delineated in a thoroughly existential way. 
In Marlow's depiction of him, there was little in Jim's appearance to 
suggest his capacity for the struggle that repeated self-transcendence 
entails. 'He was outwardly so typical of that good, stupid kind ••• that 
is not disturbed by the vagaries of intelligence and the perversions of --
of nerves, let us say' (5:39). Jim after all hailed 'from a parsonage 
of piety and peace', raised by a father who 'possessed such certain 
knowledge of the Unknowable as made for the righteousness of people in 
cottages without disturbing the ease of mind of those whom an unerring 
Providence enables to live in mansions' (1:10). Not for Jim's paternal 
household the Kurtzian glimpses into the heart of darkness. 
But though Jim did not get as profound a glimpse of things as Kurtz 
did, he none the less came to a penetrating recognition of his own deepest 
imperatives, which were so at variance with the outside world's. Yet he 
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might easily have remained in his parsonage milieu, with what Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra (73:3:321) would call its 'herd ideals' and 'petty virtues', had 
he not had four brothers also contending for 'the living [that] had belonged 
to the family for generations' (1:10-11), thus prompting his decision to 
train for the mercantile marine -- which brought him boredom rather than any 
sense of a full existence. 'He went to sea, and entering the regions so 
well known to his imagination, found them strangely barren •• He knew 
the magic monotony of existence between sky and water ••• , the prosaic 
severity of the daily task' (2:14). In finding his life to be one of sheer 
automatism, Jim as he is shown to us clearly illustrates Jaspers's claim in 
Man in the Modern Age (50) that 'in becoming a mere function, life forfeits 
its historical particularity, to the extreme of a levelling of the various 
ages of life'. 
Jim was trapped in what existentialists would quickly recognise as 
inauthentic being. To exist as a self, they argue, is either to stand in 
the possibility of becoming at one with oneself, of fulfilling oneself (even 
by giving up oneself), or to be divided in oneself. These two possibilities 
are to exist 'authentically' or 'inauthentically', the former marked by the 
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self-perpetrating quality inherent in the Greek roots ~u~,Vit)S 
' , (authentes), the actual perpetrator of a deed, and ~VTOS(autos), one who 
does things for himself. Achieving authentic being, or selfhood, is 
a difficult -- even tragic -- process, since one must constantly fight both 
against one's own inner resistances and against the masses, whose levelling 
influence destroys the singularity and qualitative difference of the self. 
'To battle against princes and popes ••• ', we recall Kierkegaard saying, 
'is easy compared with struggling against the masses, the tyranny of 
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equality' (Journals 502). 
To exist is to be faced with the choice of gaining existence in the 
fuller sense or letting true selfhood slip away. Allowing oneself to be 
dominated unduly by external forces rather than fostering what one considers 
best for one's own individual self leads to what we might call a 'false' 
existence. As Macquarrie puts it, 'Existence is authentic to the extent 
that the existent has taken possession of himself and, shall we say, has 
moulded himself in his own image. Inauthentic existence, on the other hand, 
is moulded by external influences, whether these be circumstances, moral 
codes, political or ecclesiastical authorities, or whatever 1 • 6 
Such external forces pressure man into social conformity (what 
Nietzsche calls the majorisieren of the individual), and exactly how one 
avoids being dominated by such external influences is not clear. But it 
does involve eschewing the human tendency to become absorbed in the 
multiplicity of everyday affairs, which distracts the individual from the 
project of becoming himself and abets his evasion of ascertaining what he 
truly desires for himself. Authentic being on the other hand permits 
understanding of the self -- which may produce anxiety when the individual 
perceives himself as failing to achieve his goals. 
Without the disturbing awareness of the responsiblity entailed in 
choosing the self he wishes to be, man is simply a machine. Authentic 
being, says Jaspers in his Way to Wisdom (38), offers quotidian man a 
philosophical rebirth in that 'the fall from absolutes [or established 
positions, Festigkeiten] which were after all illusory becomes an ability to 
soar; what seemed an abyss becomes space for freedom; apparent Nothingness 
is transformed into that from which authentic being speaks to us'. The 
ennui of the inauthentic gives way to an apprehension of one's own 
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possibilities, which in turn offers the opportunity of choosing one's own 
sense of personal purpose. 
We have seen how Jim's life at sea carried no such sense of purpose; 
instead, it was marked by the vapid malaise of inauthentic being. We 
remember that, 'disabled by a falling spar', he 'spent many days stretched 
on his back, dazed, battered, hopeless, and tormented as if at the bottom of 
an abyss of unrest. He did not care what the end would be' (2:14, 15). In 
Heidegger's terms, his life had fallen into the bottomless abyss of the 
inauthentic and the commonplace. 
Jim looked on 'the majority' of his fellow sailors as men who sought 
'the soft spot, the place of decay, the determination to lounge safely 
through existence' (2:16). Not for them Nietzsche's injunction to 'live 
_dangerously! • Send your ships into uncharted seas!' (Science, 
283:228). The demands of men (along with other obstacles to selfhood) 
produce a sense of alienation in the individual, whose only remedy is to be 
true to his own self and what Sartre terms his 'project' of what he 
ultimately wishes to be. In a state of inauthentic being, comments 
Heidegger, 'everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The "they", which 
supplies the answer to the question of the "who" of everyday Dasein, is the 
"nobody" to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-
one-another' (Time 165-5). Kierkegaard takes the view in his Journals (179) 
that 'no one whatsoever is prevented from being an individual unless he 
prevents himself -- by becoming one of the masses'. Jim would therefore 
have to create his own being-for-itself in the face of the majority and what 
Nietzsche calls their 'levelling of humanity•. 7 
8 As Patricia F. Sanborn remarks, in everyday life man tends to 
74 
abdicate his struggle against the techniques of degradation that foster 
dehumanising functionalism and prefers instead to enjoy the comforts of 
technology and the benefits of a depersonalised world -- a world in which 
the masses, though very real, are an impersonal abstraction. Kierkegaard 
stresses that, while the 'universal' was once regarded as the highest goal, 
modern man should uphold the 'individual', since only as a unique individual 
can he formulate the personal truths that are most fundamental to his 
existence. 'The self', says Sartre, 'is individual; it is the individual 
completion of the self which haunts the for-itself' (Nothingness 91). 
Living in Kierkegaard's 'untruth' of 'the crowd', Jim needed to forge a 
truer self by overcoming 'the masses, the tyranny of equality, . . . the 
grin of shallowness' (Journals 502) of men 'who, like himself, [were] thrown 
there by some accident' (2:16), in the way that Heidegger and Sartre assert 
we are all 'thrown' into the world. 9 We remember Roquentin contending in 
Nausea (131) that 'to exist is simply to be there'. We recall too that in 
Heidegger's formulation, our condition of being-there (Dasein) does not 
point to essence but to a mode of being (sein) that emanates from a certain 
position (Da) into which the existent has been 'thrown'. Man is a being-
in-the-world, spread over the field of his care and concern. In Barrett's 
10 paraphrase, Heidegger considers each individual as initially simply one 
among many -- 'the One [das man]', the impersonal and public creature each 
of us is before he is a real 'I'. Thus, like Jim in his boredom as a 
merchant seaman, we exist in a state of 'fallenness [Verfallenheit]' when we 
languish below the level of existence to which it is possible to rise. It 
is easier to be 'the One' than a true self, and (like the early Jim) we 
multiply the devices whereby we seek to evade the rigours of the internal 
and external conflict involved in wresting Sartrean for-itself from 
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in-itself. Dasein is in the world in the sense of being preoccupied, 
producing, ordering, fostering, applying, sacrificing, undertaking, 
following through, inquiring, questioning, observing, talking over, or 
agreeing (see Time 83). Assertion of oneself amid all this requires a 
'project towards' essence, and Marlow presents Jim as questing to espouse 
Kierkegaard's desire 'to understand myself, ••• to find the idea for 
which I can live and die' (Journals 15). 
But that was long in the finding. Existentialists contend that 
recognition of the self's own possibilities occurs only in resolute moments 
when the call of personal conscience is heard, moments when the future self 
clarifies the past self to the present self by ignoring everyday 
distractions. 'Resoluteness', says Heidegger, 'constitutes the loyalty of 
existence to its own Self' (Time 443) -- which is what Conrad explicitly 
requires of the artist, who must have 'absolute loyalty towards his feelings 
and sensations' (Notes 9). 'If', Heidegger continues, 'Dasein discovers the 
world in its own way [eigens] and brings it close, if it discloses to itself 
its own authentic Being, then this discovery of the "world" and this 
disclosure of Dasein are always accompanied as a clearing-away of 
concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which 
Dasein bars its own way' (Time 167). The inauthentic man, in Heidegger's 
view, fails (like the younger Jim) to see himself and his world clearly, and 
his inauthenticity is manifested in misuse of language, in bad faith, in the 
appropriation of others as objects. It is a form of deracination, of 
feeling that one is not 'at home' in the world, as Laing puts it in The 
Divided Self. 11 It is a 'falling' out of being, 'with temptation, 
tranquillizing, alienation, and entanglement as its essential 
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characteristics' (Time 224). 
Amid such snares, Jim failed to sunder himself from the 'gossiping 
crowd' who seemed 'more unsubstantial than so many shadows' and instead 
'took a berth as chief mate of the Patna' (2:16) -- another decision that 
~--
was to thwart him, concluding as it did in the ignominious jump whose 
consequences were to lead him into an anguished flight from himself. His 
jump, as existentialists would readily point out, amounted to an evasion of 
responsibility or of facing reality -- much like Martin Decoud's jump in 
Nostromo (3:10:413) when, unable 'to grapple with himself single-handed', he 
cast himself into the Sartrean in-itself of the Placid Gulf, or Winnie 
Verloc's leap into the Channel in The Secret Agent when she imagined her 
future life too hard to bear. In this ambiguous world, however, leaps are 
double-edged. They need not betoken only inauthentic evasion but can 
like Kierkegaard's Christian 'leap of faith' -- lead to the embracing of a 
valuable new direction, as with Jim's leap on Patusan or the 'plunge' taken 
by Heyst in eloping with Alma/Magdalen in Victory (2:2:76). Leaps point to 
the jagged quality of life, its sudden twists that give the lie to the 
smoothness offered by the 'unerring Providence' of Jim's boyhood home 
(1:10). Their very nature suggests disruption and anxiety, whether 
associated with painful indecision or the agonised adoption of resolution in 
the face of 'the Unknowable' (1:10). Even Kierkegaard's espousal of 
Christianity entailed a leap suffused with a sense of abandoning oneself to 
what is beyond one's control even as one frees oneself from known shackles 
-- the embracing of a profound and terrifying freedom of the kind Kurtz 
experienced once he had 'kicked himself loose of the earth' (3:144). 
Jim's leap from the Patna revealed him for what he was at the time, 
bringing him face to face with the terrible truth that the self he was at 
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that moment was not the self he had ultimately wanted to be; as a 1921 
review points out, Conrad's personages are 'intensely ••• themselves in a 
crisis'. 12 And, as we have seen, these selves change, preferably in 
accordance with one's chosen project of selfhood. To Sartre, 'it is 
necessary that we make ourselves what we are' (Nothingness 59). Only to 
others (or to oneself in inauthentic being) does one appear as an object; as 
a being-for-itself, one is one's own free project. For-itself entails a 
continually reformulated 'project of self toward its possibilities', ever in 
the making (Nothingness 85). 
This in a sense means adopting a kind of mask, in the higher 
Nietzschean understanding of the word -- the mask fashioned by men who 
'invent themselves' (Zarathustra 43:157). To Yeats, who is among the most 
thoroughly Nietzschean of modern poets, man 'follows an Image, created or 
chosen by the Creative Mind from what Fate offers'; 'personality is a 
constantly renewed choice' (A Vision 128-9, 84)! 3 'The great secret' that 
comes to Septimus in The Player Queen (Collected Plays 267/420) is that 'man 
is nothing till he is united to an image' -- a view similar to Sartre's 
contention that 'man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself' 
(Humanism 28). Jim's daydreams of heroic action carried no firm image of 
selfhood, no determined resolve. Yet they did have great value for him at 
the time as an intimation of the self he truly aspired to be. 'His thoughts 
would be full of valorous deeds: he loved these dreams and the success of 
his imaginary achievements. They were the best parts of life, its secret 
truth, its hidden reality' (3:21). 
But not until he actualised their truth did he achieve fuller selfhood. 
As idle daydreams, his imaginings were a form of unconscious lying to 
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himself, an irresolute evasion of the reality of his inauthentic existence. 
In this he perfectly displays what Sartre terms bad faith (mauvaise foi). 
'In bad faith there is no cynical lie nor knowing preparation for deceitful 
concepts. But the first act of bad faith is to flee what it can not flee, 
to flee what it is. The very project of flight reveals to bad faith an 
inner disintegration in the heart of being •••• But it denies this very 
disintegration as it denies that it is itself bad faith' (Nothingness 70). 
'The concept of bad faith. should replace those of the censor, 
repression, and the unconscious which Adler uses'; 'existential 
pyschoanalysis rejects the postulate of the unconscious'; 'we do not 
establish ••• the difference between the unconscious and the conscious, 
but rather that which separates the fundamental unreflective consciousness 
and its tributary, the consciousness reflected-on' (473). 
There was no 'cynical lie' in Jim: he truly imagined himself capable 
of 'valorous deeds' (3:21). But his dreams were none the less an attempt 
to flee what he in fact was at the time, one of Heidegger's 'they' -- as his 
jump testified. It revealed to the man who believed himself to be heroic 
that he had been cowardly, much as in the case of Camus's Jean-Baptise in 
The Fall. As Carole Slade points out, 14 Camus himself made the connection 
in a talk with Dominique Aury when discussing 'the flaw in man': 
Aury: That's a theme of Conrad -- the brave man who suddenly becomes a 
coward. 
Camus: Exactly; a less brilliant Lord Jim. 15 
Jim was not in bad faith to the extent that he denied the pressures on what 
Kierkegaard would call his 'heart of being' or sought to evade a fuller 
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existence. But his desired self was merely the product of nebulous 
daydreams, not a purposefully chosen project. Only later, by embracing 
Patusan, did he both recognise his inner dissolution and actively proceed in 
the direction of the self he had imagined himself to be and was not. 
The Jatna jump and the ensuing trial thus brought Jim harsh recognition 
of what he really was at the time -- and such anagnorisis is open to the 
existent himself alone, who is left as the sole arbiter of what his self is 
at any given moment. We recall Jaspers maintaining that only the individual 
himself, in relation to himself, can decide who he is (cf. Philosophy 
2:32ff.); he cannot rely on society's judgement. Jaspers unequivocally 
condemns the inauthentic existence one lives when one is a member of mass 
society as not being true to one's individual self. One should move from a 
state of being-there to being-oneself, to an existence that becomes real 
only as freedom, which alone remains as a source of value. But though 
Sartrean man is basically and completely free (however strong the forces 
massed against him), he all too often fails to use his freedom purposefully. 
Jaspers feels that in an act undertaken with a sense of its being one's own 
free choice, one recognises oneself as a true self, upholding Heidegger's 
exhortation that man heed his own inner call, his conscience, which is the 
true voice of God in him -- in Jim's case, his 'romantic conscience' 
(14:121). 
Regrettably, the existentialists are rather vague on the precise nature 
of conscience. 16 As Macquarrie speculates, it may imply that existence 
carries with it a given basic awareness of the direction of human 
fulfilment. Although conscience may popularly be associated with the moral 
codes accepted in society, existentialists see it as an individual's own 
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moral conviction, which often leads to the rejection of society's mores in 
response to what the individual believes to be a more deeply founded 
imperative. Such rejection is both arduous and elating. As Dostoevsky 
phrases it in the The Brothers Karamazov, 'There is nothing more alluring to 
man than his freedom of conscience, but there is nothing more tormenting 
either'. 
Exactly how internalisation of the social may be mitigated or 
counteracted remains unresolved in the post-modernist debate. But to an 
existentialist like Kierkegaard (and, in our case, Conrad), overcoming 
social morality is possible, however difficult it may be. Discussing 
individual morality in Fear and Trembling (70), Kierkegaard presents the 
case of Abraham and Isaac as entailing a 'teleological suspension of 
ethics' when Abraham goes against the generally accepted moral idea of what 
is right by being prepared to slay his son at the directive uniquely given 
him as an individual by God. Abraham is ready to sacrifice Isaac 'for 
God's sake, and (in complete identity with this) for his own sake'. In 
Kierkegaard's estimation, the individual should surpass the 'universal' 
ethic through his personal conscience that is both God's command and the 
individual's own deepest awareness. George Price comments that 'what is at 
stake in the book is Abraham's self, his struggle to be, to exist as the 
individual he knows he ought to be. He must forge his own categories. His 
is therefore the paradigm for any and every individual who finds himself at 
the frontier of ethics. 117 
Heidegger, speaking of 'public conscience', asks: 'What else is it 
than the voice of the "they"?' (Time 323). True conscience, by contrast, 
rooted in the being of Dasein, at a deeper level delivers the individual 
from the 'they': 'conscience summons Dasein's Self from its lostness in the 
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"they"' (319), as Jim discovered when he finally surmounted universal 
opinion. This 'call' comes from the depths of the authentic self that is in 
ceaseless conflict with the masses, and 'when the call is rightly 
understood, it gives us that which is the "most positive" of all 
the ownmost possibility which Dasein can present to itself, as a 
namely, 
calling-back which calls it forth into its factical potentiality-for-being-
its-Self at the time' (341). The self thus becomes aware through its 
private conscience of its possible concrete ways of existing, which must 
then be effected -- as Jim eventually managed to do in Patusan. 
18 As Calvin O. Schrag remarks, conscience is not an abstracted faculty 
of the human psyche (just as reason, will and emotion are not) but reveals 
itself in the immediate concerns of the individual's lived experience, 
acting as a judge of his choices and actions. The summons of conscience, 
Heidegger continues, 'discourses in the uncanny mode of keeping silent. And 
it does this only because, in calling the one to whom the appeal is made, it 
does not call him into the public idle talk of the "they", but calls him 
back from this into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being' 
(Time 322). 
So it is that the existentialist demands that each man quest -- like 
Jim -- after his own potentiality for being by heeding his inner voice of 
conscience (which is assumed to exist) in the face of conventional morality. 
M • 19 . k acquarrie is quic to point out the perils of this, since no individual 
conscience ever speaks with complete purity. It is easy to manipulate 
conscience, and the appeal to 'God's will' has been the excuse for the most 
outrageous conduct. Yet all human existence is perilous and potentially 
frightful; risks are sometimes necessary to avoid the danger of moral 
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nihilism and to permit the possibility of advance. One may of course 
genuinely approve of conventional standards (as had the young Jim under his 
father's influence), and to obey them is then not a case of being in bad 
faith. But unquestioning acceptance of them bespeaks a shallow life and 
carries the danger of stagnation (as Jim began to discover in life aboard 
ship). Nietzsche insists that it is only through inner and outer conflict 
that growth occurs, and his Zarathustra urges those who have the spark of 
the superman in them to surpass the 'petty people' who 'preach submission 
and humility and policy and diligence and consideration and the long~ 
cetera of petty virtues' (73:3:321). Real virtue lies in the courage to 
follow the call of the inner self. 
Sartre too champions fealty to one's inner dictates and laments the 
oppression of the individual by societal morality. 'The moral attitude 
appears when technical and social conditions render positive forms of 
conduct impossible. Ethics is a collection of idealistic tricks intended to 
enable us to live the life imposed on us by the poverty of our resources and 
the insufficiency of our techniques•. 20 'We have neither behind us, nor 
before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or 
excuse. We are left alone' (Humanism 34) to create our own values under the 
guidance of conscience (vaguely defined though it may be, and its origins 
obscure). 'Man is a useless passion' except in so far as he ascribes a 
meaning of his own choosing to himself (Nothingness 615) in a Zarathustrian 
world in which God is dead. We exist authentically to the extent that we 
endeavour to forge and implement those values that are truly our own. As 
Conrad comments in a letter to Edward Noble, 'Everyone must walk in the 
light of his own heart's gospel. No man's light is good to any of his 
fellows. • That's my view of life -- a view that rejects all formulas, 
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dogmas and principles of other people's making. These are only a web of 
illusions. We are too varied. Another man's truth is only a dismal lie to 
me' 
21 (_1:,etters 1: 253). 
For Kierkegaard, 'it is really the conscience which constitutes a 
personality ••.• For the conscience may slumber, but the constitutive 
factor is its possibility' (Journals 151). Conscience provides us with the 
truth of what we are and what we might be. Kant, he says, 'held that man 
was his own law (autonomy), i.e. bound himself under the law which he gave 
himself. In a deeper sense that means to say: lawlessness or 
experimentation' (364-5). So it is that conscience (whether its premise be 
metaphysical or materialist) is vital to my being able, in Jaspers's words, 
to 'soar and seize my being and feel it is true' (Philosophy 2:324). No one 
else can make that decision for me, since no one wholly knows another's 
inner self. As we remember Heidegger insisting, no scientific consideration 
of man as an 'organismic' being can yield up his essence -- which is echoed 
in Marlow's contention in Lord Jim that the trial would never reveal to an 
outsider the inner workings of the officers aboard the Patna: 'You can't 
expect the constituted authorities to inquire into the state of a man's soul 
or is it only of his liver?' (6:48). 
So Jim alone could make the discovery of what his self was at the time 
of the Patna incident -- as he indeed began to during his ten days aboard 
the rescuing Avondale. What he saw shocked him: 'he was partly stunned by 
the discovery he had made -- the discovery about himself' (7:67). Talking 
to Marlow, he asserted that he had looked the whole event "'in the face. I 
wasn't going to run away •••• I knew the truth, and I would live it 
down -- alone, with myself.'" (11:103). In this recognition, incomplete 
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though it may have been, lay the means to achieving personality, as Morton 
Dauwel Zabel comments in general terms of the major figures in Und~r Western 
22 Eyes. 
Jim's self-recognition brought Captain Brierly, one of the assessors at 
the trial and in a sense Jim's Doppelganger, face to face with his own self, 
and their contrasting responses heavily underscore Jim's moral courage in 
heeding his individual conscience. Brierly's self-discovery did not lead 
him to set his sights in the direction of the for-itself. Instead, he chose 
suicide, an extreme flight from the demands of selfhood. Marlow realises 
that 'the inquiry was a severe punishment to that Jim, and that his facing 
it -- practically of his own free will -- was a redeeming feature in his 
abominable case' (6:57). Brierly had initially thought Jim foolish not to 
flee the rigours of standing trial, to which Marlow had commented: '"There 
is a kind of courage in facing it out as he does, knowing very well that if 
he went away nobody would trouble to run after him." "Courage be hanged!" 
growled Brierly. "That sort of courage is of no use to keep a man straight, 
and I don't care a snap for such courage'" (6:55-6). To Nietzsche, of 
course, grappling with one's deepest self is testimony to the highest 
courage: 'he who with eagle's talons graspeth the abyss: he hath courage' 
(Zarathustra 73:4:322). And Brierly's suicide suggests that he had in fact 
come to agree with the German philosopher -- but had failed of the requisite 
strength to build on his discovery. 
Jim was ultimately hardier, but full acceptance of his self-recognition 
was a slow process; the insight that his jump offered him was simply one 
step on his difficult journey towards selfhood as a Marcellian ~omo viator. 
Yet his plunge did lead him -- as Gerald Morgan points out 23 -- to a fresh 
engagement of himself and his fidelity to himself and others, even if it was 
85 
beset with an intricate play of facing and evading the truths he glimpsed 
about himself. When early on Marlow 'taxed him with running away, he said, 
"Never! ••• From no man -- from not a single man on earth"' (6:62). 
But a few moments later he conceded, '"I can't put up with this kind of 
thing • and I don't mean to. In court it's different; I've got to 
stand that -- and I can do it too"' (6:62). And so it continued, with 
evasion becoming the dominant mode, turning Jim into a 'vagabond' (16:137) 
in an anxious flight from the deed that had exposed him. A flight, in 
short, from his Patna self. 
Jim did not of course perceive it as flight: he felt that he was 
squarely facing his self. And in a sense he was, since his life between his 
Patna jump and his Patusan leap became the record -- too detailed to 
rehearse fully here -- of a man's vacillating struggle with himself at the 
promptings of conscience. As Marlow comments, 'I could never make up my 
mind. whether his line of conduct amounted to shirking his ghost or to 
facing him out' (19:150); 'for it is my belief no man ever understands quite 
his own artful dodges to escape from the grim shadow of self-knowledge' 
(7:65). 
Jim's acknowledgment of the awful fact that he "'had jumped'" did, 
however, leave him -- 'dumbfounded and hurt' -- with 'a sad sense of 
resigned wisdom' about himself (9:88). '"There was no going back"', he 
declared (9:89). There was indeed no going back to his former self. As 
Sartre would insist, Jim needed to frame a project for a self that would be 
ready for conduct different to that of his Patna self. "'It is all in being 
ready. I wasn't; not -- not then'" (7:66). 
Marlow points to the inner strife entailed in the deliberate 
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formulation of that new self, 'those struggles of an individual trying to 
save from the fire his idea of what his moral identity should be' -- though, 
as Marlow indicates, Jim's conception of his desired self was still strongly 
influenced by societal opinions, enslaved as he was to the 'precious notion 
of a convention, only one of the rules of the game, nothing more, but all 
the same so terribly effective by its assumption of unlimited power over 
natural instincts, by the awful penalties of its failure' (7:66). Jim was 
not yet able to perceive that Kierkegaard's despised 'universal' ethic did 
not necessarily apply to him as an individual. 
As a result, he remained listless, still incapable of that resoluteness 
which to Heidegger 'constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own Self. 
As resoluteness which is ready for anxiety, this loyalty is at the same time 
a possible way of revering the sole authority which a free existing can have 
-- of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence' (Time 443). The 
self, demands Sartre, 'must assume [its] situation with the proud 
consciousness of being the author of it' (Nothingness 554). 
Hence one should concentrate on the limited, incomplete self hie et 
nunc with a view to enhancing it through aspiring to make a personal 
destiny. One is inclined to look on oneself as a mere object in a world of 
objects, but one's essential self is subjective and unfinished, which is why 
Kierkegaard counsels the engagement of what he calls one's 'passionate 
inwardness', the opening of oneself to conversion, to a radical change in 
one's entire being that will make the self fully present to itself. The 
'extraordinary and marvelous instants', says Sartre, 'when the prior project 
collapses into the past in the light of a new project which rises on its 
ruins and which as yet exists only in outline, in which humiliation, 
anguish, joy, hope are delicately blended, in which we let go in order to 
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grasp and grasp in order to let go these have often appeared to furnish 
the clearest and most moving image of our freedom' (Nothingness 476). So 
long as man blinds himself to the nature and meaning of his behaviour (and 
24 his freedom to change it), conversion is impossible, comments Sanborn. But 
if he can uncover the manner in which he lives out his goals, can isolate 
forms of inauthentic behaviour and substitute new ways of realising his 
fundamental project, then conversion can occur and the potential for 
selfhood be engaged. 
Lacking determined goals, Jim 'wandered on the quays all by himself, 
detached from his surroundings, irresolute and silent' (7:67). At dinner 
with Marlow, his projections of what he might one day be seemed to his host 
to be ironically tinged with dreamy romanticism -- though gradually firming 
into resolve: 'I could see in his glance darted into the night all his 
inner being carried on, projected headlong into the fanciful realm of 
recklessly heroic aspirations •••• With every instant he was penetrating 
deeper into the impossible world of romantic achievements. He got to the 
heart of it at last! A strange look of beatitude overspread his features; 
he positively smiled! He had penetrated to the heart -- to the very heart' 
(7:68), in one of Sartre's 'marvelous instants' in which one glimpses a new 
direction towards self-fulfilment. 
So Jim at least had an intimation of the image of himself that would 
bring him a feeling of being at one with himself, Zarathustra's desired 
condition in which 'one may endure to be with oneself, and not to go roving 
about' (55:2:214). In Nietzsche's estimation, true selfhood promotes a 
sense of wholeness (Ganzheit) that reconciles the individual to himself and 
to the world in which he all too often does not feel 'at home'. Twilight 
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of the Idols (102) lauds this quality of wholeness in Goethe: 'What he 
aspired to was totality; ••• he disciplined himself to a whole, he 
created himself'. Such wholeness, what Yeats calls 'unity of being', is 
often best approached in solitude (Nietzsche's 'terrible mistress'), when 
the daily concerns of the world and others are less oppressive. Removed 
from the universal, man is not so subject to its norms and can learn to know 
himself better. The Nietzschean hero has 'a solitude within him that is 
inaccessible to praise or blame' (Power 962:505), and solitude becomes a key 
word for Zarathustra in his 'stillest hour'. Such 'distance' from the crowd 
is not easy. The individualist, says Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling (86), 
'knows that it is terrible to be born outside the universal, to walk without 
meeting a single traveller. He knows very well where he is and how he is 
related to men. Humanly speaking, he is crazy and cannot make himself 
intelligible to anyone'. 
Wholeness (never absolutely achieved) is not easily approximated. 
Simple retreat from the madding crowd is no guarantee of finding it, since 
even in one's own secret inwardness one discovers much that is alien. 'We 
are necessarily strangers to ourselves ••• ' Nietzsche contends in On 
the Genealogy of Morals (preface:1:15); 'for us the law "each is furthest 
from himself" applies to all eternity'. The prime means to virtual 
wholeness lies in being able to 'learn to love oneself ••• with a 
wholesome and healthy love', loving all one's contrasting elements, from 
basest to loftiest (Zarathustra 55:2:214). 
For Jim the beatitude of wholeness still lay only in dreamy glimpses of 
that state. In actuality, he remained in one of Zarathustra's fragmented 
situations in which 'I and me are always too earnestly in conversation' 
(14:57). 'He was not speaking to me,' Marlow recounts, 'he was only 
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speaking before me, in dispute with an invisible personality, an 
antagonistic and inseparable partner of his existence another possessor 
of his soul. These were issues beyond the competency of a court of inquiry: 
it was a subtle and momentous quarrel as to the true essence of life, and 
did not want a judge' (7:75). At least, not an external judge; in an 
existential world, we remember, the individual is the sole arbiter of value, 
arrived at through anguished deliberation prompted by the inner judge of 
conscience. 
Jim's fancifulness was deepened more and more by sobering visions of 
what lay in store for him -- a life of conflict, to be followed by death, 
which (as Heidegger reminds us) is 'Dasein's Being-towards-the-end" (Time 
293). Ahead of Jim there now stretched, as Marlow recounts in language 
redolent with existential imagery, 'the grasp of the abyss, the struggle 
without hope, the starlight closing over his head for ever like the vault of 
a tomb -- the revolt of his young life -- the black end ••• there was a 
hot dance of thoughts in his head. • He burrowed deep, deep, in the 
hope of my absolution, which would have been of no good to him. This was 
one of those cases which no solemn deception can palliate, which no man can 
help; where his very Maker seems to abandon a sinner to his own devices' 
(S:77-8). 
The very mode of Marlow's narration here (not merely what is being 
told) constitutes Jim's dilemma as thoroughly existential. In addition to 
the habitual rhythms, syntactic repetitions and parenthetical suspensions of 
Marlow's language that convey his lack of omniscience, there is the 
disturbing quality of its thought and imagery -- the Nietzschean 'grasp of 
the abyss', 'struggle', 'hot dance of thoughts', 'depths', and the 
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potential despair from looking too deeply into things; the Kierkegaardian 
anxiety that betokens man's 'sickness unto death'; the Camusian demand for 
'revolt'; the Sartrean picture of man abandoned to 'carry the weight of the 
world ••• alone without anything or any person being able to lighten it' 
(Nothingness 555). In a Sartrean world where 'no signs are vouchsafed' 
(Humanism 38), only Jim himself could assess the moral quality of his action 
-- and he felt "'there was not the thickness of a sheet of paper between the 
right and wrong of this affair'" (11 : 102). 
If he was to have any hope of authentic selfhood, he dared not shirk 
this responsibility for determining his own 'moral identity' (7:66). As 
Lois A. Michel has remarked in a general way of 'the thoughtful character 
in Conrad', 'the worst evil that can happen to a man is not one of the 
absurd irrational calamities, but the loss of personal moral integrity 1 • 25 
And Jim was clearly set on pursuing such integrity in order to maintain 
himself in the indifferent universe in which he was adrift. 
Already in the midst of the Patna episode he had felt himself rootless 
in his imagined sinking of the vessel: '"Everything was gone and -- all was 
over • "he fetched a deep sigh ••• "with me"' (10:91). In 
Marlow's view, this constituted admirable subjective truth on Jim's part: 
'Wasn't he true to himself, wasn't he? His saved life was over for want of 
ground under his feet •••• Annihilation. ' (10:91). In a sense 
this apprehension of nothingness was accurate, in that Jim's Patna self was 
over; the quest for a new self had begun. What Jim now needed was Camusian 
revolt against nihilism, a call from authentic being whereby, in Jaspers's 
estimation, 'apparent Nothingness is transformed' (Way to Wisdom 38). And 
this requires resolve. 
Heidegger's call for 'resolutenness which is ready for anxiety' (Time 
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443) emerges in the view of the commander of the French gunboat that had 
encountered the captainless Patna. '"There is somewhere a point when you 
let go everything (vous lachez tout). And have got to live with that 
truth -- do you see? Given a certain combination of circumstances, fear 
is sure to come •••• And even for those who do not believe this truth 
there is fear all the same -- the fear of themselves •••• Man is born 
a coward (L'homme est ne poltron). It is a difficulty -- parbleu! It would 
be too easy otherwise'" (13:114). Which puts us in mind of Sartre, to whom 
'the coward makes himself cowardly, and the hero makes himself heroic; 
there is always a possibility for the coward to give up cowardice' 
(Humanism 43), a possibility he explores in works like The Wall and No 
Exit. 
It was therefore encumbent on Jim to slough off his cowardice and turn 
his dreams of heroic action into a conscious project of selfhood. 'Brierly's 
plan of evasion' (13:118) was a shallow way out, and Jim's assertion "'I 
don't run away'" (13:119) was a valuable first step in the direction of 
fuller selfhood, the product of his 'imaginative conscience' (14:121). A 
first step it might have been, but in this assertion he was in fact still in 
bad faith, unconsciously lying to himself -- for, as Marlow tells us, Jim 
was indeed 'running. Absolutely running, with nowhere to go to' (13:120), 
'no place where he could ••• withdraw • be alone in his loneliness' 
(15:131). Jim's desire for relief from the world was in accord with 
Jaspers's contention that 'Existenz warns me to detach myself from the 
world lest I become its prey' (Philosophy 2:5) -- world understood here as 
quotidian functionalism with its distractions that deny one the leisure for 
considered reflection. Jim needed a place 'where he could have it out with 
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himself without being bothered by the rest of the universe' (15:132). It 
would be a long time before Marlow, in his final view of him, saw Jim 'at 
home' in the world, 'in complete accord with his surroundings -- with the 
life of the forests and with the life of men' (16:135). 
This was a condition of wholeness that Jim alone was able to create for 
himself. 'Felicity we recall Marlow saying, 'is quaffed out of a 
golden cup in every latitude: the flavour is with you -- with you alone, 
and you can make it as intoxicating as you please' (16:135). This puts us 
in mind again of Sartre's assertion that 'there is no sense in life a priori 
••• it is yours to make sense of' (Humanism 54). Tot homines, quot 
sententiae; hence the different views of various characters on Jim's 
conduct -- of Brierly, the French officer, Egstrom, Chester, Jewel, Tamb' 
Itam, Cornelius and Brown -- as well as the persistent note of uncertainty 
in Marlow's narration with its self-conscious awareness of the limitations 
of his speculations, its constant inclusion of ironies, and its pervasive 
sense of the mystery of things -- all of which roundly confute the rigidity 
of dogma. What eventually enabled Jim to be at one with himself and the 
world was his achievement of a self that recognised itself as the sole judge 
of worth in an otherwise meaningless universe. 'Valuation itself', insists 
IS:" 
Zarathustra (\), 'is the treasure and jewel of valuated things'. 
But (as Marlow so intricately recounts) Jim's hesitant journey towards 
selfhood was a long and anxious one, thanks to his 'fine sensibilities, his 
fine feelings, his fine longings •••• A little coarser nature would 
not have borne the strain; it would have had to come to terms with itself 
with a sigh, a grunt, or even a guffaw; a still coarser one would have 
remained invulnerably ignorant and completely uninteresting' (16:136). A 
coarser Jim would have settled for a self indistinguishable from Heidegger's 
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'they'. 'No better than a vagabond' after the trial, he sought 'some sort 
of chance' for redemption (16:137-8), confident that there would be 'time to 
climb out' of his inauthentic state (16:138). Marlow clearly recognises that 
Jim was about to 'begin the journey towards the bottomless pit' (16:138), 
Nietzsche's 'abyss' of the self. In their ensuing conversation, Marlow 
relates, he found Jim filled with 'some mysterious, inexplicable, impalpable 
striving of his wounded spirit' (17:140), Kierkegaard's contention that 
existence is 'a constant striving' for transcendence (Postscript 85). Vague 
though his yearnings were, Jim was at last on the way to a fuller self 
even if he was to be thwarted for so long by elements of bad-faith flight. 
Jim's main obstacle was his Patna self, resurrected each time he 
encountered someone with knowledge of the affair. Yet in shaping himself 
man has to take cognisance of and deal with his Sartrean 'contingency' with 
others. Individual existence, after all, occurs within the wider context of 
circumambient being. As we have seen, man is a 'being-in-the-world', and 
'contingency is not a delusion, a probability which can be dissipated; it is 
the absolute' (Nausea 131). Which is why Marlow existentially considers 
Jim's evasion of those with knowledge of his past a 'retreat' (19:153). In 
engaging oneself one must also engage the world; Jim initially evaded it. 
'It was pitiful', Marlow comments, 'to see how he shrank within himself. A 
seaman, even if a mere passenger, takes an interest in a ship, and looks at 
sea-life around him with the critical enjoyment of a painter, for instance, 
looking at another man's work. In every sense of the expression he is "on 
deck"; but my Jim, for the most part, skulked down below as though he had 
been a stowaway' (19:153) -- which underscores his sense of alienation from 
the world he was in; though on the ship, he did not feel himself fully part 
Of . 26 it. 
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At this stage, then, Jim lacked sovereignty over his existence, much 
like the early Stein, who did not carry 'his life in his hand' but 'played 
ball with it' (19:155). The credo of the mature Stein, however, was that 
one should learn "'how to live. • How to be!"' (20:162). To any man 
his own mode of being is crucial. As Kierkegaard phrases it, 'For an 
individual ••• existence (to be -- or not to be) is of quite decisive 
importance' (Journals 358). And in deciding what one wishes to be one is 
assailed by a welter of conflicting urges. '"We want"' , says Stein, '"in so 
many different ways to be ••• man ••• wants to be a saint and he 
wants to be a devil"' (20: 162). 
Most men merely '"dream"' of what they desire to be: '"a man that is 
born falls into a dream like a man who falls into the sea"' (20:163) in his 
Heideggerian or Sartrean condition of 'thrownness'. But the existentialist 
demands that dreams be turned into commitments, into conscious projects that 
should be actively undertaken by engaging the world, not evading it. We 
recall that this is very much Stein's position as well: '"to the 
destructive element submit yourself, and with the exertions of your hands 
and feet in the water make the deep, deep sea keep you up"' (20:163). 
Stein's exhortation puts us in mind again of Nietzsche's enthusiasm for 
the Dionysian, which entails 'an ecstatic affirmation of the total 
character of life • the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow 
that sanctifies and calls good even the most terrible and questionable 
qualities of life' (Power, 1050:539). Stein, Marlow tells us, 'had 
travelled very far, on various ways, on strange paths, and whatever he 
followed it had been without faltering, and therefore without shame and 
regret' (20:164). He had embraced life in all its Nietzschean complexity 
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and had in a practical way realised his own dictum, '"To follow the dream, 
and again to follow the dream -- and so -- ewig -- usque ad finem' 
(20:164). 27 
Stein, thus, shared Jim's 'romantic' vein but had actualised his dreams 
(or a good number of them). For him, the readiness was all. '"Among other 
things"', Marlow reminded him, '"you dreamed foolishly of a certain 
butterfly; but when one fine morning your dream came in your way you did not 
let the splendid opportunity escape •••• Whereas he did. "Stein 
lifted his hand. "And do you know how many opportunities I let escape; how 
many dreams I had lost that had come in my way"' (20:166). Jim too lived 
in the possibilitiy of one day realising his dreams. He too would 
eventually be able to say with Stein, '"I exist'" (20:165), in a full and 
authentic manner that embraces what Tillich calls 'the courage to be'. 
It was Jim's very 'romanticism' that in Marlow's view endowed him with 
the potential for a fuller life. 'Your imaginative people swing farther in 
any direction, as if given a longer scope of cable in the uneasy anchorage 
of life' (21:171). But in Stein's view Jim would have to establish a 
definite commitment and then carry it out -- Camus's demand almost exactly, 
28 
as C. N. Stavrou has pointed out. "'We shall do something practical"', 
Stein promised Marlow: the sending of Jim to Patusan as a means of 
promoting that which "'by inward pain makes him know himself"' (20:165). In 
going to Patusan, Jim 'left his earthly failings behind him and that sort of 
reputation he had, and there was a totally new set of conditions for his 
imaginative faculty to work upon •••• And he got hold of them in a 
remarkable way' (21:167). Like Leggatt at the end of The Secret Sharer, he 
was 'a free man, a proud swimmer striking out for a new destiny'. 
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Visiting Jim later in Patusan, Marlow found him in control of his 
environment at last, the creator of his condition in the world (as Sartre 
insists every man must be) -- even though he had never entirely shaken off 
the memory of the Patna: '"There is something he can never forget"', Jewel 
told Marlow (33:237). Yet Jim's going to Patusan in the first place had 
been prompted partially by the desire to escape his old self rather than 
face it. Marlow comments that Jim's arrival in 'a crazy dug-out' along the 
Patusan River 'cast the complexion of a flight upon all his acts, of 
impulsive unreflecting desertion -- of a jump into the unknown'; Jim still 
hungered for 'a refuge' (22:175). But soon his whole bearing changed, as he 
vowed to be "'ready for any confounded thing'" (23: 179). 
Marlow intially considered even such asserted resolution to be mere 
'vapourings •••• Where was the sense of such exaltation in a man 
appointed to be a trading-clerk. Why hurl defiance at the universe?' 
(23:179). Yet Jim would eventually invalidate Marlow's scepticism. In his 
Camusian protest he would remake himself. By going to Patusan he was 
'approaching greatness as genuine as any man ever achieved' (24:186). 
That achievement was not, of course, easily won. No sooner had Jim 
reached Patusan than he was incarcerated by Rajah Tunku Allang, leading to a 
leap very different to that from the Patna -- over 'the north front of the 
stockade' which held him prisoner. "'Good leap, eh?"' he later exulted to 
Marlow (25:191). And then a 'second leap', over a creek to a new 
uncertainty, again feeling himself, like Sartre's Orestes in The Flies, 
'alone, with no help, no sympathy, no pity to expect from anyone' (25:193). 
'Received, in a manner of speaking, into the heart of the community' by 
Doramin, 'chief of the Bugis' (25:196), Jim now found something he could 
commit himself to, a course of action, a definite project, that would enable 
-----------·-
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him to realise his dreamed-of vision of himself as capable of 'valorous 
deeds'. Through the war against Sherif Ali he would finally give body to 
that Yeatsian 'Image, created or chosen by the Creative Mind from what Fate 
offers' (A Vision 128-9). His decision to embrace battle left him poised to 
attain a fuller existence, 'to stand out into the truth of Being', as 
Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism' puts it (Basic Writings 206), poised to 
seize the Sartrean 'possibility for the coward to give up cowardice' and 
'make himself heroic' (Humanism 43). He had discovered Kierkegaard's 
desired 'idea for which I can live and die' (Journals 15). "'All at once I 
saw what I had to do'", he told Marlow (26:198), recounting one of Sartre's 
'extraordinary and marvelous instants when the prior project collapses into 
the past in the light of a new project which then rises on its ruins' 
(Nothingness 476). In Marlow's words, Jim had 'a new direction to his life' 
(26:201) -- a Sartrean movement towards being-for-itself. 
'Thus', comments Marlow, 'he illustrated the moral effect of his 
victory in war. It was in truth immense. It had led him from strife to 
peace' (27:204), a triumph not only over Doramin's enemy but also over his 
Patna self. 'It was immense ••• the conquered ground for the soles of 
his feet, ••• the belief in himself snatched from the fire' (27:206). 
'He seemed to have come very near at last to mastering his fate' (28:207) 
and was now 'capable of anything. He was equal to his fortune, as he --
after all -- must have been equal to his misfortune' (28:210). So Jim ended 
up by fashioning his own self and his own world, fighting successfully 
like MacWhirr in Typhoon -- against what seemed inexorable fate, 29 
controverting Neville H. Newhouse's general view that in Conrad a man is 




In Patusan Jim was finally at peace with the self he had created, 'at 
home' in the world he had made for himself through his 'marital, homelike, 
peaceful' life with Jewel (28:210). In his subjectivism, he assigned his 
own value to existence; 'he had the gift of finding a special meaning in 
everything that happened to him' (32:229). 31 Into this intruded the dreaded 
Sartrean 'others': Sherif Ali, Cornelius and Brown. Yet in spite of them 
Jim felt himself sovereign of his destiny in his newfound plenitude: 
"'Nothing can touch me!'" (30:221). He was like Nietzsche's 'great man', 
who -- 'in his works, in his deeds -- is necessarily a prodigal: his 
greatness lies in the fact that he expends himself. One calls this 
"sacrifice"; one praises his "heroism" therein, his indifference to his own 
interests, his devotion to an idea, a great cause, a fatherland: all 
misunderstandings •••• He flows out, he overflows, he uses himself up, 
he does not spare himself' (Idols 98). No longer would Jim resort to 
evasion: Jewel's urging him to '"Fly! • Fly!"' met with a brisk 
dismissal (31:225). 
Not that Jim had found a self and situation that would have left him 
fulfilled once and for ever; man, after all, is constantly in a 
Kierkegaardian 'process of becoming'. But he had created a world in which 
he was 'satisfied ••• nearly' (34:244), in which he would stay until he 
(l4:24s) 
was 'quite satisfied~-- until the inner call to forge yet another self. For 
the present his life was one of authentic being, since, if we turn again to 
Macquarrie's estimation, 'existence is authentic to the extent that the 
existent has taken possession of himself and, shall we say, has moulded 
h • lf • h • • I 32 J • bl • h I II imse in is own image. im was a e to assert wit equanimity, I 
have lots of confidence in myself'" (34:245). Like Willems (with all his 
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shortcomings) in An Outcast of the Islands (1:1:3, 5)1 he now had an 'inward 
assertion of unflinching resolve', with 'an exalted sense of his duty to 
himself and the world at large'. In Nietzschean terms, he had become one of 
those men who 'invent themselves' (Zarathustra 43:157), who are true to 
themselves. As Marlow testifies, 'the sheer truthfulness of his last three 
years of life' (43:296) enabled Jim to proclaim 'daily the truth that surely 
lived in his heart' (45:307). Even in his dying moment he was able to cast 
'a proud and unflinching glance' (45:312) at those around him as his 
self-made for-itself was finally claimed by the in-itself of non-conscious 
matter. 
In Bruce Johnson's view, 33 Jim had in fact sought to be God in terms of 
Sartre's definition of man as 'a being which tries to become God' through 
the desire of the conscious for-itself simultaneously to be non-conscious 
in-itself. The ideal of for-itself is to be for-itself-in-itself, or what 
Sartre calls God, and thus 'the best way to conceive of the fundamental 
project of human reality [or man] is to say that man is the being whose 
project is to be God', or is fundamentally 'the desire to be God' 
(Nothingness 566). With its sense of itself as a separate individual 
entity, for-itself is the nihilation of being-in-itself. Consciousness 
introduces the notion of nothingness into the fulness of being, establishing 
differentiation by a feeling that everything beyond the in-itself is 
nothingness. Man is constantly aware of the threat of annihilation, of the 
fact that his consciousness might at any moment cease to exist. And 'a 
being is fragile,' we remember, 1 if it carries in its being a definite 
possibility of non-being' (8). 
Unlike Heidegger, then, Sartre transfers nothingness from the objective 
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to the subjective, to consciousness: it is ontological, present to every 
conscious individual in all his emotions and actions. The threat of 
non-being experienced by the for-itself lies not just in personal death but 
in the plenitude of circumambient being that threatens to overwhelm it --
and with which it therefore longs to be united, to become for-itself-in-
itself. 
Nietzsche too speaks of man's desire for such unity, but as an escape 
from 'the conception of individuation as the primal cause of evil', embodied 
in the ancient myth of the dismemberment of Dionysus by the Titans (Tragedy 
10:74). Man's 'vast Dionysian impulse' transports him to 'the bosom of the 
primordially One' (22:132), to that sense of 'complete self-forgetfulness' 
he seeks in music, dancing and intoxication, as seen in 'the Bacchic 
choruses of the Greeks' (1:36) and the drunken dancing crowds of St Vitus 
and St John. 
In Sartre's conception, however, the for-itself desires to become 
in-itself without surrendering its sense of self: it 'would be the 
foundation of its own being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it 
would have of itself. It is this ideal which can be called God' 
(Nothingness 566). As Johnson comments, Jim wanted his divinity in a manner 
easily comprehended in these terms. He wanted to be part of the plenitude 
of being that surrounded him, just as Lingard did in The Rescue when 
succumbing to Mrs Travers, 'seduced away by the tense feeling of existence 
far superior to the mere consciousness of life', wishing to relinquish his 
freedom and responsibility so as to become for-itself-in-itself. 34 
Only when Jim guaranteed beetle Brown's exit with his own life and then 
gave that life to Doramin did he, as Johnson remarks, take the direct path 
to a condition of non-conscious being-in-itself, suffering to the end the 
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inherent contradiction in his desire to be at once cause and caused. His 
own action led to his death, as is true also of Nostromo and of Lena in 
Victory: to Conrad, 'character is fate' -- as it was to Novalis before him 
and to his contemporaries Eliot and Hardy. 35 Yet Jim in all probability 
met his fate quite unaware that it flowed as a direct outcome of his being 
what he was ••• 
* 
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Jim's existential struggle for selfhood finds many parallels throughout 
Conrad's work -- most notably Razumov's equally intricate quest in Under 
Western Eyesr Indeed, Boris Ford considers Razumov's 'tormenting journey 
towards self-knowledge' to be 'the central theme of the novel'. 'Rootless 
and without identity, he is intent on creating a meaning for his existence, 
••• confronted by individuals and forces which undermine his precarious 
ff • d d h• • 1 • I 36 self-su 1ciency an eepen is 1so at1on. Under Western Eyes, like 
Nostromo and The Secret Agent, is concerned foremost with individuals rather 
than politics or anarchism -- and all three novels provide confirmation and 
consolidation of the existential elements we have so far explored in Lord 
Jim. 
As a young student Razumov aspired to nothing more than a conventional 
life approved of by Heidegger's 'they'. But this was not to be: Victor 
Haldin's confession that he had assassinated de P---- threw Razumov back on 
his own inner conscience, forcing him in full existential anguish to 
determine his own values and forge a self with which he could be 'at home' 
in the world. His initial step towards achieving his envisioned career of 
public approbation was his desire to win the university's silver medal, 
which he felt would gain him 'distinction' in the eyes of the world. The 
professor of languages who narrates the novel very much as a conventional 
Westerner of his time sees 'nothing wrong' in Razumov's desire, since 'a 
man's real life is that accorded to him in the thoughts of other men by 
reason of respect or natural love' (1:1:63). We recall, though, that the 
professor does admit to his own 'limitations' (2:1:131) and 'the corrupt 
frivolity of a Western mind' (2:2:151). And much of his narrative is in 
turn based on Razumov's confessional journal. Again Conrad avoids an 
omniscient narration, implicitly supporting the existential position that no 
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absolute perspective is possible. Yet it is Conrad's hope in his note to 
the novel that the professor's vantage point will 'be useful to the reader' 
(note:50); Conrad stresses his value as an eye-witness and does not bring 
his testimony into serious question -- but the limitations of his 
subjectivity are none the less pointedly mentioned. 
The Razumov who is shown to us thought himself set on a life that would 
demand little of the courage needed for the sort of authentic existence that 
does not permit itself to be dominated by, as Macquarrie puts it, 'external 
forces, ••• moral codes, political or ecclesiastical authorities, or 
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whatever'. But Haldin early on told him that 'there is a solidity about 
your character which cannot exist without courage' (1:1:64). Whether 
Haldin's perception was valid or not becomes a crucial concern: whether 
Razumov would, like Jim, pursue Tillich's 'courage to be' or slip into 
Kierkegaard's despised 'untruth' of 'the crowd' by seeking to escape the 
anxieties of a full existence through obedience to convention or through 
drink -- like the coachman Ziemianitch, 'a proper Russian man' unable 'to 
bear life ••• without the bottle' (1:2:75). 
In the wake of Haldin's confession, Razumov had only his own 
Kierkegaardian 'inwardness' to guide him. '"I can't even run away"', he 
lamented; 'he had nothing', neither 'material refuge' nor 'moral refuge' 
(1:2:78). Even late in the novel Razumov looked upon this abandonment as 
'desolation' (4:3:327) rather than as the Sartrean potential for the freedom 
to create oneself in one's own postulated image. Still too much the 
conventional public man, he 'turned to autocracy for the peace of [his] 
patriotic conscience •••• Like other Russians before him, Razumov, in 
conflict with himself, felt the touch of peace upon his forehead' (1:2:79). 
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Once he had experienced the call of personal conscience~ however, the values 
of the established order would no longer offer such peace. Already his 
'conflict with himself' revealed that he had the innate potential for the 
terrible, but ultimately fulfilling, road to selfhood that would make him 
more than a mere Heideggerian 'One', an impersonal public creature existing 
in a state of 'fallenness'. Looking at 'the frivolous crowd' around him, he 
mused: '"Not one of them is capable of feeling and thinking as deeply as I 
can. How many of them could accomplish an act of conscience?'" (1:2:82). 
Razumov's sense of self-superiority, though, was swiftly overturned 
when he betrayed Haldin to Prince K-- and General T--. By upholding that 
'public conscience' which to Heidegger is 'the voice of the "they"' (Time 
323), he had in his anguish failed to enact what Ford Madox Hueffer (later 
Ford) considered to be the central moral in Conrad, that 'when our private 
and intimate honour is in conflict with the law, we must break the law', 
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which is merely a 'conventional arrangement between man and man'. Sartre 
would demand that Razumov override 'social morality' born of 'technical and 
' 1 d. t. ' h. h ' d · · f f d · · bl ' 39 H socia con i ions w ic ren er positive orms o con uct impossi e. e 
would have to heed his inner imperatives, since, as we remember Kierkegaard 
asserting, 'it is really the conscience which constitutes a personality' 
(Journals 151). 
That all men are volatile 'becomings' without any fixed, given essence 
was clear to Razumov, as we saw in the opening paragraph of this chapter: 
'"A man goes out of a room for a walk •••• He comes back ••• and behold 
he is no longer the same man"' (1:2:99). The man in question is of 
course himself. Like Kierkegaard, he now realised that "'I've got to find 
my own ideas of the true way"' (1:2:100). And this dependence on his 
personal conscience placed him '"on the rack"' (1:2:103), pointedly 
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illustrating James Huneker's broad contention that Conrad's characters are 
b f h 1 h . 1 . d 40 never at rest ut trans orm t emse ves as t ey grow in evi or wis om. 
The workings of Razumov's troubled mind in his dreams of abandoned 
aloneness reveal him as being in bad faith with himself which to Sartre, 
we recall, is what the word unconscious actually means: 'the concept of bad 
faith ••• should replace those of the censor, repression, and the 
unconscious' (Nothingness 473). Razumov's sense of his life as 
inauthentic consigned him to a rote, empty existence, to that alienating, 
'self-entangling' quality which Heidegger perceives in such a condition 
(Time 223). He acted 'mechanically. An incredible dullness, a ditch-water 
stagnation was sensible to his perceptions as though life had withdrawn 
itself from all things and even from his own thoughts' (1:3:106). 
The ransacking of his room by the police left him with 'a distinct 
sensation of his very existence being undermined in some mysterious manner, 
of his moral supports falling away from him one by one' (1:3:112). Tony 
Tanner has likened Razumov's state at this point to the kind Sartre presents 
in Nausea of meaningless matter appearing monstrous: 'the usual 
significances have drained out of the objects of the phenomenological 
world 1 • 41 Viewing himself as a mere 'body'~ an 'unrelated organism. 
walking, breathing, wearing these clothes, ••• of no importance to 
anyone' (1:3:113), Razumov saw himself in Kierkegaardian terms as simply an 
object in a world of objects, lacking a sense of his self as fully present 
to itself. Were he honest with himself, Sartre would argue, he would employ 
this apprehension of 'himself as a thing ••• to escape the condition of 
a thing' (Nothingness 65), acknowledge his unworthy aspects in order to 
alter them. To lift himself from his fall into the mere existence of a 
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thing-in-itself, he would have to seek 'the true Razumov •• • in the 
willed, determined future' (1:3:113). 
Such amomie amid preception of inauthentic existence appears again and 
again in Conrad. For example, the eponymous hero of Nostromo, 'awakening in 
solitude amongst the ruins of the fort' after his theft of Gould's silver, 
had a 'confused feeling. which made everything that had gone before 
for years appear vain and foolish, like a flattering dream come suddenly to 
an end' (3:8:348, 349). All at once he saw that his life hitherto had 
simply been that of a useful object in the service of exploiters. He felt 
utterly 'destitute', filled with 'loneliness, abandonment, and failure' 
(3:8:350). 
His earlier anticipation of public praise, 'his own peculiar view' of 
the silver escapade's merit (2:7:233), had dwindled to nought. Now 'the 
Capataz de Cargadores, on a revulsion of subjectiveness, ••• beheld his 
world without faith and courage' (3:8:351), with 'the dazed feeling of 
enlightenment as to being done for, of having inadvertently gone out of his 
existence on an issue in which his personality had not been taken into 
account' (3:8:353). Through an action undertaken in Sartrean bad faith, he 
had fallen into inauthentic being. 
This sense of malaise persisted during his meeting with Dr Monygham in 
the Custom House, produced by what Nostromo perceived as his betrayal, which 
'floated upon his sombre indifference as upon a sluggish sea of pitch' 
(3:8:358). With full existential anguish, he looked on himself as 
"'nothing!'" (3:9:380). 'His courage, his magnificence, his leisure, his 
work, everything was as before, only everything was a sham' (3:12:432). 
Alienated from all that had once sustained him, he now experienced the world 
through an altered consciousness. Familiar objects appeared different: 
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'silent in inhospitable darkness, the Casa Viola seemed to have changed its 
nature; his home appeared to repel him •••• His head swam with the 
illusion that the obscurity of the kitchen was as vast as the Placid Gulf, 
and that the floor dipped forward like a sinking lighter' (3:9:388, 389). 
Martin Decoud too felt his world to be alien and meaningless when he 
'found himself solitary on the beach' of the Great Isabel (2:8:262), in a 
solitude that led to an untenable perception of his own self and the 
oppressiveness of Heidegger's non-human existentia -- a feeling that 
resulted, as Martin Seymour-Smith comments, in Decoud's failure to achieve 
h . f 11 . d .. d 1 . . 42 K. k d' . . ' is u yin ivi ua , unique existence. ier egaar s imperative to 
understand myself' (Journals 15) and Heidegger's 'clearing-away of 
concealments and obscurities, [the] breaking up of the disguises with which 
Dasein bars its own way' (Time 167), can spell devastation for the 
individual who is unable to surmount such disclosures through Camusian 
revolt against them. 'The brilliant "son Decoud" • was not fit to 
grapple with himself single-handed' (3:10:413). 
Winnie Verloc in The Secret Agent also chose suicide in the face of 
solitude and penetrating insight. Prior to her galvanising discovery that 
her husband had caused Stevie's death, she had 'wasted no portion of this 
transient life in seeking for fundamental information' (8:167). Instead, 
she 'trusted in 'that distant and uninquiring acceptance of facts which was 
her force and her safeguard in life' (8:155). 'She felt profoundly that 
things do not stand much looking into' (8:172). 
Though such superficiality condemned her to a rote existence and was an 
obstacle to the attainment of full selfhood, the narrator agrees with 
Nietzsche in commenting that 'it may be good for one not to know too much' 
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(8:167), since only a strong soul can overcome a penetrating knowledge of 
the self and the world. Yet a shallow vision relegates one to 
inauthenticity, according 'very well with constitutional indolence' (8:167) 
of the kind that her husband was also prone to. Stevie, however, for all 
his limitations, was not satisfied with surface explanations. 'Unlike his 
sister, who put her trust in face values, he wished to go to the bottom of 
the matter' as to why there was pretence in the world (8:169). He revealed 
to Winnie 'what there was of the salt of passion in her tasteless life --
the passion of indignation, of courage, of pity, and even of self-sacrifice' 
(8:170). 
With Stevie's death and Winnie's murder of Verloc, her self that had 
'always refrained from looking deep into things' disappeared, and she now 
stared 'into the very bottom' of her deed (12:237) -- only to see the 
gallows, the terrible price of her independent individualism. She was, in 
the Sartrean sense, 'alone, without excuse' (Humanism 34), 'the most lonely 
of murderers that ever struck a mortal blow' (12:240). Unable to engage the 
terrible freedom of her new self and the responsibility it carried, she 
surrendered it to Ossipon in a fresh flight from self to the Continent -- a 
flight that ended with her jump into the Channel, the final sign of her 
failure to overcome her 'terror and despair' (13:267). 
Decoud, similarly removed from the 'they' who had supported his 
inauthentic existence even as they heightened his alienation, 'died from 
solitude and want of faith in himself and others' (3:10:412), unable to bear 
the weight of finding himself alone in an indifferent universe. 'After 
three days of waiting for the sight of some human face, he caught himself 
entertaining a doubt of his own individuality' (3:10:413). That 
consciousness which constitutes the very basis of individuality and without 
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which, in Camus's view, 'nothing is worth anything' (Sisyphus 19), was 
assaulted by the brute non-conscious world that enveloped him. 
Aboard the lighter, with the Heideggerian sense of being 'thrown 
into a dark gulf', he had longed to merge with the in-itself of the sea, 
imagining the boat 'sinking to the bottom with an extraordinary shudder of 
delight' (2:7:234). Again we see a Conradian figure in what approximates to 
a Sartrean desire to be God, to be sheer in-itself while retaining the 
conscious experience of for-itself. Now, unable to overcome the despair of 
abandonment, he simply surrendered himself to annihilation by oppressive 
being-in-itself. Mortally shot by his own hand and weighed down by the four 
silver ingots in his pockets, he rolled out of the dinghy into 'the Placid 
Gulf, whose glittering surface remained untroubled by the fall of his body' 
(3:10:416). 'A victim of disillusioned weariness', his individuality 
'merged into the world of cloud and water, of natural forces and forms of 
nature' (3:10:413). 
At face value, Conrad seems at this point to be bleaker even than 
Sartre and Camus, who overtly counsel revolt amid the full realisation that 
all existence is absurd. Implicitly, though, and by his accumulated 
depictions of the value of 'activity' (Sartre's notion that we are the sum 
of our actions), Conrad shows the need to transcend the disturbing 
apprehensions that attend a profound Nietzschean stare into the heart of 
things. Decoud, however, bereft of his sense of individual selfhood, sank 
passively into the in-itself, with just 'the vague consciousness of a 
misdirected life given up to impulses whose memory left a bitter taste in 
his mouth ••• the first moral sentiment of his manhood' (3:10:413). 
Similar 'detachment' (2:70) and 'lassitude' (3:83) associated with 
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inauthentic being attended Adolf Verloc in The Secret Agent, prompted in his 
case by Vladimir's demand for 'activity' (2:59), which 'menaced' what was 
(1: tr) 
'dearest to him -- his repose and his security~. As a result, 'Mr Verloc 
descended into the abyss of moral reflections' (3:81), his existential angst 
unsettling the even tenor of his vapid life as he wrestled to establish what 
his true imperatives were. 'The instinct of conventional respectability was 
strong within him' (3:81-2), and Vladimir's demand for 'bomb throwing' 
(3:81) bore down on him as an external force. 
Indeed, the pressure of all cicumambient being bore down on him, much 
as in the case of Sartre's Roquentin in Nausea (131), who feels that 'no 
necesssary being can explain existence •••• All is free [gratuitous], 
this park, this city and myself. When you realize that, it turns your heart 
upside down and everything beings to float here is Nausea'. 
Roquentin experiences this disgust as a force from outside himself: 'the 
Nausea is not inside me: I feel it out there in the wall' (19). The 
plenitude conveyed by encircling being is something jelt: 'existence is not 
something which lets itself be thought of from a distance: it must invade 
you suddenly, master you, weigh heavily on your heart like a great 
motionless beast' (132). 
Verloc, looking outside at 'the enormity of cold, black, wet, muddy, 
inhospitable accumulation of bricks, slates, and stones, things in 
themselves unlovely and unfriendly to man felt the latent 
unfriendliness of all out of doors with a force approaching to positive 
bodily anguish' (3:84). It was a 'luminous and mutilated vision' of the 
'gratuity' of the world, 'ghastly physically' (3:84). Everything suddenly 
seemed strange and absurd to him, a Sartrean world that had no reason behind 
it. In fact, as Paul Goetsch points out, the basic experience of all the 
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main characters in The Secret Agent is of a world become absurd. 
The nihilistic Professor too experienced the alienating force of a once 
familiar world weighing down on him. 'All around him, on and on, even to 
the limits of the horizon hidden by the enormous piles of bricks, he felt 
the mass of mankind mighty in its numbers. They swarmed numerous like 
locusts, industrious like ants, thoughtless like a natural force' (5:103). 
Like Verloc and Sartre's Roquentin, he physically felt the oppressive 
plenitude of encircling being. 'Lost in the crowd', his only sense of his 
individual power lay in his ability to cause his own death through the 
india-rubber detonator that was 'the supreme guarantee of his sinister 
freedom' from the 'they' (5:102). Encountering Chief Inspector Heat (with 
'his blameless bosom of an average married citizen' [6:132]), and learning 
of the observatory bombing, the Professor again considered himself merely 
'a miserable object' in the world; 'life had such a strong hold upon him 
that a fresh wave of nausea broke out in slight perspiration upon his brow' 
(5:112). 'The resisting power of numbers, the unattackable solidity of a 
great multitude, was the haunting fear of his sinister loneliness' (5:113). 
Such an apprehension descended also on the Assistant Commissioner, the 
dehumanising quality of whose inauthentic life is suggested by the fact that 
he is always referred to by his title, never by name. 'No man engaged in 
work he does not like can preserve many saving illusions about himself. The 
distaste, the absence of glamour, extend from the occupation to the 
personality' (6:125). 'A square peg forced into a round hole, he had felt 
like a daily outrage that long-established smooth roundness into which a man 
of less sharply angular shape would have fitted himself', and he compelled 
himself to adopt a Sartrean bad-faith manner of 'forced calmness' to conceal 
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his constant 'irritation' (6:126). He too experienced the outside world 
as the 'great motionless beast' of Sartre's Nausea (132): 'the van and 
horses, merged into one mass, seemed something alive -- a square-backed 
black monster'; the 'barrier of blazing lights, opposing the shadows 
gathered about the humble abode of Mr Verloc's domestic happiness, seemed to 
drive the obscenity of the street back upon itself, make it more sullen, 
brooding, and sinister' (7:153). 
Razumov, afflicted by similar revulsion at meaningless existentia in 
Under Western Eyes, none the less resolved, in 'a mood of grim determination 
and as if with a new knowledge of his own nature' (1:3:114), to forge a new 
self to replace the existence Haldin had destroyed, 'the only thing he could 
call his own on this earth' (1:3:117). Again we are reminded of the 
existential 'mineness' of personal being, what Conrad's older contemporary 
Hopkins called 'that inmost self of mine', his own individual 'thisness' (or 
'haecceity', derived from John Duns Scotus's use of haecceitas to indicate 
an individuality finer than specific quidditas, or 'whatness', an 
individuality Hopkins connotes in his term inscape). As we recall Jaspers 
contending, one's identity rests only on oneself (cf. Philosophy 2:3ff.). 
And, says Kierkegaard, 'no one whatsoever is prevented from being an 
individual unless he prevents himself -- by becoming one of the masses' 
(Journals 179). 
This resonates in the comment of Haldin's sister, Natalia, that "'it is 
a very miserable and a very false thing to belong to the majority'" 
(2:1:136) -- Kierkegaard's contention that 'the crowd is untruth', which 
puts one in mind also of Heidegger's view that surrender to the impersonal 
'they' brings a falling into the empty abyss of the inauthentic and the 
commonplace (Time 166). Victor Haldin, heeding his own conscience, had 
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defied the establishment and 'done what he was compelled to do' (2:1:143), 
fashioning for himself one of those 'unstained, lofty, and solitary 
existences' (2:1:158) he had considered Razumov to have. Natalia too had 
been 'suspected of holding independent views on matters settled by official 
teaching' (2:3:161), thereby standing out from the crowd in existential 
exsistere and earning 'a reputation of liberalism'. 
Natalia was not one to be cowed by the world: even though she found 
the Chateau Borel and its revolutionaries 'intimidating', she 'did not run 
away' (2:4:166) -- and so encountered Tekla, the reified dame de compagnie 
and secretary to Madame Eleanor de S---- and Peter Ivanovitch, who had 
'destroyed' her 'illusions' and reduced her to believing herself a mere 
{2: 4: '") 
object, 'the blind instrument of higher endsA. Tekla is always referred to 
in terms of her function, as if she had no personal name, a cruel situation 
for someone who had rejected her previous self in search of fuller selfhood 
by leaving her parents '"directly I began to think by myself'" (2:4: 169). 
This upholds Heidegger's demand that each man learn to think independently 
and live accordingly; or, as Sartre says, the self 'must assume [a] 
situation with the proud consciousness of being the author of it' 
(Nothingness 554). This is exactly what Tekla later did when resolving to 
follow Razumov, in an attempt to overcome an existence that had put her on a 
par with '"tables and chairs"' in a household where '"no one is told my 
name •••• I have no use for a name, and I have almost forgotten it 
myself'" (3: 2: 236). 
Her condition was much like that of Mrs Schomberg in Victory, who was 
also reduced by others to the status of an object: 'one was inclined to 
think of her as an It -- an automaton' (1:5:46), the dreaded condition of 
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'functional man' that Marcel attacks in Man against Mass Society. Unlike 
Tekla, however, Mrs Schomberg failed to rebel against her condition. 
Instead, she resigned herself to 'concealing her tortures of abject 
humiliation and terror under her stupid, set, everlasting grin, • • • an 
excellent mask, (2:3:90), submitting to the brutal tyranny of her husband, 
Wilhelm, with his 'moral weakness' (2:3:91) and his 'want of courage' 
(2:5:97) to take action that would have overcome his attitude of caring for 
'nothing', of seeing life as 'a hollow sham' (2:5:99). 
Tekla, on the other hand, at last 'found work to do after her own 
heart' (4:4:341) by making the crippled Razumov the focus of her care. 
Though Razumov was left a deaf invalid, he did finally achieve a self that 
brought him a sense of personal worth by openly proclaiming his true colours 
-- but not before an agonised period of 'weary indifference' (2:5:202). His 
'secret dialogue' with himself persisted (3:1:207), plunging him 'into the 
depth' that in Nietzsche's view comes when the 'I and me' of Laing's divided 
self 'are always too earnestly in conversation' (Zarathustra 14:57). The 
thought of meeting Natalia 'tempted' Razumov 'to flight', but he knew that 
'he had no place to fly to'; leaving Geneva 'would have been a fatal 
admission, an act of moral suicide' (3:1:212). 'One could not renounce 
truth altogether, he thought, with despair' (3:1:215). 
The self-analysis contained in Razumov's 'memorandum' testifies to this 
search for personal truth through his heightened consciousness, which, says 
Sartre, is the hallmark of a being that questions its own being. With 
Nietzschean self-division Razumov 'felt as though another self, an 
independent sharer of his mind, had been able to view his whole person very 
distinctly indeed' (3:2:232). And he resolved to fight the 'disgust' this 
self-division engendered, seeing in 'moral resistance' -- obedience to 
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personal conscience -- his sole hope of overcoming the forces that beset him 
(3:2:232). Later, in conversation with the revolutionary Sophia Antonovna 
through the bars of the ch~teau gate, he reminded himself that 'the only 
condition of success and safety was indomitable will-power' (3:3:247); once 
more we recall Sartre's insistence that the self has to will its own chosen 
condition in the world. 
The Sartrean 'weight of the world' (~othingness 555), however, left 
Razumov 'inexpressibly weary' (3:3:246), bereft as he was of any long-term 
commitment. 'He longed to be on the other side of the bars, as though he 
were a prisoner within the grounds of this ••• house of folly' (3:3:247) 
and thus free from the responsibility of acting on the call of his 
conscience. But though he longed for escape from the inauthenticity of 
'playing a part' (3:3:249), escape from his present self, he feared that he 
would 'never be found prepared' (3:3:250). 
Whatever Razumov's inner sensations, Sophia Antonovna considered him 'a 
man of character' (3:3:246), whose supposed actions lifted him above the 
"'shameful"' life, "'the subservient, submissive life. • • • Life, Razumov, 
not to be vile must be a revolt -- a pitiless protest -- all the time"' 
(3:3:256). Antonovna's shortcomings aside, her sentiment here accords well 
with Camus's assertion in The Rebel (100) that the individual's 'protest' at 
the meaninglessness of the world will carry him beyond absurdity and the 
spectre of annihilation. 'Human insurrection' is 'a prolonged protest 
against death'. Camus of course speaks of revolt as applied in a personal 
sense; he advocates not licentious revolution but 'a rebellion moderated by 
equilibrium and guaranteed in its moderation by the supreme relativiser, 
44 death'. Rebellion, he argues, entails man's 'refusal to be treated as an 
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object' (250), his assertion of personal being that saves him from being 
what Antonovna termed "'vegetation on the filthy heap of iniquity which the 
world is"' (3:3:256). And in Razumov she perceived '"an immense force of 
revolt'" (3:3:256) an intimation of his potential for eventual 
self-overcoming. 
Needless to say, Razumov did not share her view that impersonal 
revolutionary action can change 'this world of men' (3:3:256). To him, 'she 
was the true spirit of destructive revolution' (3:3:257), that 'species 
anarchistica within the educated proletariat' which Nietzsche condemns 
(Morals 3:26:157). Yet Conrad, faithful to his depiction of the world as 
informed with ironies and ambiguities, has the professor of languages 
present Antonovna as an arresting figure with her 'white hair ••• a 
testimony to the invincible vigour of revolt ••• , the unwrinkled face, 
the brilliant black glance, the upright compact figure, the simple, brisk 
self-possession of the mature personality' (3:3:258) 
that Nietzsche would not find morally unattractive. 
personal attributes 
Conrad depicts similar ambiguities in the Professor of The Secret 
Agent, who is presented as being wholly at one with his nihilistic 
attitude. During his meeting with Ossipon in the basement of the Silenus 
Restaurant, he drank his beer with 'firmness, an assured precision 
calm ••• self-confident' (4:89, 90, 91). Those around him he condemned as 
'"inferior •••• Their character is built upon conventional morality. It 
leans on the social order. Mine stands free from everything artificial"' 
(4:93). "'I've the grit to work alone, quite alone, absolutely alone"' 
(4:94). 'Individualist by temperament', he had had the Sartrean strength to 
find his own truths that opposed those of his Christian father with his 
confidence 'in the privilege of his righteousness' (4:102). The Professor 
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had come to look on 'the true nature of the world' as entailing a morality 
that was 'artificial, corrupt and blasphemous' (5:102) and had accordingly 
resolved with fanaticism to destroy the 'established social order' -- but, 
crucially, without any responsible concern for establishing new values in 
place of those he wished to overthrow. In this he and the band of 
anarchists are given a negative cast by Conrad, who displays similar 
antipathy to Mr X in 'The Informer'. As Jocelyn Baines has observed, 45 Xis 
thoroughly cynical and callous, traitrously content to continue his 
luxurious living and cling to his bronzes and china. He is utterly lacking 
in genuine commitment. 
Antonovna in Under Western Eyes is presented in less damning hues. 
Looking at her, Razumov 'reflected that a revolutionist is seldom true to 
the settled type. All revolt is the expression of strong individualism' 
(3:3:258). In her brand of rebellion Antonovna had found what was true for 
her. She knew that 'no one is born an active revolutionist. The change 
comes disturbingly, with the force of a sudden vocation, bringing in its 
train agonizing doubts, assertive violences, an unstable state of the soul, 
till the final appeasement of the convert in the perfect fierceness of 
conviction' (3:4:262-3). Though Razumov's perceptions point ultimately to 
the perils of fanaticism, there is much here that the existentialist would 
endorse. We recall Sartre's assertion that 'existence precedes essence', 
that 'man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world 
and defines himself afterwards' (Humanism 28). He wrestles with the 
Kierkegaardian problem of what he is to do, of finding a truth that is true 
for him (Journals 15), and in one of Sartre's 'extraordinary and marvelous 
instants' embraces 'a new project ••• in which humiliation, anguish, 
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joy hope are delicately blended' (~othingness 476), entailing Heideggerian 
'resoluteness which is ready for anxiety' (Time 443). 
The existential concern with the quest for selfhood is raised again 
overtly by the professor of languages towards the end of his narration when 
he returns to Councillor Mikulin's 'simple question "Where to?" on which we 
left Mr Razumov in St Petersburg •••• "Where to?" was the answer in the 
form of a gentle question to what we may call Mr Razumov's declaration of 
independence' (4:1:281). Razumov's new situation, as we have seen, 
plunged him into the anxiety of the Kierkegaardian problem of deciding what 
action to take, of finding his own truths, and 'the consciousness of his 
position presented itself to him as something so ugly, dangerous, and 
absurd' (4:1:284). In moments of Sartean bad faith he dreamily sought 
escape from the problem of defining himself, imagining 'himself to be 
existing languidly somewhere very far away from everything that had ever 
happened to him' (4:1:286). 
But the demands of conscience -- the call of one's deepest imperatives 
that bespeak authenticity -- dogged him remorselessly, and 'whenever he went 
abroad he felt himself at once closely involved in the moral consequences of 
his act' (4:1:286). Oppressed by Kierkegaard's 'crowd', by 'the 
conversational, commonplace, unavoidable intercourse with the other kind of 
students' (4:1:286), he found no 'retreat' from facing the self that he felt 
'no longer belonged to himself' (4:1:287); 'his existence was a great cold 
blank' (4:1:289). 
Associated with the call of conscience was Haldin's haunting presence, 
which Razumov constantly strove to shake off, rather like Dr Monygham in 
Nostromo, who -- 'the slave of a ghost' (3:4:318) -- sought to evade the 
spectre of his dead inquisitor, Father Beron. Indeed, the professor 
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describes Razumov's overwheming desire to cut short his visit to Haldin's 
mother as 'frankly a flight' (4:3:318). Such bad-faith evasion, however, 
can never bring inner peace: even if one flees the external source of 
anxiety one is thrown back on one's secret 'inwardness'. And so Razumov 
found his 'retreat cut off' by Natalia (4:3:318), whose self-deceiving 
picture of him fuelled afresh his self-disgust. But in one of Sartre's 
'marvelous instants' he suddenly fell silent before her, as if providing 'a 
sign of momentous resolution' (4:3:325), the by now familiar Heideggerian 
'resoluteness' that betokens 'the loyalty of existence to its own Self' 
(Time 443). Razumov was clearly about to embark on authentic existence by 
confessing to Natalia the truth about himself, thereby overcoming himself 
and opening himself to the creation of a self with which he could be at one. 
His admitting to his role in her brother's death may have devastated 
Natalia, but it left Razumov 'washed clean' (4:4:330), a spiritual cleansing 
symbolised by the 'heavy shower' that drenched him on his walk home 
(4:4:329). His words addressed to her in his confessional journal reveal 
his realisation that endless evasion would never have brought him inner 
peace: "'While shunning the sight of you, I could never succeed in driving 
away your image •••• You were appointed to undo the evil by making me 
betray myself back into truth and peace'" (4:4:331). His words acknowledge 
that he had "'embraced the might of falsehood"' (4:4:332), both towards 
others and himself, until "'the truth shining in you drew the truth out of 
me •••• In giving Victor Haldin up, it was myself, after all, whom I have 
betrayed most basely"' (4:4:333). 
Not that Razumov's new self would make him one of the revolutionary 
'crowd'. "'Have I then the soul of a slave? No! I am independent"' 
120 
(4:4:333). With this newly won self-sufficiency he felt himself able 
publicly to reveal his part in the Haldin affair and to declare: "'Today I 
made myself free from falsehood, from remorse -- independent of every single 
human being on this earth'" (4:4:338). The professor was ironically correct 
when he had 'felt a strange certitude that Mr Razumov was going home' as he 
saw him leaving the chateau (4:2:305); Razumov, again like Jim, was indeed 
finally to be 'at home' in the world. 
His long quest for sovereign individuality had taken him on a terrible 
journey, which ended with Nikita's enraged blows that left him deaf and 
unable to hear the tramcar which crippled him. But he had won inner peace 
for himself, and had also provided a means for Tekla's self-fulfilment. And 
not only hers: Natalia too was transformed by his revelations. She 
'looked matured by her open and secret experiences ', the professor 
records, 'talking slowly, smooth-browed, with a resolute profile. She gave 
me a new view of herself. • • It was the perfection of collected 
independence. The strength of her nature had come to surface because the 
obscure depths had been stirred' (4:5:342). 
This was also the case with Winnie Verloc in The Secret Agent when she 
discovered that Verloc had caused the death of her brother, had reduced him 
to 'raw material for a cannibal feast' (4:106). It released her inner 
energies, as if she were 'ready to tear off violently' the 'mask' she had 
been wearing (9:198) -- much like the 'mask' Mrs Schomberg in Victory 
(2:3:90) never managed to discard. Winnie's changed consciousness (and the 
mind, says the narrator, is capable of 'altering even the aspect of 
inanimate things' [11:225]), perceived her husband in a new light, and she 
finally acknowledged to herself that her bargain with him was over. She was 
suddenly 'clear sighted', in 'almost preternaturally perfect control of 
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every fibre of her body. It was all her own', no longer Verloc's sexual 
object (11:233). Amid her self-assertion she struck the death blow of the 
man who had reduced her to inauthentic being -- only to lapse into Sartrean 
evasion both of the new self she had become and of the trickle of blood, the 
emblem of her deed, that seemed 'the first sign of a destroying flood' 
(11:236). Yet she had for a brief spell broken the grip of bland 
inauthenticity to experience the disturbing, invigorating fulness of 
authentic selfhood. 
Such self-sufficiency almost just as short lived -- was also the 
ultimate hallmark of Lena and Heyst in Yictory. But, as with Jim and 
Razumov, it was won only after a long struggle against the forces of 
inauthentic being. The initial picture we get of Heyst is of his 'inertia', 
at which the narrator and his colleagues who were flung 'out there' used to 
laugh, though 'not inimically. An inert body can do no harm to anyone, 
provokes no hostility, is scarcely worth derision' (1:1:19). In short, Axel 
Heyst had become little better than the inanimate world of in-itself around 
him. 
In this he was somewhat like Adolf Verloc, who is described as 
'constitutionally averse from every superfluous exertion ••• lazy, 
undemonstrative and burly in a fat-pig style' (2:52), his 'mission in life' 
being 'the protection of the social mechanism' (2:53-4). He was simply a 
Heideggerian 'One', the nondesript creature is of us is before he is a true 
'I', the mere existent who has been 'surrendered' to the 'inauthenticity' of 
the 'they' (Time 166). 
Not surprisingly, then, Vladimir's demand for action required of him as 
an agent provocateur filled Verloc with the Kierkegaardian 'fear and 
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trembling' that accompanies the threshold of any important undertaking. He 
felt 'startled and alarmed', agitated even 'by the faint buzzing of a fly': 
'the useless fussing of that tiny, energetic organism affected unpleasantly 
this big man threatened in his indolence' (2:62). Rather than protest 
against Vladimir's command in obedience to his own inner preferences, Verloc 
embarked on action that constituted bad faith to himself, just as he lived 
his domestic life in bad faith with Winnie and Stevie. He was constrained 
to action by external forces, like the title character of 'The Anarchist' 
who, as Edward W. Said comments, 46 acted simply as the person he had been 
told to become, without examining the real basis of his existence. 
In Victory, however, Heyst eventually embarked on action of his own 
choosing, overcoming the pose of detachment he had foisted on himself in bad 
faith at his father's injunction when the younger man had made the misguided 
decision to 'drift altogether and literally, body and soul', as his 'defence 
against life' (2:3:87). He 'was not a hermit by temperament', and some 
inner call finally drew him out of his 'retreat' (1:1:40). Given various 
identities by others -- 'Enchanted Heyst', 'Hard Facts' (1:1:22), 'Hermit' 
(1:4:39) -- he would existentially have to propose and realise his own 
identity, his own image of self. 
Heyst's first step in his Sartrean 'project' towards his possibilities 
was his taking Lena away with him, that 'plunge' (2:2:76) which landed them 
without any support from conventional morality in their dependence on 
themselves alone for guidance, 'face to face in a moral desert as arid as 
the sands of Sahara' (2:2:78). But even in his new life with her 'there 
still lingered in him a sense of incompleteness not altogether overcome --
which, it seemed, nothing ever would overcome' (3:4:179). Man, after all, 
is ever 'in process of becoming'. To Heyst, his sense of being 'uprooted' 
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seemed 'an unnatural state of existence' (3.5:182); to Sartre, it is in fact 
the very condition of man, who is nothing till he fashions a meaning for 
himself. Heyst struggled still to flee the ghost of his father, who had 
disparaged love and had counselled detachment as a mode of escape from his 
existential vision of 'universal nothingness' (3:5:184), the opposite of 
Stein's urging Jim to engage the 'destructive element' (20:163). 
That element is of course given its vilest embodiment in Jones, Ricardo 
and Pedro, who produced in Heyst the disturbing awareness that his present 
self would not suffice to deal with them. 'The outer world had broken upon 
him' (3:9:212), and he would have to grapple with it. But "'how is one to 
• resist, assert oneself ••• ?'" (4:8:282). The answer, it 
appears, is to follow one's own inner imperatives, even if they lead 
ultimately to self-destruction in physical terms: Lena's death was a 
victory because it came in the fulness of authentic being. Her existence 
prior to her meeting Heyst had plainly been inauthentic, subject to 'the 
sordid conditions and brutal incidents' that came with touring as a member 
of the Zangiacomos' ladies' orchestra, among women who were often 'anything 
but musicians by profession' (1:5:45). Reduced to an object (whom Mrs 
Zangiacomo had no compunction about pinching), she had not taken charge of 
her life until her deliberate decision to elope with Heyst, choosing to let 
him give her a new name, the identity of a new self that would no longer 
pass as Magdalen (with its connotations of prostitution) or Alma (with its 
associations -- like Nostromo -- of 'ours', our possession, or of an 
Egyptian dancing girl viewed as a sexual object). 
Her love for Heyst provided her with a greater sense of personal 
authenticity, just as Dr Monygham's love for Emilia Gould in Nostromo 
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heightened his existence. Hitherto the doctor had led a life that had left 
him with a 'withered soul' after 'many arid years' until he found himself 
'refreshed' by his love for Emilia (3:4:315) -- a love that spurred him to 
redeem his past life, as Antonia Avellanos's love might have redeemed Martin 
Decoud's life had his decision to take part in the removal of the silver not 
landed him in untenable isolation on the Great Isabel. Monygham felt 
himself an 'outcast spirit' estranged from the 'respectable people' around 
around him (3:4:316) and had once longed for death at the hands of the 
captors who had crippled his ankles but had released him, maimed and 
bedraggled, 'to take possession of his liberty' (3:4:319). He purposefully 
used this liberty to make for himself 'an ideal conception of his disgrace' 
(3:4:319), settling the 'great fund of loyalty' in his nature on Emilia 
(3:4:320). She, of course, did not reciprocate his affection but, chaining 
herself to her husband and the San TomJ mine, succumbed to 'an immense 
desolation, the dread of her own continued life' (3:11:431). Rather than 
act to alter her inauthentic condition she merely 'sighed without opening 
her eyes -- without moving at all' (3:11:430). Thus, in spite of her 
potential to do so, she failed to achieve an authentic existence -- even 
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though Lois A. Michel would claim the contrary. 
Through devotion to what mattered most to him Monygham eventually 
gained a sense of 'self-respect' that 'was marked inwardly by the almost 
complete disappearance from his dreams of Father Berbn' (3:11:420). Free at 
last of the ghost that was so looming a part of the self he had desperately 
sought to overcome, he achieved a fuller sense of selfhood that gave 
authenticity to his existence through fidelity to the devotion that sprang 
(3:11:4-30) 
from 'the truth of his nature~· 
Lena's similar loyalty to Heyst in Victory brought her, too, a new 
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sense of self, so that she at last felt free of the 'they' who had been 'too 
many' for her (2:2:75), transported to a realm where there was no one to 
'think anything' of her and Heyst, 'good or bad' (3:3:160), where their own 
existentially formulated values could prevail. Having chosen to base her 
new identity so firmly on Heyst's love, she was deeply troubled 'with the 
sensation of having been abandoned to her own devices' when she woke from 
her 'painful dream of separation' from him (3:9:206). Ricardo became the 
unwitting instrument that helped her overcome this disturbing apprehension 
of Sartrean abandonment by prompting her to affirm Heyst as her raison 
d'etre, her means to finding value in her own existence as an individual who 
mattered -- even though Ricardo and Jones seemed to her 'a sort of 
retribution from an angry Heaven' for her having transgressed the 
conventional morality of the masses by choosing to live with Heyst 'of her 
own free will, with her whole soul yearning unlawfully' (4:8:285). 
Despite these assaults of public conscience on her private conscience, 
however, Lena had through her own sovereign self freed herself from her 
supposed 
former life, and she now determined to surmount even Heaven'sAinstrument, 
drawing sustenance from her love for Heyst. And so the former 
'fiddle-scraping girl picked up on the very threshold of infamy' now 
resolved to 'try to rise above herself, triumphant and humble; and then her 
happiness would burst on her like a torrent, flinging at her feet the man 
whom she loved' (4:8:284) in the joy that comes with Nietzschean 
self-fulfilment, when one treats onself with 'a wholesome and healthy love' 
and stops 'roving about' (Zarathustra 55:2:214). Whether or not she agreed 
with Ricardo's Heideggerian sentiment that they had both '''been chucked out 
into this rotten world of 'ypo~rits'" (4:2:242), she was determined to use 
A 
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her abandonment in a Jaspersian way that would bring self-fulfilment, even 
if it involved apparent self-sacrifice. 
She was fully resolved to use Ricardo's own knife on him -- and would 
have, had Jones's bullet intended for Ricardo not struck her. Her death 
might have been unintentional, but it was a wholly plausible outcome of her 
decision to resist the intruders from the outside world. Her dying moments 
filled her with a 'triumphant expression' and 'wild joy' (4:13:322), the 
exultation of being herself -- like those whom Yeats lauds for having 
'become the joy that is themselves' ('Discoveries', Essays and 
Introductions, 217). Her glory, Heyst told her, lay 'in your 
resourcefulness and your profound knowledge of yourself' (4:13:322). 
The melodramatic Martin Ricardo and 'plain Mr Jones' achieved no such 
glorious authenticity. Though they may have boasted of their evilness as 
proof of their independence from conventional morality, Sartre would deem 
this mere bad faith, a flight from reality. 'The sincere man constitutes 
himself as a thing in order to escape the condition of a thing •••• The 
man who confesses that he is evil has exchanged his disturbing "freedom-for-
evil" for an inanimate character of evil; he is evil, he clings to himself, 
he is what he is' (Nothingness 65). 
Ricardo's and Jones's treatment of Pedro their factotum (who is always 
depicted in animal imagery) 48 as a base object immediately classifies them 
by Heidegger's standards as inauthentic, much in the way this attitude 
condemns so many characters in The Secret Agent. Verloc was regarded by 
Vladimir as merely a 'useful' instrument, which is exactly how he was seen 
by Chief Inspector Heat and the Assistant Commissioner, to whom he was 
simply a 'tool' (7:145). The main characteristic of Verloc's being was 
clearly that of Marcellian 'functionalism'. He in turn treated Winnie 'with 
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the regard one has for one's chief possession' (8:174), and dealt with 
Stevie too as a thing, calling him to his fatal expedition as if he were 
inviting 'the attendance of the household dog' (9:179). 
There was not, however, any deliberate malice in Verloc's reification 
of others, whereas Jones and Ricardo actively considered people as simply 
'samples of intensely artless, helpless humanity' (2:6:106), and Jones's 
misogyny very likely derived in part from his consideration of women as mere 
objects for whom he had no sexual 49 use. Ricardo similarly reduced Lena to 
the condition of a thing, lustfully regarding her as 'no meat for the likes 
of that tame, respectable gin-slinger' Heyst (4:3:244). Though Ricardo and 
Jones may not have been 'tame', in Schomberg's plausible estimation they 
were none the less simply common thieves (3:7:118). 
Viewing the world as they did, they eagerly embraced the tale of 
Heyst's 'plunder' (2:8:135) offered by Schomberg, who 'believed ••• 
firmly in the reality of Heyst as created by his own power of false 
inferences' (2:8:139). Ricardo pursued the 'truth' of this tale 'in the 
manner of men of sounder morality and purer intentions than his own; that is, 
he pursued it in the light of his own experiences and prejudices', as 
existentialists contend all men do. 'For facts ••• can be only tested 
by our own particular suspicions' (2:8:135). Even Lena had at first 
believed Schomberg's 'outside' version (3:4:175) of Heyst's dealings with 
Morrison, until Heyst reminded her of the dubious 'value of human judgement' 
(3:4:176). As we have seen the narrator remark, 'There is a quality in 
events which is apprehended differently by different minds or even by the 
same mind at different times' (3:8:205). Though Jones later came to doubt 
'the Schombergian theory of Heyst' (3:10:216), to Ricardo it had become 'a 
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profound conviction •••• His patron's doubts were a wanton denying of what 
was self-evident' (3:10:217). In truth, of course, it was self-evident only 
from Ricardo's perspective. 
Conrad's works constantly point to such subjectivity. We remember that 
in The Secret Agent Verloc felt he inhabited the 'solitude of a vast and 
hopeless desert', which was how his 'mental vision' perceived 'this fair 
earth, our common inheritance' (8:174). Not for him the benign view of 
things enjoyed by the Dickensian Sir Ethelred's secretary, Toodles, who 
blandly considered 'this earth. to be a nice place to live on' 
(10:201). In Nostromo, from Teresa Viola's perspective her request for a 
priest was a crucial matter; to Nostromo, it was an old woman's 
idiosyncrasy. "'Women"', her husband Giorgio had commented, "'have their 
own ways of tormenting themselves'" (2:7:223). Likewise, Nostromo too 
brooded on things from his own subjective point of view. 'With admirable 
and human consistency he referred everything to himself', interpreting the 
owl's cry he heard on waking after his long swim as a portent of Teresa's 
death and 'a fitting welcome for his betrayed individuality' (3:8:352), 
betrayed not by others as he surmised but -- as with Razumov -- by himself. 
Ricardo similarly deceived himself in his belief that he was not merely 
Jones's lackey. '"I follow a gentleman. That ain't the same thing as to 
serve an employer. They give you wages as they'd fling a bone to a dog'" 
(3:7:127), he declared in an echo of old Giorgio, in whose estimation 'the 
rich in general' reduced the poor to an inauthentic existence, keeping them 
'as they kept dogs, to fight and hunt for their service' (3:8:349). Jones's 
final treatment of his 'secretary' (tinged no doubt with sexual jealousy) 
revealed that Ricardo in fact meant no more to him than did any other 
object. Like Ricardo, Jones 'cared for no one, friend or enemy' (4:6:271). 
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To him Ricardo was scarcely an individual in his his own right, being 
merely 'of the faithful-retainer class -- absolutely identified with all my 
ideas, wishes, and even whims' (4:11:304). 
Ricardo's claims to the contrary suggest his deep-seated insecurity. 
He was not self-possessed. He dreaded the 'damaging' effect of failure 
'upon his own appreciation of Martin Ricardo' (3:10:213) and could not brook 
Jones's opinion of Heyst as '"a very self-possessed man. 
"'Ay, that's it. Self "Ricardo choked with indignation. "I would 
soon let out some of his self-possession through a hole between his ribs'" 
(3:10:216). This response, and his bravado, mark Ricardo as labouring under 
an inferiority complex, a mark of inauthenticity but still in Sartre's view 
a free project of a person's own being-for-himself in the world when 
confronted with some other existent. Consciously or not, the individual has 
chosen that inferiority complex, which he should acknowledge and fight 
against -- since it stems from the projection of his initial plan of failure 
into a system of many separate failures. In maintaining the choice of 
inferiority, rather than overcoming it, he is of bad faith. But Ricardo did 
not have sufficient knowledge of himself to effect such a Nietzschean 
self-overcoming, and he 'was human enough to suffer from the discovery of 
his limitations' (4:1:234). "'What do you know about yourself?'" Jones had 
asked in response to Ricardo's assertion that Heyst was not "'likely to be 
cleverer than I am'" (3:10:224). 
Not that Jones had any greater portion of self-knowledge. In his 
supercilious self-grandeur he saw himself, despite his Satanic manner, as an 
aloof god: "'I am he that is'" (4:11:302), he announced in words redolent 
of the Old Testament burning bush that addressed Moses. This might sound 
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them -- in short, a result of his bad faith towards himself, as Seymour-
Smith has commented.so Nostromo's death, ostensibly an accident (like 
Lena's), would not have occurred had he not returned to the island by night 
for the silver. Again, character is fate. 
To the last he could not free himself from the world's opinion of him, 
the fear that the absence of the four ingots Decoud had taken would have 
been interpreted by others as theft by the Capataz, a blemish on his public 
reputation. 'The silver has killed me' (3:13:460), he gasped in his dying 
breath; what really killed him was his chosen devotion in bad faith to it 
and, ironically, his desire to be true to his 'essence', which, as he saw 
it, lay in 'the admiring eyes of men' (3:12:433). This meant being someone 
else's man rather than his own: the Goulds, Teresa Viola predicted early 
on, would display him publicly with the boast, "'This is our Nostromo ! '" 
(1:4:53). He did indeed become Gould's man, an 'invaluable' tool in his 
plans for the silver (2:1:139). 51 As Johnson has remarked, both Nostromo 
and Gould formed their basic modes of being in relation to the Sartean 
in-itself of the San Tome silver, which condemned them to inauthenticity. 
Nostromo embraced the saving of the ingots as the very foundation of his 
existence, making it more important than the fetching of a priest for the 
dying Teresa, who upbraided him for succumbing to '''the praise of people who 
have given you a silly name -- and nothing besides -- in exchange for your 
soul and body'" (2:7:226). Yet Teresa's words do indicate that at the time 
Nostromo, desperate for public acclaim, was unreflectively following his own 
inner imperative, misguided though it was: '"Ah! you are always yourself, 
indeed'" -- even if his resolve was "'folly'" that would "'betray'" him 
(2:7:227). Through the removal of the treasure he did not deliberately 
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like an affirmation of self (and indeed it does remind us that every man is 
a discrete individual). But Jones and Ricardo did not utilise their 
individuality to alter themselves. Instead, they were like Sartre's 'evil 
man' who 'clings to himself, he is what he is' (Nothingess 65). 
The ultimate sterility of Jones's inauthentic existence is mirrored in 
his corpselike mien, an emaciated slave to a 'material inducement' -- his 
desire for Heyst's non-existent booty (4:11:306) -- and to sexual jealousy 
when he discovered Ricardo's knowledge of Lena's presence. He was 'a 
masquerading skeleton out of a grave' (4:11:312) -- soon to be literally in 
a grave, in all probability by his own hand, as Davidson suggested. 
"'Alone, his game clearly up, and fairly trapped'" (4:4:327), he evaded his 
self by surrendering it to the in-itself of the ocean. 
Though at the novel's end, in the words of Shakespeare's Prince of 
Verona, 'all are punished' and an absurd universe has wrought a senseless 
denouement, we realise that the value of individual lives has lain in the 
manner in which they were lived. Heyst and Lena may have been brought low 
by the unreflective Ricardo and Jones, but in their anguished deliberation 
the lovers achieved a degree of authentic selfhood -- however brief -- never 
approached by their antagonists. 
The sense of authentic selfhood gained by the lovers in Nostromo was 
even briefer, Nostromo's recognition of his false priorities coming too 
late. In the arms of Giselle Viola, 'the slave of the San Tom~ silver' 
(3:12:445) finally resolved to unburden himself of his secret hoard. But 
the release this decision brought was not to last. The 'perpetual struggle 
and the strife he carried in his breast', born of 'his silver fetters' 
(3:13:449), remained with him to the very moment of the death that came as a 
direct result of his having hidden the ingots and having become enslaved to 
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embark on any carefully considered new project of selfhood; he merely sought 
to enhance the considerable reputation he already possessed among the 'they'. 
But the potential for recognising and altering one's inauthenticity is 
ever present. Waking from his long sleep after the rigours of hiding the 
silver, Nostromo seemed to emerge from a condition of non-conscious 
in-itself into conscious for-itself. 'He stood knee deep amongst the 
whispering undulations of the green blades with the lost air of a man just 
born into the world. , and stretched himself with a slow twist of the 
waist and a leisurely growling yawn of white teeth, as natural and free from 
evil in the moment of waking as a magnificent and unconscious wild beast. 
Then, in the suddenly steadied glance fixed upon nothing from under a 
thoughtful frown, appeared the man' (3:7:347). He was an individual esse 
capable of cogitare and open to the possibility of authentic existence. 
With a sense of revulsion he now perceived the empty inauthenticity of 
his life. Whether he would surmount this sense of despair lay solely in his 
hands. Like Razumov, he was left with the terible question, 'Where to?' 
(3:8:353). Nostromo could not return openly to his masters -- who in any 
event had never taken him 'into account' (3:8:353) -- even though in service 
to them and their silver he had ridden roughshod over Teresa's request, 
placing 'material interest' above her spiritual needs. 
Dr Monygham, seeking to exploit Nostromo's despair for his own purposes 
(which to the doctor meant what he thought was best for Emilia Gould), 
offered him the blandishment that he was '"the only man"' with the '"power 
to save this town and ••• everybody from ••• destructive rapacity'" by 
surrendering the silver to Sotillo, Perdito or Camacho (3: 9: 380). "'You 
must be true to yourself, Capataz. It would be worse than folly to fail 
now'" (3:9:382). This plunged Nostomo into further uncertainty as to where 
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exactly his loyalty to his desire for a truer self lay. '"True to myself. 
How do you know that I would not be true to myself if I told you to go to 
the devil with your propositions?"' (3:9:382). He still felt that "'there 
is no getting away from a treasure that once fastens upon your mind"' 
(3:9:385) and, to his credit, acknowledged to himself that he was the 
silver's victim. 'To become the slave of a treasure with full self-
knowledge is an occurrence rare and mentally disturbing' (3:12:432), and the 
existentialist would consider it encumbent on the individual to act 
purposefully on such recognition. But Nostromo, though he 'hated the feel 
of the ingots', 'clung' to the instrument of his alienation 'with a more 
tenacious, mental grip' (3:12:43Z ). When he finally did make a choice 
that augured fuller selfhood, death intervened. 
The silver that led to Nostromo's death left virtually no character in 
the novel untouched -- particularly not the Goulds, as we shall see further 
in chapter 4. The figure in Nostromo whose life is the most obviously 
inauthentic, however, is Martin Decoud, who enters the scene described as 
'an idle boulevardier ••• welcomed in the pleasure-haunts of pressmen. 
This life, whose dreary superficiality is covered by the glitter of 
universal blague, like the stupid clowning of a harlequin by the spangles of 
a motley costume' (2:3:151-2), clearly reveals Decoud's inauthenticity, and 
calls to mind the Russian 'harlequin' in Heart of Darkness (2:122) with his 
'destitution, his loneliness, the essential desolation of his futile 
wanderings. For months -- for years -- his life hadn't been worth a day's 
purchase' (3:126). 
Decoud's manner 'induced in him a Frenchified -- but most un-French 
cosmopolitanism, in reality a mere barren indifferentism posing as 
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intellectual superiority. he was in danger of remaining a sort of 
nondescript dilettante all his life' (2:3:152). In Sartrean terms, this 
danger could be averted only by Decoud's purposefully fashioning a project 
for the attainment of a more rewarding life. Antonia had castigated him 
years earlier for 'the aimlessness of his life' (2:3:154), yet his decision 
to support Costaguana's attempts at political liberation was made in bad 
faith, with all his usual levity and cynicism. Though he may have informed 
Emilia Gould that 'he felt no longer an idle cumberer of the earth' by 
having become 'the Journalist of Sulaco' (2:3:156), his existence remained 
an uncommittted sham. Indeed, he admitted that his journalism did not 
spring from what he considered to be his true self but was in fact "'deadly 
nonsense. Deadly to me!"' (2:5:172). His strongest aspiration was to carry 
Antonia 'away out of these deadly futilities of pronunciamientos and 
reforms' (2:5:175). 
Certainly Decoud considered himself prepared to take any risk for 
Antonia's sake, with '"faith in my own ideas, in my own remedies, in my own 
desires"' (2:6:198). But he failed to act on this belief in his 
intellectual independence. Though he realised full well that his life was 
inauthentic, that the views of the 'crowd' were a Kierkegaardian 'untruth' 
to him, he simply perpetuated his cynical self-superiority, much as Razumov 
initially did. Curiously enough, Decoud's very determination to remain in 
Sulaco for Antonia's sake was in fact a flight from the self he perceived 
himself to be at the time as his admitted sense of 'solitude' testified 
(2:6:210). He insisted that his decision to aid in the removal of the 
silver was undertaken not through any desire of '"running away"' (2:7:218) 
but out of love for Antonia. He would go with the Capataz de Cargadores 
only "'to return -- to play my part in the farce to the end, and, if 
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successful, to receive my reward, which no one but Antonia can give me"' 
(2:7:219). He was of course not successful, and the silver dragged him to 
the depths of the Placid Gulf. 
Monygham, too, ultimately gave himself over to the silver, by virtue of 
his loyalty to Emilia Gould. It 'claimed him at last! This claim, exalted 
by a spiritual detachment from the usual sanctions of hope and reward, made 
Dr Monygham's thinking, acting, individuality, extremely dangerous to 
himself and to others, all his scruples vanishing in the proud feeling that 
his devotion was the only thing that stood between an admirable woman and a 
frightful disaster' (3:8:362). His 'terrible pursuit of his idea' (3:8:364) 
led him to treat Nostromo as simply an object, which consigned them both to 
inauthenticity. 'He did not think of him humanly' but as 'the only possible 
messenger to Cayta' (3:8:362). Though 'he esteemed highly the intrepidity' 
of the Capataz, he 'valued' him 'but little, being disillusioned as to 
mankind in general, because of the particular instance in which his own 
manhood had failed', aware that 'the most dangerous element common' to all 
men was 'the crushing, paralysing sense of human littleness, which is what 
really defeats a man struggling with natural forces, alone, far from the 
eyes of his fellows' (3:8:363) -- Decoud's fate exactly. 
Clearly Monygham revealed many of the qualities existentialists 
associate with inauthentic being. But through his loyalty to Emilia he did 
eventually find the conception that gave his life meaning, the personal 
truth Kierkegaard demands each man find for himself in order to achieve 
authentic selfhood. It is such authenticity (however brief) that ultimately 
redeems existence, as we have seen Conrad repeatedly suggest -- in Jim, 
Stein, Razumov, Tekla, Natalia, Lena and, now, even Dr Monygham. It is a 
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central theme throughout his work, and one that unfolds very much along 
existential lines. 
This pursuit of authenticity is evident too in Heart of Darkness, 
though here the emphasis is not so much on an existential quest for 
authentic selfhood as on a degree of profound self-discovery unmatched in 
any of Conrad's other works. Kurtz not only knew himself, he was himself. 
Not that Kurtz is shown fashioning a deliberate Sartrean project of what he 
wished himself to become: his purpose was to unveil his deepest self 
unfettered by the inauthentic claims of Heidegger's conventional 'they'. We 
find him already supremely self-assertive, rather than still engaged in a 
series of arduous attemtps at achieving 'the individual completion of the 
self which haunts the for-itself' (Sartre, Nothingness, 91). Whether his 
behaviour was morally reprehensible or not, and whether he himself 
considered it monstrous or not, Kurtz acted on the promptings of his own 
dictates, not those of Kierkegaard's detested 'crowd' -- and thereby 
experienced a depth of existence unknown to men who are constantly 
preoccupied with inauthentic Marcellian 'functionalism'. 
Like Jim, Kurtz lived out his self-discovery in a remote world removed 
from the constraints of his former social milieu or class, in a realm where 
'anything can be done' (2:91). The Congo, Marlow says, was to Kurtz what 
England once was to a Roman commander 'nineteen hundred years ago' (1:49): 
'one of the dark places of the earth' (1:48). Again, all is relative. That 
Marlow is able to admire Kurtz's achievement amid its moral ambiguity lies 
in his seaman's perspective as a 'wanderer' who 'did not represent his 
class' (1:48). If the omniscient narrator is viewed as being entrenched in 
his nineteenth-century setting, Marlow has greater flexibility of viewpoint 
-- even though he may be regarded, in Lionel Trilling's words, as an 'honest 
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soul' who despite his recognition of civilisation as 'fraudulent and 
. 52 
shameful' none the less has a 'passionate commitment' to it. 'The utter 
savagery' in the 'mysterious life of the wilderness that stirs in the 
forest, in the jungles, in the hearts of wild men', says Marlow, is 
'detestable', an 'abomination' (1:50). 
Yet he does point out that neither he nor his listeners aboard the 
Nellie ever experienced to the same degree the Sartrean sense of abandonment 
to his own resources endured by the man who had had 'to face the darkness' 
(1:50). 'What saves us is efficiency' (1:50), that busyness which makes us 
the world's 'prey', as Jaspers phrases it (Philosophy 2:5), and which in its 
baser dimensions reduces the individual to the status of 'a mere assemblage 
of functions' (2:2). This rote functionalism is given graphic depiction in 
the labouring Congolese who were ordered to dig an artificial hole just so 
as to give them 'something to do' (1:65). The only valuable work is the 
existential kind that offers you 'the chance to find yourself. Your own 
reality -- for yourself, not for others -- what no other man can ever know' 
(1:85). This was not given to the fireman on Marlow's river craft, who was 
also condemned to the inauthentic existence of a 'useful' object. 'He ought 
to have been clapping his hands and stamping his feet on the bank', at one 
with his world; 'instead of which he was hard at work, a thrall to strange 
(2: ~7) 
witchcraft, full of improving knowledge~ 'To look at him was as edifying 
as seeing a dog in a parody of breeches and a feather hat, walking on his 
hind-legs' (2:97). Even the station manager (though by no means in the same 
demeaned category as the company slaves) was a mere cipher. One who 
'originated nothing, he could keep the routine going -- that's all' (1:74), 
like the Nietzschean 'objective man' who does not know 'how to affirm or how 
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to deny' (~vil 207:116). 
Marlow would gain a deeper apprehension of life only once he had moved 
beyond 'the idleness of a passenger', beyond the 'they' with whom he would 
find he no longer had any 'point of contact', beyond 'the uniform sombreness 
of the coast' and the 'world of straightforward facts' that 'seemed to 
keep [him] away from the truth of things, within the toil of a mournful and 
senseless delusion' (1:61). As the existentialists constantly emphasise, 
preoccupation with quotidian activities leaves little time for reflecting on 
what one's personal truths should be. 
Yet the possibility of transcending inauthenticity is always present; 
once again we recall Kierkegaard saying that man is ever 'in process of 
becoming' (Postscript 84), which, as Edmond Jaloux has broadly argued, is 
1 f C d . f. 53 patent y true o so many onra 1an 1gures. The doctor who asked to 
measure Marlow's head as he set off for the Congo was of the same opinion; 
'"and, moreover, the changes take place inside, you know"' ( 1: 58). '"It 
would be interesting for science to watch the mental changes of individuals, 
on the spot'" (1:72). But to an existentialist the physiology of an 
individual can never reveal his essence. 
As in his constant emphasis on the unfathomable mystery of Jim the 
individual, Marlow in Heart of Darkness repeatedly stresses the 
impossibility of knowing another's 'mineness'. He would second Sartre's 
contention that, because each of us is ultimately alone in the world, we are 
closed to a full understanding of and by any other fellow being -- or, 
indeed, to absolute self-knowledge. 'It is impossible', Marlow says, 'to 
convey the life-sensation of any given epoch of one's existence -- that 
which makes its truth, its meaning -- its subtle and penetrating essence. 
It is impossible. We live, as we dream -- alone' (1:82). Once more we are 
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reminded of Satre's assertion that humankind has no shared essence, but 
that each individual creates his own particular essence, left to make his 
own discoveries about the self he is at 'any given epoch of [his] 
existence'. 
Marlow certainly recognised the inauthentic straits of his own life 
when he encountered a 'whirl of black limbs' (2:96) on the river bank at an 
early stage of his journey, putting us in mind of the narrator in Nostromo 
(4:4:317), who remarks that 'it may safely be said that primitive man did 
not go to the trouble of inventing tortures. He was indolent and pure of 
heart. He brained his neighbour ferociously with a stone axe from necessity 
and without malice'. There is, though, a marked tension between the 
controlled tone in Nostromo and Marlow's articulation of a similar 
sentiment, where his language is rampant with kinetic images and propelling 
syntax that convey the vibrancy of the free natives' unfettered jungle life, 
yet is infused with suspensions and question marks that suggest the 
speculative nature of his remarks, which are but uncertain gropings at 
explaining the unfathomable. In Marlow's words, the natives were not 
'inhuman •••• They howled and leaped, and spun, and made horrid faces; 
but what thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity •••• 
Ugly. Yes, it was ugly enough; but if you were man enough you would admit 
to yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace of a response to 
that terrible frankness of that noise. • And why not? The mind of 
man is capable of anything because everything is in it, all the past as 
well as all the future. What was there after all? Joy, fear, sorrow, 
devotion, valour, rage -- who can tell? -- but truth -- truth stripped of 
its cloak of time. Let the fool gape and shudder -- the man knows, and can 
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look on without a wink. But he must at least be as much of a man as these 
on the shore. He must meet that truth with his own true stuff -- with his 
own inborn strength. Principles won't do' (2:96-7). 
These are sentiments that would be wholly endorsed by Nietzsche, whom 
Freud regarded as having looked more deeply into human nature than anyone 
before him. 54 Nietzsche, who admired the Greeks' 'intellectual predilection 
for the hard, gruesome, evil, problematic aspect of existence' (Tragedy 17), 
has Zarathustra command mankind to 'become hard!' (56:29:240). Man's 
recognition of his conflicting impulses is in Nietzsche's estimation what 
gives him his capacity to create: 'For every strong and natural species of 
man, love and hate, gratitude and revenge, good nature and anger, 
affirmative acts and negative acts, belong together. One is good on 
condition one also knows how to be evil; one is evil because otherwise one 
would not understand how to be good' (Power 351:191). To become "'good 
human beings", herd animals, blue-eyed, benevolent, "beautiful souls" -- or 
as Mr Herbert Spencer would have it, altruistic -- would deprive existence 
of its great character' (Ecce Homo 330). Zarathustra despises those 'who 
think themselves good because they have crippled paws' (35:128). The 
multiplicity of the human self -- as manifold as that of the universe 
cannot be reduced to systematic formulae; as we remember Nietzsche saying, 
'I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a 
lack of integrity' (Idols 25). 
Yet Nietzsche is painfully aware of the darker elements which infuse 
that multiplicity, what Whitman called the 'multitudes' he 'contained'. 
The Birth of Tragedy (2:39) speaks of how terrible and revolting to current 
moral standards the deep urges in the hearts of men are: men have 'the most 
savage natural instincts , including even that horrible mixture of 
141 
sensuality and cruelty which has always seemed to me to be the real 
"witches' brew"'. 'Man rests, with the unconcern of his ignorance, on the 
55 pitiless, the ravenous, the insatiable, the murderous'. In him is 'matter, 
fragment, excess, clay, mud, madness, chaos; but in man there is also 
creator, sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divine spectator and the 
seventh day' (Evil 225:136). It requires a robust psyche to acknowledge 
this, and Nietzsche's 'new barbarian ••• who comes from the heights', a 
Promethean 'barbarian', is bred of the 'noble caste', whose 'superiority 
lay, not in their physical strength, but primarily in their psychical --
they were more complete human beings (which, on every level, also means as 
much as "more complete beasts"--)' (Evil 257:173). They had the inner 
strength to confront 'the horrible truth' which in lesser men promotes 
lassitude (Jragedy 7:60). 
That Kurtz had 'clay, mud, madness, choas' within him is borne out by 
the 'black, dried, sunken heads' in his domain (3:130), showing to Marlow 
that Kurtz 'lacked restraint' (3:131), that hallmark of the Nietzschean 
'great man' whose 'joy lies in self-constraint' (The Anti-Christ 57:178). 
The heads revealed 'that there was something wanting in him. • Whether 
he knew of this deficiency himself I can't say. I think the knowledge came 
to him at last -- only at the very last. But the wilderness had found him 
out early •••• I think it had whispered to him things about himself 
which he did not know, things of which he had no conception till he took 
counsel with this great solitude -- and the whisper had proved irresistably 
fascinating. It echoed loudly within him because he was hollow at the core' 
(3:131). To Marlow, then, Kurtz's whispered cry of 'The horror! The 
horror!' (3:161) remained enigmatic, but suggestive of some profound 
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discovery that Kurtz had made about himself and the world. As he lay in his 
death-throes, there came over Kurtz's face 'the expression of sombre pride, 
of ruthless power, of craven terror -- of an intense and hopeless despair. 
Did he live his life again in every detail of desire, temptataion, and 
surrender during that supreme moment of complete knowledge? He cried in a 
whisper at some image, at some vision -- he cried out twice, a cry that was 
no more than a breath --
"'The horror! The horror!'" (3:149). 
Avoiding that falling 'prey' to the routine world which Jaspers warns 
us against (Philosophy 2:5), Kurtz had in solitude, Nietzsche's 'terrible 
mistress', looked into the Nietzschean 'abyss' of the self -- and judged it 
a place of horror enveloped by a universe of horror, his 'wide and immense 
stare embracing, condemning, loathing all the universe' (3:156). What the 
precise nature of this horror was, Marlow never clarifies. But his 
intimations lend themselves to an existential reading that what Kurtz 
perceived was the nothingness, the 'hollowness', of his self and the world 
that, in Camus's words, 'everything is absurd' (The Rebel 10), and that in 
the midst of his terrible freedom he was abandoned to invent his own values, 
to pass judgement on himself through tormented inner struggle. Kurtz's 
soul, Marlow makes plain, 'had looked within itself, and, by heavens! I 
tell you, it had gone mad. I had -- for my sins, I suppose -- to go through 
the ordeal of looking into it myself. No eloquence could have been so 
withering to one's belief in mankind as his final burst of sincerity. He 
struggled with himself, too. I saw it, -- I heard it. I saw the 
inconceivable mystery of a soul that knew no restraint, no faith, no fear, 
yet struggling blindly with itself' (3:145). 
Kurtz clearly did not have the strength for Camusian revolt against the 
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Sartrean 'nausea' which comes with the realisation that everything is 
'superfluous' (Nausea 131), that 'there is no sense in life a priori' 
(Humanism 54), a realisation which to Sartre's characters is not destructive 
but liberating. As Johnson comments, there was nowhere Kurtz could look 
outside or within himself for ordained or innate sanctions. 56 He was left 
with the awareness that there is nothing man is meant to be: man is the 
nothingness from which all sense of being comes, from which, as Sartre says, 
all differentiation arises. Kurtz, looking into himself, made the 
horrendous discovery that he was 'hollow' -- nothing. 
But even though Kurtz failed to overcome this discovery, failed to 
transcend the self he was so as to embark on a new project of self, Marlow 
considers the very fact of Kurtz's discovery to have been a 'victory' 
(3:151). By grasping (if not straddling) the abyss, Kurtz had grown 
spiritually in his acceptance of himself as the sole creator of values and 
in his confrontation of his own emptiness, the poverty of his conscience, 
encountered through 'his intelligence ••• concentrated ••• upon 
himself with horrible intensity, yet clear' (3:144). To Marlow, meeting 
Kurtz had revealed new depths about himself, humanity and the world. Marlow 
himself had been faced with 'a choice of nightmares' (3:138): life in the 
'whited sepulchre' of the 'city' amid Kierkegaard's 'untruth' of 'the 
crowd', and the wilderness with its 'unspeakable secrets' (1:138) and 'the 
moral shock' they produced (3:141). Aware of the 'something altogether 
monstrous' (3:141) that Kurtz represented, Marlow nevertheless resolved to 
'be loyal to the nightmare of my choice. I was anxious to deal with this 
shadow by myself alone ••• this wandering and tormented thing' (3:141) 
which had achieved that sovereign individuality Nietzsche so admires, only 
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to be crushed by the awesome knowledge it revealed. 
Crushing too was the kind of wisdom Nietzsche records as having been 
imparted by Dionysus's companion Silenus at the urging of his captor, King 
Midas: '"Oh, wretched and ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, 
why do you compell me to tell you what it would be most expedient for you 
not to hear? What is best of all utterly beyond your reach: not to be 
born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is -- to die 
soon'" (Tragedy 3:42). And it was Kurtz's 'fate ••• to be buried 
presently in the mould of primeval earth' (3:147), to lose his tormented 
Sartrean for-itself to non-conscious in-itself. 
Despite the fact that Marlow 'had been permitted to draw back [his] 
hesitating foot' (3:151) from the edge that Kurtz had stepped over, Kurtz's 
view of things permeates Marlow's: 'Droll thing life is -- that mysterious 
arrangement of merciless logic for a futile purpose. The most you can hope 
from it is some knowledge of yourself -- that comes too late -- a crop of 
unextinguishable regrets' (3:150). This is the voice of an existential 
absurdist (though silent here on man's ability to overcome this bleak 
vision), who is yet able to assert that 'Kurtz was a remarkable man', who 
had carried out the existentialist's injunction to discover one's own truths 
about oneself and the world, to judge them according to one's own values 
amid affirmation of one's sovereign individuality. 'He had something to 
say. He said it. Since I had peeped over the edge myself, I understand 
better the meaning of his stare, that could not see the flame of the candle, 
but was wide enough to embrace the whole universe, piercing enough to 
penetrate all the hearts that beat in the darkness. He had summed up -- he 
had judged. "The horror!" He was a remarkable man. After all, this was the 
expression of some sort of belief; it had candour, it had conviction, it had 
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a vibrating note of revolt in its whisper, it had the appalling face of a 
glimpsed truth' (3:151). Kurtz's cry 'was an affirmation, a moral victory 
paid for by abominable defeats, by abominable terrors, by abominable 
satisfactions. But it was a victory!' (3:151). It had given him a measure 
of self-moving authenticity denied to those whose habitual condition of life 
straitens their range of experience. 
Even though Kurtz had realised that he rode -- as Nietzsche says 
mankind does -- on the back of a tiger (tellingly introduced by Coppola in 
Apocalypse Now), he had had the courage of a Nietzschean Ja-sagender to 
affirm his own truths, to live out the full range of his manifold impulses, 
possessing like Zarathustra 'the highest and the nethermost forces of human 
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nature, the sweeetest, wantonest and fearfullest'. Marlow, by contrast 
(even if his hesitating foot did suggest something of the eagle's talon), 
returned to civilisation and its crowds leading their inauthentic lives. 
'I found myself back in the sepulchral city resenting the sight of people 
hurrying through the streets to filch a little money from each other, to 
devour their infamous cookery, to gulp their unwholesome beer, to dream 
their insignificant and silly dreams' (3:152) -- like Nietzsche's 'belauded 
sages of the academic chairs' who, finding wisdom in 'sleep without dreams', 
'knew no higher significance of life' (Zarathustra 2:28). Marlow was left 
to a world he found empty of hope and desire as he 'tottered about the 
streets ••• grinning bitterly at perfectly respectable persons' (3:152). 
In the presence of Kurtz's Intended, he experienced Sartrean nausea at the 
oppressive gratuity of circumambient being, 'a sensation of panic in my 
heart as though I had blundered into a place of cruel and absurd mysteries 
not fit for a human being to behold' (3:157). He had a heightened and 
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alienating apprehension of the banality of quotidian life in comparison with 
the profundity of Kurtz's existence, which had given Kurtz a degree of 
authenticity most men never approach -- even though he had ultimately failed 
of full authenticity on account of his moral deformities. 
Yet Marlow could not bring himself to disabuse the Intended of her 
'great and saving illusion' (3:159). She was not (as T. S. Eliot's women 
of Canterbury say of average mankind) able to bear too much reality. Only 
the psychically strong dare look deeply into things, we remember Nietzsche 
warning, because 'the more superficially and coarsely it is conceived, the 
more valuable, definite, beautiful, and significant the world appears. The 
deeper one looks, the more our valuations disappear -- meaninglessness 
approaches' (Power 602:326). 'Woe to the fatal curiosity', he says, 'which 
should once be able to look through a crack out and down from the chamber of 
consciousness, and which should then divine that man rests, with the 
unconcern of his ignorance, on the pitiless, the ravenous, the insatiable, 
58 the murderous'. Marlow could never have told the Intended what he had 
encountered in the Congo: 'it would have been too dark -- too dark 
altogether' (3:162). It was a darkness, however, that had offered both him 
and Kurtz a depth of experience and knowledge -- terrible though it was 
unknown by the Heideggerian 'they' who are consigned to the shallows of 
bland inauthenticity. 
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3 Condemned to Be Free 
For the existentialist, engaging one's possibilities for authentic selfhood 
is crucially tied to one's complete freedom (albeit amid powerfully 
oppressive constraints) to choose a certain line of action above another, 
with all the responsibility this entails. Such freedom is a pervasive theme 
in Conrad, finding its most radical presentation in Heart of Darkness. 1 
Marlow emphasises how in 'utter solitude without a policeman •.. , where 
no warning voice of a kind neighbour can be heard whispering of public 
opinion ••• you must fall back upon your own innate strength' (2:116). 
As we have seen, Kurtz had no societal restraints, no guide other than 
himself. His was a particularly naked freedom with, as Sartre would say, 
'no limits ••• except freedom itself'; he was 'condemned to be free' 
(Nothingness 439). He had full reign, as Berdyaev would point out, to 
create the monstrous as well as the good (cf. Christian Existentialism 145). 
And in his 'hollowness' Kurtz chose to enact 'unspeakable rites' (2:118), 
devoid of any sense of wider responsibility. 
As Macquarrie points out, 'There can be few themes, if any, nearer to 
the heart of existentialism than freedom. The theme is present in all the 
existentialist writers'. 2 And crucially linked to freedom, as we shall see, 
are choice, action and responsibility. The notion of man's utter freedom 
receives an especially profound theoretical discussion in Nikolai Berdyaev's 
Christian Existentialism anthology (cf. 136-53), where in somewhat 
metaphysical and mystical language Berdyaev asserts that freedom needs no 
proof: it is already there as a condition of our existing. 'Freedom', he 
says, 'is baseless, neither determined by nor born of being' (137). It 
148 
'proceeds from the abyss which preceded being ••• the act of freedom is 
primordial and completely irrational' (136). Freedom cannot be grasped by 
thought and can be known only when it is exercised. 'The sphere of 
existential freedom is distinctly different from the sphere of objectivized 
and determined nature' (137). 
But, Berdyaev continues, 'we see at once that freedom has two 
different meanings. By freedom is meant either the primordial, irrational 
freedom which precedes good and evil and determines choice between them, or 
the final, reasonable freedom, freedom in good and truth, which is to say 
that freedom is understood both as the starting point and the way, and also 
as the end and the aim' (138). He thus distinguishes between the freedom 
which is prior to action and that which is subsequent to it. As a result, 
freedom in the world of men should not be regarded as irresponsibly 
arbitrary. It is linked to problems of sin and evil, involved in a 
dialectic whereby it can easily pass over into its opposite. The second 
kind of freedom can lead to 'compulsion and force in truth and good, to 
forced virtue, ••• to a tyrannical organization of human life' (140). 
Freedom therefore contains the seed of its own destruction. 'The tragedy of 
the world-process is that of freedom: it is born of the inner dynamic of 
freedom, of its capacity of changing into its opposite' (140). 
Yet freedom must be preserved and increased, despite risk and tragedy, 
since if freedom and existence are virtually synonymous, there is no 
humanity or human dignity without it. And Berdyaev links freedom to 
creativity, 'the mysterious power to create out of nothing' (145). Man can 
create the monstrous as well as the good, the beautiful, and the useful. 
Thus creativity must be given full play, so as to allow man the opportunity 
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of fashioning the self and the world he desires. 'Freedom needs resistance 
and struggle •••• The ancient taboos surround man on every side, cramp 
his moral life. And to liberate himself from their power, man must first 
feel himself inwardly free, and only then can he struggle externally for 
freedom •••• Man's liberation is not only from something, but for 
something. And this for is man's creativity' (142-3). 
In Kierkegaard and Sartre too freedom is equated with existence. One 
does not first exist and then become free; to be human is already to be 
free. 'Freedom is identical with my existence', says Sartre (Nothingness 
44). As Orestes declares in The Flies (121), 'I am my freedom'. 
Kierkegaard regards the self as the element of freedom in a dialectic 
between possibility and necessity -- freedom being the future possibility 
of the open self hedged about by the structural quality of the self that is 
already present amid the pressures that afflict it. And with such freedom 
comes anxiety, the 'dizziness of freedom which occurs when ••• freedom. 
gazes down into its own possibility'(Dread 55). 
Man is terrifyingly free to create his own essence and his own values: 
as Sartre's Orestes tells Zeus, upholding his own integrity by admitting 
without regret to his murder of Aegisthus, 'Suddenly, out of the blue, 
freedom crashed down on me and swept me off my feet •••• I knew myself 
alone, utterly alone in the midst of this well-meaning little universe of 
yours •••• And there was nothing left in heaven, no right or wrong, nor 
anyone to give me orders'. A few lines later Orestes comments, 'I am 
doomed to have no other law but mine •••• For I, Zeus, am a man, and every 
man must find out his own way' (The Flies 121-2). Man's freedom is the 
only foundation of values. Professor Mathieu in Jhe Age of Reason (320) 
considered himself 'free in every way . .•• He could do what he liked, • 
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there would be for him no Good nor Evil unless he brought them into 
being •••• He was alone, enveloped in [a] monstrous silence, free and 
alone, without assistance and without excuse, condemned to decide without 
support from any quarter, condemned forever to be free'. 
This was very much the position of Kurtz, who, recognising that he was 
wholly free to act as he chose, saw himself in his report as a man '"with 
the might of a deity"' among '"savages"'. '"By the simple exercise of our 
will we can exert a power for good practically unbounded'" (2:118), in the 
complete freedom to create our own standards of good and evil in a world 
where no absolute morality applies, where man is left to formulate his own 
notion of what he and the world truly are. Given the excesses he 
perpetrated, Kurtz (as Watt has remarked) 3 would have done well to recognise 
the need, as Camus puts it, not to be like men who have 'deified themselves' 
and so been driven to 'inhuman excesses' (The Rebel 305). Kurtz's behaviour 
may point to the desirability of moral absolutes, but it even more clearly 
demonstrates that none exist. Whatever emotional longings Conrad (like 
Hardy) might have had for religious sanctions, his fiction denies the 
presence of any guiding moral force from beyond man. 
Like the wounded helmsman on Marlow's river boat, Kurtz had 'no 
restraint' within himself (2:119), just as he had none from beyond himself. 
Instead, he indulged his every inclination unchecked, like some reckless 
deity. The youthful Russian 'harlequin' (2:122) looked on him as a sort 
of Old Testament God who '"could be very terrible"', who had come '"with 
thunder and lightning"', omnipotent: '"there was nothing on earth to 
prevent him killing whom he jolly well pleased'" (3:128). Kurtz lived 
'beyond the bounds of permitted aspirations', impervious to any appeal 'in 
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the name of anything high or low •.•• There was nothing either above or 
below him •••• He had kicked himself loose of the earth' (3:144). 
As with Sartre's Mathieu, then, Kurtz 'could do what he liked, 
free and alone, • without excuse, condemned to decide without support 
from any quarter' (Reason 320). Given the possible consequences of choice, 
however, Sartre stresses the tremendous responsibility that inheres in it. 
And the implications of responsibility extend beyond the individual chooser 
to all others as well: 'I am. responsible for myself and for all men, 
and [create] a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In 
fashioning myself I fashion man'; 'nothing can be better for us unless it is 
better for all' (Humanism 30, 29). (Adam Gillon is thus somewhat misleading 
in saying that Sartre considers man's freedom to be 'expressed in purely 
arbitrary preferences'; 'arbitrary' suggests ill-considered, capricious 
irresponsibility.) 4 
Sartre argues that in creating values through our choices we do not 
choose a pre-existing good but render something good when we choose it in 
good faith. He is vague on exactly how this happens, but apparently man's 
sense of responsibility -- allied to his conscience -- should provide 
sufficient guidance. No one can be truly himself and act in good faith if 
he chooses as his project of selfhood the images of pure ego or anti-social 
fascist, for example, since these would bespeak a maimed existence. 
Responsiblity, then, is crucial in exercising one's freedom. 'When a 
man commits himself to anything', says Sartre, 'fully realising that he is 
not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a 
legislator deciding for the whole of mankind -- in such a moment a man 
cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility' 
(Humanism 30). So, in taking an anguished decision one commits both oneself 
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and all mankind. Since one's sense of responsibility should control one's 
choices, only a diminished existent not responsibly himself makes choices 
that adversely affect men at large: the image one chooses for oneself 
should be an image one could choose for all men. 
This awesome responsibility, so embroiled in risk, descends on man 
through his being utterly reliant on himself alone, from his given position 
as the sole arbiter of worth. 'I am responsible for everything in fact', 
declares Sartre, 'except for my very responsibility, for I am not the 
foundation of my being' (~othingness 555). Paradoxically, this sense of 
responsibility is curiously liberating as far as Sartre is concerned. 'The 
one who realizes in anguish his condition as being thrown into a 
responsibility which extends to his very abandonment has no longer either 
remorse or regret or excuse; he is no longer anything but a freedom which 
perfectly reveals itself and whose being resides in this very revelation' 
(556). 
Nietzsche shares this view of the relation between responsibility and 
liberty, but in a personal framework: 'What is freedom? That one has the 
will to self-responsibility' (Idols 137). Sartre emphasises more 
insistently responsibility towards others in addition to that towards the 
self. 'Man being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world 
on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world' (~othingness 553). 
Jaspers too recognises the wider sphere of responsibility: 'In 
communication I feel responsibility not only for myself but for the other, 
as if he were I and I were he' (Philosophy 2:53). 
Kurtz, of course, did not use his freedom to make decisions in a 
Sartrean or Jaspersian manner. In choosing to act as he did, he was not 
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involved in fashioning a project of what it was he wished himself (and thus 
all mankind) to become; he was simply giving free play to his present self 
without regard for wider responsibility. In heeding his inner call, he was 
merely being his 'hollow' self. 
The conscience of the 'cannibals' aboard Marlow's boat, on the other 
hand, involved a far greater sense of responsiblity. After all, Marlow 
relates, 'they did not eat each other before my face', and when their 
'provision of hippo-meat. went rotten' (2:94) their self-restraint 
prevented them from eating the officials. 'Why in the name of all the 
gnawing devils of hunger they didn't go for us -- they were thirty to five 
-- and have a good tuck in for once, amazes me •••• I saw that 
something restraining, one of those human secrets that baffle probability, 
had come into play there •••• Was it supersition, disgust, patience, 
fear -- or some kind of primitive honour?' (2:104-5). Mentioned last, 
'honour' seems to be Marlow's presiding conclusion: an innate impulse in 
man -- his conscience -- to move in the direction of selfhood through a 
sense of responsibility towards the world. As Edwin M. Moseley has 
observed, 5 Marlow points here to the belief that man's moral sense is as 
inborn as flesh and passions -- a notion Conrad would have discovered 
Wordsworth propounding in The Prelude -- even if it varies from man to man 
and is subject (as in Kurtz) to aberrations. 
Unlike the 'cannibals', then, Kurtz with his 'hollow' self chose the 
worse of the directions offered by what Kierkegaard calls the 'either/or' 
inherent in any choice and so moved, in Jaspers's terminology, 'toward 
nothingness'. To Jaspers, choice lies at the very core of human existence; 
every choice we make affects us. 'My Existenz, as a possibility, takes a 
step toward being or away from being, toward nothingness, in every choice or 
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decision I make' (~hilosophy 2:4). Hence I exist authentically by virtue of 
conscious, independent choice. If a decision is made for me, I am turned 
into material for another. In Sartre's words, 'I choose myself perpetually 
• otherwise I should fall back into the pure and simple existence of 
the in-itself' (Nothingness 480). 
Since the self is not a ready-made given, man projects himself into one 
chosen possibility rather than another and so begins to determine who he 
will be and thus ultimately what mankind will be. Because decision-making 
enables man to create his own true self, Kierkegaard takes the view that 
'the most tremendous thing which has been granted to man is: the choice, 
freedom' (Journals 372). 'This treasure is deposited in thine own inner 
self: there is an either/or which makes a man greater than the angels' 
(Either/Or 2:149). The choosing of either this possibility or that pledges 
man to take charge of his own future, which entails risk and therefore 
involves anxiety. In wrestling with a decision, man comes face to face with 
himself -- and this is often disturbing, as Kurtz so graphically discovered. 
His indulgence in pure ego revealed his crippled sense of responsibility, 
pointing to the vital need for anguished deliberation in the formation of 
one's values in a universe without given absolutes. Like Conrad, no major 
existentialist philosopher would support the possibility Dostoevsky raises 
in The Brothers Karamazov that in the absence of God everything is 
allowable; responsibility sets powerful limits. Kurtz, as Marlow comments, 




Jim on the other hand acted very differently in similar circumstances. Like 
Kurtz, he also ended up in a realm where his word was truth, his values 
nakedly sovereign. Unlike Kurtz, though, he was engaged in a quest for a 
self that he had deliberately set himself to attain, rather than in an 
unrestrained confrontation with the heart of nothingness. As a result, 
Jim's freedom of choice for action was exercised in the Sartrean spirit of 
responsibility, which holds that any action must be undertaken with all men 
in mind. When we make choices in 'a project of sincerity' (Nothingness 79), 
'what we choose is always the better; and nothing can be better for us 
unless it is better for all' (Humanism 29). 
The existentialist would of course point out that Jim was already a 
free agent long before his more obvious form of freedom (at least from 
earlier constraints) in Patusan. He was free to choose his own career, free 
to abandon it when it proved inauthentic for him, free not to join the 
Patna, free not to jump from her, free not to face the consequences of that 
jump, free to give up his flight from his deed and strive to become a heroic 
man of action -- however much it might have seemed to him that a malignant 
fate compelled his choices. And, as we have seen Kierkegaard contend, such 
'freedom of choice' is 'the most tremendous thing which has been granted to 
man' (Journals 372), since amid its rigours it affords the perpetual 
possibility of self-transcendence to a fuller life. 
Jim's decision to enter the mercantile marine was not made with that 
profound sense of commitment which to the existentialist is the hallmark of 
decisive, willed action. 'To will', says Marcel in his Metaphysical 
Journal (185-6), 'is in some way to commit oneself; by which I mean to 
commit or bring into play one's own reality; to throw oneself into what one 




II I Mathieu's friend Brunet tells him~Sartre's Age of Reason (152-3). 
"'But what's the use of that same freedom, if not [to commit yourself]? • 
You live in a void, .•• you're adrift, you're an abstraction, a man who is 
not there"'. To Heidegger, there are no non-conative acts: one weighs 
choices that will affect future events in one's field of concern, or care 
(Sorge), committing oneself to something in an attempt to gain a fuller sense 
of self. 
Initially, Jim did not carefully consider his free choices. Instead, 
his vital decision to go to sea rested on the flimsy basis of some 'light 
holiday literature' that had stirred his imagination (1:11), and it 
catapulted him into a world he found sterile. Yet, rather than extricate 
himself from his life at sea, he reversed his 'idea of going home' (2:16) 
and drifted into the position of chief mate aboard the Patna, idly dreaming 
(J :21) 
of 'valorous deeds.'~ But, declares a Yeatsian epigraph, 'in dreams begins 
responsibility', and by the time of the trial Jim's decisions were of a 
completely different order. He chose to be 'frank with himself' (6:62), to 
face his action squarely rather than '"clear out"' as the skipper had 
(7:64). During the expected sinking of the ship he had been presented with 
the 'chance' for heroic action but had chosen cowardice (7:67), and he now 
decisively proposed to redeem himself. 
Jim's vacillation amid the chaos of the foundering Patna bore all the 
qualitites of Kierkegaard's tormenting either/or situation with its 
'dizziness of freedom' (Dread 55). He told Marlow 'that his first impulse 
was to shout and straight away make all those people leap out of sleep into 
terror; but such an overwhelming sense of his helplessness came over him 
that he was not able to produce a sound. he scrambled out on deck. 
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and ••. his knees wobbled a good deal as he stood on the foredeck looking 
at another sleeping crowd' (7:69). He thought of shoring up the bulkhead 
but considered it a hopeless task, feeling that 'he could do nothing, now he 
was alone. There was nothing to do but to sink with the ship' (8:79). 
Yet one of the basic conditions of freedom, Sartre remarks, is the 
presence of 'obstacles to be cleared •••• It is necessary that they be 
simply there, wholly brute, in order that there may be freedom' (Nothingess 
506). Camus would insist that Jim rebel against the sense of futility and 
passivity that enveloped him as he stood aloof from the other officers, 
struggling to free the boat that would save them, prey to 'a strange 
illusion of passiveness, as though he had not acted but had suffered himself 
to be handled by the infernal powers who had selected him for the victim of 
their practical joke' (8:86). One has to rebel against circumstances (or 
fate, or the gods; as Camus puts it, 'A revolt is always one against the 
gods as external forces and pre-established authority -- starting with the 
rebellion of Prometheus, an assertion by man against pre-ordained 
destiny'). 6 
To the existentialist, man as a free agent at all times is unable to 
escape action,and responsibility for it; the evasion of one kind of action 
is simply to follow some other kind. In Sartre's words, 'Everything takes 
place as if I were compelled to be responsible. I am abandoned in the world, 
not in the sense that I might remain abandoned and passive in a hostile 
universe like a board floating on the water, but rather in that I find 
myself suddenly alone and without help, engaged in a world for which I bear 
the whole responsibility without being able, whatever I do, to tear myself 
away from this responsibility for an instant. I am responsible for my very 
desire of fleeing responsibilities. To make myself passive in the world, to 
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refuse to act upon things and upon Others is still to choose, , , , The 
one who realizes in anguish his condition as being thrown into a 
responsiblity ••• is no longer anything but a freedom which perfectly 
reveals itself and whose being resides in this very revelation' 
(Nothingness 556). This Jim sought to deny, excusing himself as 'the 
victim' of 'infernal powers'. 
Heyst in Victory similarly tried to evade responsibility for his lack 
of purposeful action, telling Lena that his father was 'responsible for what 
my life is, or rather has been' (3:3:166). Heyst senior had been one of 
those Freudian discontents of civilisation, 'the most weary, the most uneasy 
soul that civilization had ever fashioned to its ends of disillusion and 
regret' (2:3:87). Yet the narrator does 'not refuse him a measure of 
greatness, for he was unhappy in a way unknown to mediocre souls' (2:3:87), 
dismayed at men's failure to use their innate freedom wisely -- a freedom he 
upheld even in his final work, in which 'he claimed for mankind that right 
to absolute moral and intellectual liberty of which he no longer believed 
them worthy' (2:3:87). 7 This, as Johnson comments, reveals the frightening 
contingency of man in a universe with no moral plan, hence the elder Heyst's 
injunction to his son to detach himself from his fellow beings-in-the-world 
an injunction the younger Heyst freely chose to espouse but for which he 
subsequently blamed his father. 
In the same way, Heyst had to bear responsibility for his choosing to 
elope with Alma/Magdalen to Samburan, though even in this action he had 
sought to avoid taking the decision himself, telling her to 'command' him 
(2:2:78). He had 'reflect[ed] with insufficient knowledge', filled with 
'the desire to act' (2:2:76). Initially, therefore, he tried to foist 
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responsibility for the decision to elope on to her, but it was he after all 
who had offered 'to buy [her] out' or 'steal [her]'. '"You do something"', 
she had countered. '"I didn't begin it, did I? It was you who came along 
and spoke to me • you must do something'" (2:2:78). Even after the 
elopement Heyst felt inclined both to face its consequences and to consider 
the future as being beyond his control. In one of those frequent passages 
in which Conrad moves from the direct speech of a character to third-person 
narrative that is a curious mingling of the character's thoughts and 
authorial comment, we find Heyst feeling that 'what must be must be' 
(2:2:86). 
Thus Heyst (like so many other characters in Conrad) shifted 
responsibility on to circumstance, much in the way Morrison did in excusing 
his ability 'to lay by any sum of money' (1:2:29). But Morrison was readier 
than Heyst to acknowledge his own shortcomings in this regard, even if he 
came to a dubious conclusion: 'It was partly the fault of circumstances and 
partly of his temperament; and it would have been very difficult to 
apportion the responsibility between the two •••• With a worried air he 
ascribed it to fatality' (1:2:29), rather like the nameless Assistant 
Commissioner in The Secret Agent excusing himself of responsibility for his 
inauthentic existence by considering himself 'the victim of an ironic fate' 
(6:125). Verloc too abrogated his personal responsibiity by believing that 
his 'fate' had been 'taken out of his hands', that his situation was 'no 
one's fault' (11:212, 215). An existentialist would of course point out 
that his situation had been brought about by Verloc himself in his failure 
to refuse Valdimir's demand that he bomb the Greenwich Observatory, in his 
failure to exercise his Sartrean possibility of saying no. 
Nostromo was also quick to blame circumstance for his situation, 
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feeling that 'he had been betrayed' by his masters and by 'unseen forces' 
rather than by himself (3:8:351, 352), much as Emilia Gould considered the 
wall between her and Charles to be the work of 'evil spirits': San Tom~ had 
become a 'fetish' that 'had grown into a monstrous and crushing weight. It 
was as if the inspiration of their early years had left her heart to turn 
into a wall of silver-bricks, erected by the silent work of evil spirits, 
between her and her husband' (2:6:205). But Sartre would insist that it was 
the Goulds themselves, not 'evil spirits', who were responsible for their 
subservience to the mine. Stressing our 'autonomy of choice', he would not 
excuse Emilia's 'passive part' in permitting this situation (see 
Nothingness 556). 
Such shifting of responsiblity also marked Razumov in Under Western 
Eyes, yet another novel in which freedom, decision, action and 
responsibility are crucial. Prior to his recognition of his own 
self-betrayal, he attempted to blame his ancestry and upbringing for his 
shortcomings. The professor of languages likens Razumov's 'memorandum' to a 
mirror in which 'a threatened man may look fearfully at his own face. 
formulating to himself reassuring excuses for his appearance marked by the 
taint of some insidious hereditary disease' (3:1:220). But Sartre would 
insist that genetic inheritance or environment can never be blamed -- as 
Razumov later discovered: "'It's myself whom I have given up to 
destruction'" (4:3:318). He alone was ultimately responsible for his own 
sparagmos, set in motion by his chosen response to the Haldin incident. 
Just as Razumov's free decision to side with 'autocracy' revealed what 
he was at the time, so Jim's leap from the Patna -- his avoiding of 
responsbility -- exposed him as what Marcel would term 'the guilty 
161 
participant in an inexcusable blunder' (The Philosopher and Peace 11). His 
self-revelatory action in this case was of the kind Sartre considers to be 
'non-reflective' (Nothingness 36): Jim simply discovered that he "'had 
jumped •••• It seems'" (9:88). Yet to the existentialist even action that 
is not consciously chosen is originated by the self, revealing it and 
affecting its future and that of the selves around it. The impulsive act in 
Sartre's Dirty Hands when Hugo shoots Hoerderer after finding Jessica in his 
arms is an instance in which, 'far from determining the act', the motive 
'appears only in and through the project of an action' (Nothingness 448). 
Hugo none the less identifies himself with his act and points to Hoerderer's 
part in its occurrence: 'A man like Hoerderer doesn't die by accident. He 
dies for his ideas, for his political program; he's responsible for his 
death' (pirty Hands 247). By our own actions we determine our fate, which 
is to say, our character -- as we saw in chapter 2. 
Jim at first tried to evade responsibility for what had been his own 
free choice of action aboard the Patna. Marlow describes him as clutching 
at 'some conviction of innate blamelessness [that] •.• checked the 
truth writhing within him at every turn' (7:64), seeking to blame the 
'unreasonable forces' of the world, 'the unthinking might of nature, or the 
stupid brutality of crowds' (7:72). From Jim's perspective, the fault lay 
primarily in his fellow officers: '"I tell you they were too much for any 
man. It was their doing as plainly as if they had reached up with a 
boat-hook and pulled me over'" (10:97). He felt that 'everything had 
betrayed him' (8:77), an attitude which in Marlow's existential view was at 
variance with 'the truth writhing within him' -- which suggests that, like 
Razumov and Nostromo, Jim had betrayed himself. 
Eventually, though, he did come to recognise that he was 'responsible' 
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(10:94) for his action all the same, that his present self had been nakedly 
exposed in his freedom. As Marlow comments, 'When your ship fails you, your 
whole world seems to fail you •••• It is as if the souls of men floating 
on an abyss and in touch with immensity had been set free for any excess of 
heroism, absurdity, or abomination' (10:95) -- Kurtz's condition exactly. 
In Sartre's words, 'I find myself suddenly alone and without help' 
(Nothingness 555), left with the Berdyaevian freedom to 'create' the 
monstrous or the good. And Jim's freedom landed him in 'an everlasting 
hole' (9:89). 
His condition at this point was very much like that of Razumov after 
Haldin had taken him into his confidence, a confidence Razumov had freely 
permitted: he could at any time have 'cut short that talk and told this man 
to go away' (1:1:68). By allowing himself to become embroiled, Razumov was 
faced with the terrible choice between aiding Haldin or betraying him to the 
authorities -- Kierkegaard's anxiety-laden 'either/or which makes a man 
greater than the angels' (Either/Or 2:149), and which to Nietzsche carries 
within it the potential for advancement: 'one is still fruitful only at the 
cost of being rich in contradictions' (Idols 44). Taking a decision was 
unavoidable for Razumov. And choice entails risk, as both Haldin and 
Razumov discovered. In his dilemma, Razumov too experienced Kierkegaard's 
'dizziness of freedom' (Dread 55), left more alienated than ever by his 
eventual decision to betray Haldin. 
In fact, Razumov's fateful decision 'could hardly be called a decision. 
He had simply discovered what he meant to do all along' (1:2:83). In spite 
of all his anguished vacillation, he had (like Jim) merely heeded the 
inauthentic self he was at the time, the self wedded (like Nostromo's) to 
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the esteem of the conventional 'they', who applauded his choice. "'You have 
done well"', Prince K---- assured him twice (1:2:85, 86). As Razumov had 
confided to Haldin, '"I must get acknowledged in some way before I can act 
at all"' (1:2:100). 
Razumov's Sartrean apprehension of being utterly 'abandoned' in the 
world, 'without anything or any person being able to lighten' the weight of 
his responsibility (Nothingness 555), penetrated his nightmares of 'walking 
through drifts of snow in a Russia where he was as completely alone as any 
betrayed autocrat could be' (1:2:104). Tormented by the unforeseeable 
aspect of his free actions, he 'envied the materialism of the thief and the 
passion of the incorrigible lover. The consequences of their actions were 
always clear and their lives remained their own' (1:3:114). This the 
existentialist would recognise as simply a perpetuation of Razumov's desire 
to evade responsibility, since the need to exercise one's freedom wisely is 
just as incumbent on thieves and lovers as on anyone else. But he 
considered his torment unique, and succumbed to the debilitating malaise 
that existentialists identify with a lack of purposeful action. 
As a result, Razumov acted 'with an air of profound indifference. . . . 
He did nothing at all' (1:3:106). He thought nostalgically of the 
'freedom' of his earlier life (1:3:118), though that life had in fact been 
tainted by inauthentic allegiance to the 'they', whose standards Kierkegaard 
would insist he was free to surpass, just as Abraham had had the freedom to 
sacrifice Isaac in defiance of accepted morality at the call of conscience. 
He was left to forge 'the true Razumov ••• in the willed, determined 
future' (1:3:113) by engaging his Heideggerian Dasein (being-there) and 
fashioning his Wesen (essence) through his own deliberate choices by sheer 
dint of will. 
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This was Jim's position too, and his first step in such engagement 
came with his recognition of his Patna self in order to overcome it. 'Man's 
liberation', we remember Berdyaev saying, 'is not only from something, but 
for something. And this for is man's creativity' -- in Jim's case, as in 
Razumov's, the creation of a new being-for-itself. 'Freedom', Sartre 
asserts in 'Materialism and Revolution', means 'rising above a situation in 
order to get a perspective on it' (Essays 235-6). Jim had gained a fresh 
view of himself, and it now remained for him to surpass that self as he 
ultimately did in Patusan after a long flight in a bad-faith attempt to 
escape his deed, which is to say, his self, since Sartre contends that man 
is 'nothing else but the sum of his actions' (Humanism 41). (Hopkins gives 
this poetic form in sonnets like 'As Kingfishers Catch Fire', where 'Each 
mortal thing ••• / Selves -- goes itself' through its actions: 'myself 
it speaks and spells;/ Crying What I do is me'. Drawing on Duns Scotus 
and the notion of ~ctus, Hopkins suggests that by acting you 'selve', 
actualise yourself, which he illustrates so memorably in the 'act' of the 
eponymous kestrel in 'The Windhover'.) 
Properly speaking, existential action should be intensely personal, 
engaging the full spectrum of one's being. In Sartre's formulation, 'There 
is no reality except in action •••• "Man is nothing else but what he 
purposes, he exists only in so far as he realises himself, he is therefore 
nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is"' 
(Humanism 41). 8 As John Macmurray argues, the self is an agent and exists 
only as agent. Though it may be a subject, it cannot exist as subject -- it 
can be a subject only by virtue of being an agent: it is a subject in and 
for the self as agent. Yet the self can be an agent only by being a subject 
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as well. 
To the existentialist, action is thus a product of the entire man as 
the unity of a person who expresses himself in all his activities and 
thereby creates himself. As Macquarrie comments, 9 a man's actions are more 
than empirically observable deeds, for in them the individual is both 
projecting and realising an image of personhood. It is in action, which 
entails freedom, decision and responsibility, that a man is most truly and 
fully himself. Not surprisingly, then, one's actions are crucially 
important, hence Kierkegaard's desperate desire 'to be clear in my mind 
what I am to do' (Journals 15). As Sartre maintains, man is a form of 
doing, of choosing and realising himself, rather than simply a form of 
being. And the bedrock of action is the freedom of the agent, his 
conscious recognition of himself as a separate existent, his 
self-projection towards what he conceives of as possible. 
Heidegger is quick to stress that not all actions are equal. There is 
a vast difference between authentic action and humdrum quotidian action. 
Sanborn, encapsulating Heidegger's position, lO points out that it is usually 
easy to perform the actions needed merely to maintain oneself in the 
everyday world. But if a man remains fixed in the day to day, he lacks the 
insight to understand his basic possibilities and is content to satisfy 
external rules and be guided by public norms. He does not heed the call of 
personal conscience, because he is lost in present entanglements. Authentic 
action is not what simply happens to the self but what the self brings about 
through recognising its own potentiality for being; in authentic action, man 
'goes towards' himself. For Marcel, we recall, the essence of an act is to 
commit the agent (cf. Metaphysical Journal 185-6). There cannot be 
authentic action without commitment and attendant responsibility, since an 
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individual and his acts are inseparable. It is a person who acts, not a 
depersonalised 'One'. To deny one's actions is to deny oneself; actions 
are a means to self-assertion in the world. As Sartre maintains in 
'Materialism and Revolution', 'That the agent be free' is one of 'two 
necessities of action'; the other is 'that the world in which he acts be 
determined' (Essays 244). Thus, action both reveals human freedom and 
alters the condition of the world. An act (as Marcel also asserts) is 
something that modifies a situation; it is more than sheer happening or 
performance. The choice that leads to action is a choice as to one's 
position in the world, and, as we have seen Sartre contend, whatever one 
chooses for oneself one chooses for everyone. 
As a result Jim, in wrestling with the problem of his proper course of 
action, appeared to Marlow to be grappling with an 'obscure truth ••• 
momentous enough to affect mankind's conception of itself' (7:75), clearly 
evoking Sartre's view that 'in fashioning myself I fashion man' (Humanism 
30). But the briars of the workingday world constantly impeded Jim's 
potential for a fuller life as he failed during the ensuing years as a 
chandler's boy to overcome those Sartrean 'obstacles to be cleared' 
(Nothingness 506). Instead, he drifted -- 'waiting for •.• something in 
the nature of an opportunity' (19:154). 
Razumov experienced similar irresolution. Yet Sartre would argue that 
his 'unsettled mind and shaken conscience' (4:1:292) were, like Jim's, the 
very basis of the young student's freedom to make of himself whatever he 
wished~ his potential to 'redeem his existence' (4:2:299) through conquering 
the despair of inauthentic being. The peripateia in Razumov's downward 
slide initially came with his electing to reveal the truth about himself to 
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Natalia Haldin, though he had once thought he would 'never be found 
prepared' to act on a decision that was genuinely true to himself (3:3:250). 
This revelation was preceded by another clear instance of Kierkegaard's 
'dizziness of freedom' that inheres in any choice attending the threshold of 
non-quotidian action. Razumov 'was like a man defying his own dizziness in 
high places and tottering on the edge of the precipice' (4:3:324). His 
admission to Natalia opened the way for him to reveal himself 'voluntarily' 
(4:4:337) to the revolutionaries as well, making him truly feel the inner 
freedom for self-creation that Berdyaev speaks of: '"Today I made myself 
free from falsehood, ••• independent'" (4:4:338). Thus, even though 
Razumov's actions eventually left him deaf from Nikita's blows, he did 
achieve a condition of being at one with himself, self-fulfilled -- just as 
his actions brought self-fulfilment to Tekla and to Natalia, who could 
assert: '"My eyes are open at last and my hands are free now'" (4:5:345). 
Winnie Verloc in The Secret Agent also eventually discovered such 
'freedom' (11:226) when she rid herself of the husband who had consigned 
her to the status of a reified possession. 'She was a free woman' (11:226) 
-- but with 'really no idea where she was going to' (11:227). 'For she did 
not exactly know what use to make of her freedom' (11:228), of her 
Kierkegaardian possibilities for action that would offer her a new self. 
'No signs are vouchsafed' in Sartre's world (Humanism 38), and Winnie was 
condemned to freedom of choice with only herself to guide her. 
This was Heyst's position in Victory too, when faced by Jones and 
Ricardo. His Sartrean contingency in the world demanded engagement but gave 
him 'no line of action' (3:9:212). "'Is there no guidance?"' he had asked 
of his father years before (3:1:150). None, was the elder Heyst's implied 
response, upholding Sartre's assertion that 'no rule of general morality can 
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show you what you ought to do' (Humanism 38). Like every other man, Axel 
Heyst was left to his own resources, 'absolutely free', as Sartre puts it, 
to follow the action of his choice (Nothingness 509). Existentialists would 
maintain that even with the woman he had named Lena beside him he was still 
individually responsible for anything he might have done, just as Winnie 
was responsible for the consequences of having stabbed Verloc. 
Although Winnie's act cemented her freedom, it immediately assailed her 
with Kierkegaardian 'giddiness' (12:237), and her new sense that her former 
bonds no longer applied soon passed into fear of the outcome of her having 
reduced her husband to 'nothing' (12:237), an action that ultimately brought 
her to the same condition by her own hand, unable to muster Camusian 
rebellion against the 'terror and despair' she now perceived at the heart of 
things (13:267). Yet she had for a brief moment used her freedom to assert 
her own authenticity. 
Her phlegmatic husband of course never experienced even such brief 
authenticity. As we saw in the previous chapter, he was innately averse to 
action. 'He could not all at once, either in his own home or in larger 
assemblies, take the initiative of action' (3:81). As Sartre reminds us, 
however, even inaction is action of a sort. To play a passive part in the 
world -- like Beckett's Vladimir and Estragon, Stoppard's Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern, or Eliot's Prufrock does not remove the self's condition of 
being a responsible agent. Thus, to Sartre responsibility would inhere in 
even the most humdrum of Verloc's activities, not to mention his bombing of 
Greenwich Park, which like all his actions -- lacked any inner enthusiasm 
or commitment. He carried out the sabotage under external compulsion, 
failing to assert his Sartrean freedom to say no to Vladimir's demand for 
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'activity' (2:59), that no which affords man the dignity of sovereign 
selfhood. 
In consequence Verloc, plagued with Kierkegaardian 'giddiness', felt 
himself 'hopelessly lonely in the world', estranged from his wife, who 
could not assuage him with 'the usual remedies' of sex (3:85). As Camus 
insists, each man creates his own condition in the world, and Verloc alone 
was responsibile for his having succumbed to the pressure of the 
'Hyperborean swine' Vladimir (9:198), for his having allowed himself to be 
propelled towards the bombing and thus his murder at Winnie's hand when she 
discovered his role in Stevie's unintended death. 
In planting the bomb Verloc had no genuine desire to remedy what he 
might in Sartrean terms have perceived as a lacking in a present situation, 
which could in certain circumstances lead to sabotage performed in good 
faith for the sake of a better future. Thus a dynamiter, for example, 
perceiving present conditions in a factory as inadequate, might genuinely 
believe that the workers would benefit from sabotage, and his action would 
be a deliberate effort to remedy a lack. And, indeed, if he agonises over 
his decision and reflects on it profoundly, his act may be seen as action in 
the proper sense (even though some might consider it misguided), since it is 
characterised by a decision made not by an abstracted reasoning faculty 
alone but by the whole self in good faith, entailing commitment to a project 
of desired selfhood. 
Verloc's bombing, in contrast, would be seen by Sartre as an action 
performed by someone enslaved to inauthentic being. Burdened by a fatalistic 
sense (which he was free to overcome) that no further action could save 
him, he 'felt terribly empty physically' (11:212), oppressed by 'an immense 
load of weariness' (11:228), so that he was simply unable to avoid Winnie's 
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knife when he saw it coming towards him. The Assistant Commissioner had in 
fact offered Verloc the '"advice ••• to clear out while you may"' 
(9:197), a suggestion the lethargic secret agent chose to ignore. As the 
commissioner commented to Sir Ethelred, '"Even if there were no obstacles 
to his freedom of action he would do nothing. At present he hasn't enough 
moral energy to take a resolution of any sort'" (10:204). Verloc's own 
inauthentic action had trapped him. Though 'Mr Verloc never meant Stevie 
to perish with such abrupt violence' (11:210), Nietzsche would stress that 
the results of actions cannot be evaded, whatever the intentions behind 
them. 
Like Verloc, Comrade Ossipon was also 'no man of action', despite his 
'attitude of defiance' (3:78). His imperatives sprang not from inner 
freedom but from his 'evil gift' to invoke the 'sinister impulses which lurk 
in the blind envy and exasperated vanity of ignorance, in the suffering and 
misery of poverty, in all the hopeful and noble illusions of righteous 
anger, pity, and revolt' (3:78). The Professor told Ossipon that he 
regarded him and the other 'revolutionaries' as "'slaves of the social 
convention, which is afraid of you; slaves of it as much as the very police 
that stand up in the defence of that convention •••• It governs your 
thought, of course, and your action, too, and thus neither your thought nor 
your action can ever be conclusive"' (4:93). Although the Professor is also 
ultimately given an unfavourable cast, he does set himself apart from the 
anarchists, none of whom Sartre in 'Materialism and Revolution' would see as 
a true revolutionary, who 'is defined by his going beyond the situation in 
which he is placed. And because he does go beyond it towards a radically 
new situation, he can grasp it in its synthetic wholeness, or if you like, 
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he makes it exist for himself as totality. Thus it is by means of this 
thrust towards the future and from the point of view of the future that he 
realizes it. • He must consider himself an historical agent' (Essays 
210-11). The anarchists in.'!'._~~ Secret Agent do not exhibit such a 'thrust 
towards the future', and in the Professor's estimation Chief Inspector 
Heat and Karl Yundt are equally unfree, '"like to like. The terrorist and 
the policeman both come from the same basket. Revolution, legality --
counter moves in the same game; forms of idleness at bottom identical"' 
(4:94). 
On this view, neither Heat nor Yundt was engaged in authentic action, 
and Verloc's bombing was equally devoid of value in the eyes of the 
Professor: '"Solidarity with the extremist form of action is one thing, 
and silly recklessness is another'" (4:99). To the Assistant Commissioner, 
Verloc's act was merely a breaking of the 'rules of the game' (6:132) that 
he and Heat played by in their subservience to conventionality, which to 
Berdyaev is freedom turned into 'compulsion and force in truth and good, to 
forced virtue, ••• to a tyrannical organization of human life' 
(Christian Existentialism 140). 
Even if the commissioner appreciated Heat's 'zeal and ability, 
moderate in himself', he did so without any 'moral confidence' (6:127) and 
felt alive only when resolving to investigate the Greenwich incident 
himself, as a means to escaping 'desk work, which was the bane of his 
existence because of its confined nature and apparent lack of reality' 
(6:141). Though the commissioner deliberately 'made up his mind to some 
course of action' ( 6: 14D), the narrator immediately points out that his 
decision was grounded in temptation, which Heidegger regards as a mark of 
inauthenticity (cf. Time 223). 'He had that very moment succumbed to a 
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fascinating temptation' (6:140), rather than asserted a long-term 
commitment to something that would offer him a fuller life -- even though 
his action did take him in that direction nevertheless. 'Reflecting upon 
his enterprise', he 'seemed to lose some more of his identity. He had a 
sense of loneliness, of evil freedom' (7:151). 
Such 'evil freedom' was of course the distinguishing feature of Jones 
and Ricardo in Victory, in which, we recall, Heyst moves from initial 
'inertia' (1:1:19) and 'detachment' (2:2:86) to active engagement of himself 
and the world, as represented primarily by Jones and Co. Though made at his 
father's prompting, his withdrawal -- 'his indifference as to roads and 
purposes' (3:4:178) -- had in the last analysis been of his own choosing. 
And Sartre would contend that Heyst could not escape responsiblity for this 
decision or for his decision to elope with Alma/Magdalen. Not surprisingly, 
having 'engaged himself ••• to an action big with incalculable 
consequences' (2:2:80), he was assailed by the existential 'doubts' and 
anxiety that inhere in such action. No man can anticipate every last 
consequence of his action, and, 'like the rest of us who act~ all that 
[Heyst] could say to himself • • • was: "We shall see!'" (3: 3: 158-9). 
His earlier attempt at action with 'purposeful energy' (1:3:35), on 
behalf of the Tropical Belt Coal Company, was not of the deeply 
existential kind that he now undertook. His new position in which he 
and Lena were faced with the threat of Jones and Ricardo was a radical 
change from his previous choice to evade action, which in an early 
conversation with Davidson he had branded as '"devilish"' and the reason 
why '"this world is evil upon the whole"' ( 1: 6: 57). '"I suppose I have 
done a certain amount of harm, since I allowed myself to be tempted into 
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action. It seemed innocent enough, but all action is bound to be harmful • 
• I shall never lift a little finger again'" (1:6:56-7). Now, faced 
with Jones and Ricardo, he came to the Heideggerian realisation that there 
are different kinds of action and that purposeful action is in fact a means 
to conquering the evil spawned by inauthentic action. He and Lena would be 
called on to garner the strength to effect Camus's demand to 'defy the 
fates' (1:6:59). Previously 'disenchanted with life as a whole' (2:1:67), 
Heyst now chose to overcome his taedium vitae through rebellion against it: 
"'I am going to confront these scoundrels'" ( 4: 10: 298). 
His attempt failed, of course, and he sank again into a 'formless, 
hideous' malaise, thinking that 'he who experienced such a feeling had no 
business to live -- or perhaps was no longer living' (4:11:313, the 
existential notion that man cannot truly be said to exist until he has 
achieved authentic being. With Lena mortally wounded, 'he looked down 
intently at her still face', remaining 'absolutely idle. There did not 
seem anything more for him to do' (4:13:323). Finally overcome by his 
sense of futility, death by fire was his only answer. Though John A. 
Palmer considers Heyst's suicide an 'existential affirmation', a triumphant 
repudiation of his earlier life, 11 this is severly muted by Davidson's 
words towards the end of the novel: '"I suppose he couldn't stand his 
thoughts before her dead body -- and fire purifies everything"' (4:14:327). 
Even if Heyst did take his own life as a free agent rather than have it 
foisted on him, his suicide was the outcome of his inability to engage his 
existential freedom to surpass his perception of his life's nullity; the 
narrator makes no mention of Heyst experiencing a triumph of the kind Lena 
achieved. 
Lena's earlier life had plainly been one in which she had failed to 
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make affirmative use of her freedom, allowing herself to be oppressed by the 
Zangiacomo crew. With Heyst, however, she did not simply drift into her 
elopement but actively embarked upon it as a personal rebellion against 
circumstance. And through this active decision she experienced -- like 
Natalia Haldin and Winnie Verloc -- a fresh awareness of her individual 
freedom, which carried with it 'the sensation of having been abandoned to 
her own devices. She was really alone' (3:9:206), like Heyst and 
Sartre's Mathieu, 'free and alone, without assistance and without excuse' 
(Reason 320). 'She had not been forced into' eloping with Heyst, not been 
'driven, scared into it •••• She had come to him of her own free will' 
(4:8:285). 
On Samburan, removed from the masses, Heyst and Lena (like Kurtz and 
Jim) felt more clearly able to create their own values and standards of 
morality: "'There's no one here to think anything of us, good or bad"' 
(3:3:160). Though Lena may have turned to Heyst for her sense of personal 
worth ("'I can only be what you think I am"' [3:3:160]), existentially she 
remained dependent on herself alone for her choice of action. But her 
belief that Heyst's love removed her condition of solitude did enable her to 
confront Ricardo with purposeful action, even if she still wondered whether 
she had been for Heyst nothing more than 'a violent and sincere choice of 
curiosity and pity -- a thing that passes' (4:12:315). Her conviction that 
her sense of self was inextricably linked to Heyst carried her beyond the 
specious appeal of Ricardo's blandishments, and when he offered her his 
knife to 'feel the balance' she decisively seized her chance and took 'the 
very sting of death' into her hands. 'She had done it!' (4:12:317). She 
firmly intended to use Ricardo's knife on him, but Jones's bullet intervened 
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-- the outcome of her decision to resist the representatives of the outside 
world, her free decision for 'self-sacrifice' (4:5:257). 
Or so-called self-sacrifice. In Nietzsche's words from Human, all 
too Human (1:57:75), 'the individual loves ~_omething of himself, a thought, 
a desire, a production, more than anything else of himself; he therefore 
divides his nature and to one part sacrifices all the rest'. As Michel 
says of any existential man, 'The inner man must choose whether to act in 
reliance upon some value transcendent to man, or in allegiance to a 
12 physical love of his own life, prolonged at any cost by any means' -- a 
choice the Romantics emphasised a century before Kierkegaard. In heeding 
what she felt was her strongest inner imperative, Lena demonstrated that 
'mind and will are potentially more powerful than the absurdity of the 
universe; they are capable of inventing values upon which paradoxically men 
can base triumphant, even though defeated, action•. 13 
This was very much Jim's position once he had undertaken Patusan, which 
he chose to go to in an 'experiment' of 'his own doing'; in Marlow's 
existential view, Jim 'was responsible for it and no one else' (22:176). 
There at last he exercised his freedom in a way that enabled him to create 
his own world through decisive action prompted by his Marcellian commitment 
to the ideal self he had proposed for himself, as all men are beholden to 
do. In the end, Jim 'had regulated so many things in Patusan! Things that 
would have appeared as much beyond his control as the motions of the moon 
and stars' (21:168-9). 
Initially, though, Marlow presents Jim entering Patusan in full 
Sartrean abandonment, 'alone ••• and engaged in a world for which [he 
bore] the whole responsibility' (Nothingness 555). He 'would have nothing 
but the soles of his two feet to stand upon, and he would have first to find 
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his ground at that' (22:177). Like Sartre's Mathieu, he was 'free and 
alone, ••• without support from any quarter, condemned forever to be 
free' (Reason 320). And 'every day added a link to the fetters of that 
strange freedom' (26:199). His commitment to Patusan left him with 'no 
appeal, as it were; he was imprisoned within the very freedom of his power' 
(29:214). 
It was, however, a joyous freedom. Jim was 'like a man released from 
bonds who stretches his cramped limbs, runs, leaps, responds to the 
inspiring elation of freedom' (35:249). He had taken charge of his 
freedom, and so of his life. He had espoused what Kierkegaard terms the 
ethical mode, in which man acts not just for gratification of the moment 
but commits himself to long-range purposes by responsible, decisive choice. 
Its opposite, the aesthetic mode, as John Wild comments, 14 is one of 
hedonism, in which the individual pursues materialism and avoids commitment 
to any long-term purpose. He makes no decisive choices to which he commits 
his entire self and then upholds. Instead, he seeks pleasure in the moment 
and flees from anxiety. In the ethical mode, on the other hand, the 
individual is loyal to lasting decisions, recognising his own humanity and 
responsibility. 
Of course, the existentialist does not suggest that a decision be 
taken once and for all without further deliberation. It must continually 
be reaffirmed in the changing situations produced by a world of becoming. 
Kierkegaard points to this in the example of his own decision to break off 
his engagement to Regina Olsen: the choice not to marry her was a decisive 
h · B ' . 15 1· K k one tat, in arrett s view, spit ier egaard in two and had ultimately 
to be met as a choice of himself, since it determined what he would become. 
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He saw the pain of alternatives: a life of unbridled sensuality or an 
absolutely religious one. The choice involved both torment and triumph, 
and it had to be renewed freely day by day throughout Kierkegaard's life to 
be given meaning. The drastic either/or of choice entailed sundering 
himself from a certain possibility for his self, throwing him back on the 
reality of that self. The ethical self chooses the whole of itself and, in 
reiterating its past choices, withstands the flux of time by preserving an 
existential continuity through passing moments. 
Thus, in the highest moments of decision-making the individual 
disregards conventional opinion and makes a choice in obedience to his own 
personal conscience. Not that decisions should occur in a vacuum; man must 
plunge himself into making decisions that will affect his situation in the 
world. We recall again Marcel's and Sartre's insistance that man engage the 
world by pledging himself to long-range decisions that extend beyond any 
immediate situation. Every time a man chooses his engagement in 'a project 
of sincerity', whatever this choice may be, it is impossible to prefer 
another to it. 
This was certainly true of Jim in Patusan. Heeding his own conscience 
and his father's injunction 'never ••• to do anything which you believe 
to be wrong' (36:257), he acted as he saw fit -- but, unlike Kurtz, with a 
profound sense of responsibility. In the process, he accomplished energetic 
self-assertion, much like Leggatt in The Secret Sharer when, as Cox has 
pointed out, 16 the captain proved to himself that he was not just a rigid 
automaton blindly obeying the seaman's code but could take exceptional 
measures when necessary once he had achieved self-recognition. Jim's 
self-assertion clearly went beyond Nietzsche's demand for 'the will to 
self-responsibility' alone (Idols 137) and extended to all the populace 
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whose champion he was. In the battle against Sherif Ali he unequivocally 
'made himself responsible for success on his own head' (26:200). 
Jones and Ricardo in Yictory could not have been more different, 
utterly devoid as they were of responsibility towards others. Having in 
Sartrean terms 'exchanged [their] disturbing "freedom-for-evil" for an 
inanimate character of evil' (Nothingness 65), they never once embarked on 
action born of a responsible choice made in the Kierkegaardian anxiety of an 
either/or situation. Their respectively effete and braggadocian claims of 
their evilness merely revealed their enslavement to their view of 
themselves, which -- like all men -- they were free to change. Just as the 
Sartrean coward can, like Jim, become a hero if he decides to, so the evil 
man is free to pass 'beyond his evilness'. Instead, Jones acted 'as if the 
world were still one great, wild jungle without law' (2:5:103), and Ricardo 
openly asserted, "'I don't care what I do'" (3:6:115). He pursued Lena 
through unrestrained lust and impulsively wished to "'put a hole between 
[Heyst's] ribs"' (3:10:216). In a Kierkegaardian framework, Ricardo lived 
in the aesthetic mode rather than the ethical, never pausing to distinguish 
between the two. All actions were 'one to him, as long as by the act he 
liberated the suffering soul of savagery' within him (4:1:237). 
In a Sartrean world which demands that each individual create his own 
values, Ricardo had chosen for himself 'the morals of a cat' (2:7:128). 
His ape-like functionary, Pedro, strapped by the limitations of his narrow 
subjectivism, 'had no morals. Nothing could be more hopeless' (2:7:129). 
Though Ricardo exhibited vigorous action, viewing life as 'a particularly 
active warfare vividly aware that it held many possibilities of 
failure' (3:10:213), his action lacked the virtue of conscious commitment. 
179 
And, as Suresh Raval has remarked, 'unless actions spring from intending 
human selves they are liable to have their own inhuman momentum 1 • 17 
Jones behaved with similar disregard for the long-term effect of his 
actions, which were in the nature of a 'trade' rather than a 'vocation' 
(2:6:108). He simply delivered himself over to his 'boredom', giving up 
his freedom to change himself, choosing instead to chain himself to his 
conception of himself as evil. As Michael Williams comments, Conrad does 
not explain away evil as lying outside man, who would then not be 
responsible (though Williams strangely sees Conrad as a 'Catholic' rather 
than a 'humanist' writer). 18 Jones's actions went untrammelled by the 
existential anxiety of reflection; like Kurtz, he could kill a man without 
any 'confounded fuss' (2:7:122), without 'turn[ing] a hair' (2:7:124). 
Jim on the other hand, as we have seen, took full responsibility for 
the war against Sherif Ali, as Sartre would agree he should have. 'If I am 
mobilized in a war, this war is E!Y_ war •••• I deserve it first because I 
could always get out of it by suicide or by desertion •••• For lack of 
getting out of it, I have chosen it • and everything takes place as if 
I bore the entire responsibility for this war' (Nothingness 554). Jim was 
by no means deluded in thinking himself "'responsible for every life in the 
land'" (43:297), since to the Bugi, in their 'simple form of assent to his 
will', his truth had become theirs (43:296). And truth to his own self 
nothing else -- led to his end. Like Sartre's Hoerderer in Dirty Hands 
(247), 'he was responsible for his own death'. In his self-possession 
(tinged though it was with egotism and narcissism) Jim let his inner 
directives dictate his actions, not external compulsion as in the case of 
Verloc, and he came down 'of his own freewill' to meet Gentleman Brown 
(41:287), to whom his talk of 'responsibility' was repugnant (41:2887). 
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Nostromo too was ultimately responsible for his own death, and his 
final act of returning for the ingots shows that he had still not completely 
'regained his freedom' (4:12:447) from the silver that he had served so 
vigorously (as Heyst had once served the coal company), though in the sense 
of everyday action, not the Heideggerian understanding of authentic action 
by which man 'goes towards' himself through commitment and responsibility, 
action that is the product of an anguished free decision. Yet in the last 
analysis he and the other major figures of Nostromo had freely chosen 
(whatever the inducements for them to do so) to form their fundamental modes 
f b . . 1 . ' . 1 . ' 19 o eing in re ation to materia interest • San Tome, like the 'stony 
levels of Azuera' (1:1:40), left you 'free to call the devil to your aid 
with impunity' (1:1:42). 
Careful consideration played little part in Nostromo's desperate 
adventure, which he -- like Razumov -- undertook through the value he 
placed on being "'well spoken of"' (2:7:219) by the Heideggerian 'they'. 
Sartre reminds us that it is left to the individual to assign whatever 
value he chooses to his existence: 'there is no sense in life a priori 
it is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing but the 
sense that you choose' (Humanism 54). And Decoud's letter to his sister 
depicts the Capataz as 'a man for whom the value of life seems to consist 
in personal prestige' (2:7:221). Nostromo alone was responsible for 
choosing that value -- as he was for the consequences of his actions 
throughout the silver escapade, particularly his failure to kill Hirsch 
when he discovered him in the lighter. 'Nostromo did nothing', allowing 
Hirsch to fall into Sotillo's hands; 'the moment of silencing him for ever 
had passed' (2:8:241, 248). Similarly, in Victory Heyst failed to dispatch 
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Jones when he might have: '"If I want to kill him, this is my time", 
thought Heyst; but he did not move' (4:11:310). He was somewhat like 
Beckett's Vladimir and Estragon at the very end of Waiting for Godot when, 
having decided they will 'go', just 'remain standing'. Later, 'by simply 
shouldering Mr Jones', Heyst might have grabbed the revolver that was to 
kill Lena, but again he did not act, 'his very will ••• dead of 
weariness' (4:11:312). 
None of Nostromo's actions occurred with conscious existential resolve 
to embrace an authentic project of selfhood. Though his actions were of 
considerable importance to himself and to subsequent events, they were 
different only in degree, not kind, from Mitchell's 'fussy action' 
(4:8:353) that had so irked Nostromo in the way that 'the necessity of 
overcoming small obstacles becomes wearisome to a self-confident 
personality as much by the certitude of success as by the monotony of 
effort' (4:8:352-3). The silver, Nostromo later reflected, had led him to 
abandon 'in their last extremity' both Teresa and Decoud -- actions 'paid 
for by a soul lost and by a vanished life', leaving their perpetrator 'a 
hunted outcast' (4:10:416) through devotion to the treasure. 
The same may be said of Martin Decoud, who never undertook anything 
with a sense of commitment, except his wooing of Antonia. His trip to 
Sulaco as 'the executive member of the patriotic small-arms committee' 
(2:3:152) may have seemed to his sister as having been made with 
'earnestness' (2:3:153), but its chief attraction had in fact been the 
amusement it offered him and the chance to renew his acquaintance with 'the 
beautiful Antonia, as Miss Avellanos was called in Sulaco' (2:2:150), she 
with her 'self-possessed manner' and dedication to a cause (2:1:153). 
Though Decoud, 'the dilettante in life, imagined himself to derive an 
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artistic pleasure from watching the picturesque extreme of wrong-headedness 
into which an honest, almost sacred, conviction may drive a man' like Don 
Jost (2:5:188), he himself none the less misguidedly chose to ally himself 
to a cause simply for Antonia's sake. Thus, he accompanied Nostromo as a 
'man with a passion, but without a mission' (2:7:219), without an ethical 
Kierkegaardian long-term commitment to a Sartrean project for selfhood. To 
a man who like Nietzsche and Sartre had no firm belief in supernatural 
sanction, the responsibility for his decision was his alone. Even his 
suicide lacked the quality of affirmative action, despite its coming amid 
the 'vague' realisation that he had 'misdirected' his life (3:10:413). His 
death was a mere Heideggerian falling away from Sartrean for-itself to 
brute in-itself, as the silver dragged him to the depths of the Placid 
Gulf. 
The Goulds too lost their possibilities for authentic being through 
freely choosing devotion to the silver. Gould's father had early on warned 
'his fourteen-year-old Charles' of 'the injustice, the persecution, the 
outrage' of San Tome, 'the fatal consequences attaching to the possession of 
that mine' (1:6:79). The younger Gould, however, chose to regard the mine 
as a source of 'hope, vigour, and self-confidence' against 'weary 
indignation and despair' (1:6:80), an attitude he adopted without any 
careful deliberation, laying hold of San Tome in an 'angry desire for action 
••• the enemy of thought and the friend of flattering illusions', 
looking to immediate action for a 'sense of mastery over the Fates' 
(1:6:86). Even though the mine had killed his father, he persisted in his 
misguided personal view as Decoud made quite clear to Emilia Gould: 
'''Are you aware to what point he has idealized the existence, the worth, the 
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meaning of the San TomJ mine?"' (2:6:199). 
Though Gould espoused San Tomt at the time with the noble intention of 
making the mine 'a serious and moral success' (1:6:86), his decision turned 
out to have been made in bad faith to his best interests. In their 
'illusion' he and his wife chose the silver as a means 'to make good their 
vigorous view of life against the unnatural error of weariness and despair', 
doing so without considering profoundly the Kierkegaardian either/or of the 
whole situation, trusting instead to an 'idea of rehabilitation' that 'was 
so vague as to elude the support of argument' (1:6:92). Indeed, in making 
her happiness dependent on 'materialism' Emilia was consigning herself to 
something she had 'never considered'; in truth, the 'only real' side of her 
relationship with Charles rested on the 'immaterial' (1:6:93) -- a truth she 
failed to recognise in time. She too was therefore in Sartrean bad faith of 
the kind that involves an unconscious lie to the self. 
Even if Gould was ultimately acting in bad faith in that his 
undertaking later crippled his for-itself, his devotion to the mine was 
sincere in relation to his self at the time and carried a strong sense of 
commitment to a well-intentioned, long-range plan, the hallmark of what 
Kierkegaard considers ethical behaviour to be. The mine, Gould felt, was 
'dependent on himself alone. It was a serious affair, and he ••• took 
it grimly' (1:6:98). He certainly did not shirk his perception that, in 
Sartre's words, he bore 'the whole responsibility' for the 'weight of the 
whole world on his shoulders' (Nothingness 553). But any existential 
commitment has constantly to be reassessed, and changed if necessary; Gould 
doggedly pursued his decision without any repeated reflection on its wisdom. 
His wife was less comfortable about this preoccupation with what she 
considered to be the 'most awful materialism' (1:6:99), and her failure to 
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follow up this sentiment made her responsible for the subsequent barrenness 
of her inauthentic existence. Rather than assert her freedom to sunder 
herself from the world of materialism, she acquiesced in its encroachment, 
mindless of Jaspers's comment that 'Existenz warns me to detach myself from 
the world lest I become its prey' (Philosophy 2:5). 
Gould, having cast his mine into the political fray and citing the 
adage that 'God is very high above' (2:5:193) -- implying man's free agency 
-- adopted as his deliberate 'choice' (2:5:192) the threat of dynamiting 
the mine, using it as a political weapon. He did this much to Emilia's 
burgeoning concern, which followed her realisation that the mine had come 
between them. Camus would insist that she was free to rebel against San 
Tome's insidious power, yet even in her fuller perception later of the 
silver's corrupting influence she failed to take action that would have led 
to authentic being. And for her husband the mine continued to provide the 
basis of his existence, of what he thought was true for him. As the chief 
engineer of the railway commented to Dr Monygham, 'Things seem to be worth 
nothing by what they are in themselves. I begin to believe that the only 
solid thing about them is the spiritual value which everyone discovers in 
his own form of activity' (3:1:275) -- Nietzsche's contention exactly: 
'Man merely assigned values to things in order to maintain 





Monygham, however, felt that he himself did not 'put spiritual value' 
on his own actions, in a cynical attempt to avoid deluding himself 
(3:1:275), and Gould also gradually began to lose his idealised vision of 
San Tom~ as he came to realise that it 'had brought to a point all the 
consequences involved in his line of conduct, with its conscious and 
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subconscious intentions' (4:4:321), or what Sartre would term its 
reflective and non-reflective choices. 
Ultimately, the intentions behind Gould's actions carried little 
weight in the material world; only their ~_onsequences mattered -- as the 
Monteros well knew. Their followers, 'violent men but little removed from 
a state of utter savagery', shared primitive man's recognition 'of success 
as the only standard of morality' (4:5:327), the view Nietzsche ascribes to 
the prehistoric 'pre-moral' age of man in Beyond Good and Evil (32:45). 
Whatever value Gould had given his actions, he eventually felt himself 
suffering from 'fellowship in evil' (4:7:343) and was actually relieved 
when he no longer had the silver to protect in the midst of warring 
factions. "'I am glad we've removed it •••• It would have been a danger 
and a curse"' (4:7:346). 
But his freely chosen loyalty to the silver had already destroyed the 
best in him: his affection for his wife and his compassion for the poor of 
Costaguana. Emilia was left to her 'immense desolation •• all alone in 
the Treasure House of the World' (4:11:431), and the populace left to 
penury and the turmoil of war. And in an existential framework Gould had no 
excuse for his actions. Like all men, he was condemned to utter freedom of 
choice (however powerful the factors that influenced him) to undertake the 
actions he did -- with full responsibility for their outcome, as we have 
seen Conrad insist throughout the major novels. 
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4 Being with Others 
'In the beginning is relation', declares Buber (I and Thou). We are all, 
in Sartre's phrase, contingent 'existences-in-the-world-in-presence-of-
others', existing either authentically or inauthentically with our fellow 
men. As Macquarrie elaborates, 1 the existentialist regards authentic 
being-with-others as that mode of relation to another which promotes 
existence in the full sense, allowing one to stand out as human in freedom 
and responsibility. Conversely, inauthentic being-with-others 
depersonalises and dehumanises. Therefore existence with others is judged 
authentic to the degree to which it permits individuals the freedom to 
become the unique persons they wish to make of themselves: true community 
allows for true diversity. 
Such diversity, however, is all too often absent. In Kierkegaard's 
'untruth' of 'the crowd', the tyranny of conformity allows scant room for 
individual excellence, promoting a situation in which 'all things at one 
common level lie', as Yeats puts it in 'These Are the Clouds' (Poems 107). 
Nietzsche's 'herd' (as at Power 20:17) abhors difference and brooks no 
deviance from its norms. Thus, it tends to pull down those who rise above 
its dead level. Which is why existentialists (and their Romantic 
precursors) generally demand that the individual defy the masses as an 
initial movement towards the freedom that will open him to fulfilling 
relations with his fellows. Even if Sartre insists that no wholly 
authentic being-with-others is ever possible, it must be attempted all the 
same, since one's achievement of personal authentic selfhood is never fully 
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satisfying on its own. One should, Kierkegaard stresses, aim to be a self 
that moves beyond itself to the wider community of men, for, as Nietzsche 
warns, 'how narrow 
2 
everlasting meditation on the~ makes us!' But 
though we must 'go beyond the individual and idiosyncratic', we should do 
3 
so 'only in alliance with the individual'. 
Sartre more than most emphasises this Nietzschean primacy of 
individuality over community, as his famous line in No Exit (47) 
testifies: 'Hell is -- other people' (though this surely implies its 
corollary, 'Heaven is -- other people'). But even if to Sartre others are 
often obstacles to an individual's self-fulfilment, he does (as we saw in 
the preceding chapters) uphold the need for engagement with and concerned 
responsibility towards others. This points to the conflicting claims of 
individuality and what lies beyond it. Like Nietzsche, Sartre underlines 
the tension inherent in personal relationships as they are experienced by 
most existents, who tend to be worlds unto themselves, 'locked in 
selfhood', as T. S. Eliot says, each seeking to absorb or transcend the 
other. Thus to Sartre 'the essence of the relations between 
consciousnesses is not the Mitsein; it is conflict' (Nothingness 429). 
This conflict, Sartre argues, arises not from any deliberate ill will 
but simply from the bald fact of our 'contingent' existence. 'The fact of 
the Other is incontestable and touches me to the heart. I realize him 
through uneasiness; through him I am perpetually in danger •••• The 
Other does not appear to me as a being who is constituted first so as to 
encounter me later; he appears as a being who arises in an original 
relation of being with me and whose indubitability and factual necessity 
are those of my own consciousness' (Nothingness 275). This embroils us in 
188 
attempts to subjugate or possess others, thereby impinging on their 
freedom. 'While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the 
Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the 
Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. Descriptions of concrete 
behaviour must therefore be envisaged within the perspective of conflict' 
(364). 
Yet this situation of conflict can be mitigated by opening oneself to 
others and seeking genuine communion with them, so that Kierkegaard 
fervently maintains that the 'self which is the aim is not merely a 
personal self but a social, a civic self' (Either/Or 2:220). 'It is 
dangerous', he says, 'to isolate oneself too much, to evade the bonds of 
society' (Journals 28). 'He who has ethically chosen and found himself has 
himself as ••• a concrete self which stands in reciprocal relations 
with these surroundings, these conditions of life, this natural order'. 
And the quality of this reciprocity should constantly be enhanced, since 
'the personal life as such' achieved by the solitary individual is 'an 
isolation and hence imperfect; in the fact that through the civic life he 
comes back into his personality the personal life mainfests itself in a 
higher form' (Either/Or 2:219-20). 
To accomplish this 'higher form' of selfhood (which for Kierkegaard 
is attained through Christianity), one should strive to transform 'every 
relationship between man and man into a relationship of conscience and 
thereby also into a relationship of love' (Love 138). In such 
relationships men live as co-existents; without them, they live simply as 
contingent objects. In Marcel's words, 'Fundamentally, I have no reason 
to set any store by myself, except in so far as I know that I am loved by 
other beings who are loved by me' (Mystery 2:9). Or, more particularly, 
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that I am loved by another individual in a bond that exceeds even the 
already considerable bonds with others enjoyed by the social self. 
Through love, declares Sartre, we 'feel our existence is justified' 
(Nothingness 371) -- a sentiment Conrad wholly endorses. 
Yet it is not until his last major novel, Victory, that Conrad makes 
the quest for genuine interpersonal relationships through love an 
overriding theme, though he does of course explore the question of 
authentic being-with-others in numerous earlier works also. As Paul L. 
4 Wiley observes in a general way, after Nostromo the erotic strain 
increases in Conrad's fiction and the novelist regularly focuses on the 
evidence love gives of man's willingness to establish a protective bond 
with another of his kind, stressing the consequences of its neglect 
through a decline of moral feeling in society. Newhouse too 5 indicates 
Conrad's emphasis in his later works on man's salvation through devotion 
to another person, and among these novels it is in Heyst and Lena that 
Conrad provides a particularly intricate depiction of people overcoming 
the isolation of inauthentic personal being by moving beyond the confines 
of selfhood to a wider engagement with others through the existential 
desiderata of genuine communication, solicitude, fidelity and love to 
achieve a Sartrean sense of personal justification for their existence. 
In consequence, Victory offers a useful expository model for these 
concerns, which I shall set out in some detail before reinforcing them 
through references to other exemplary works by Conrad later in the 
chapter. 
Initially, Axel Heyst was as isolated from the wider community of men 
'as if he were perched on the highest peak of the Himalayas', surrounded 
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on his island by the monotony of 'a tepid, shallow sea' (1:1 19). He had 
imposed this way of life on himself through what he professed was 'a taste 
for solitude' (1:4:37); but in truth, the narrator tells us, Heyst 'was 
not a hermit by temperament. The sight of his kind was not invincibly 
odious to him', and his visit to the Tesmans indicated 'that his 
detachment from the world was not complete', that 'the wandering, 
drifting, unattached' Swede shared the 'innate curiosity about our fellows 
which is a trait of human nature' (1:4:40-1). After all, the 
existentialist would point out, there is no side-stepping being-with-
others. As Heidegger emphasises, 'Safar as Dasein is at all, it has 
Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being' (Time 163). Thus, man should 
develop in a fulfilling way this inescapable relation between his self and 
the world that makes up his field of concern (Besorgen) by engaging in 
solicitude (Fursorge) towards others (see Time 157ff.) 
To Heidegger, one cannot avoid a sense of concern, and he illustrates 
this in the Roman myth of Care taking up a bit of earth into which Jupiter 
had breathed spirit and which was called homo, because it was fashioned 
from humus. Saturn judged that Care would possess the animated clay as 
long as it lived, after which Earth would receive its body and Jupiter its 
spirit. Hence care is intrinsic to man, both generally and with regard to 
other people. In relation to another, a man is not simply an object of 
practical concern but one of personal concern. It is this personal 
concern that the word solicitude should properly convey (see Time 157), 
though both solicitude and general concern, as Macquarrie mentions, 6 may 
be expressed in the negative mode of pushing things out of the way rather 
than using them, of neglecting or resenting the other person rather than 
actively caring for him, To exist simply as an anonymous 'One' without 
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solicitude for another Heidegger considers living in the Mitwelt as a mere 
contingent creature, ignoring one's ontological freedom that is the sole 
means to fuller communication with others. 
Thus Vict~'s Captain Davidson in his concern for Heyst, in his 
'affection' for him as his 'self-appointed protector' (1:5:44), feared for 
his friend in his misguided self-exile and 'spiritual starvation' 
(3:1:152) -- almost as though Davidson were heeding Kierkegaard's warning 
that 'it is dangerous to isolate oneself too much, to evade the bonds of 
society' (Journals 28). For Heyst (as his elopement with Alma/ Magdalen 
so tellingly revealed) was indeed tied to the necessity for human company, 
despite all his appearances of having 'no connexion with earthly affairs 
and passions', of being utterly 'detached from feminine associations' 
(1:7:61). 
Through seeking to avoid the 'realities of common human enterprise' 
and the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to, Heyst's self had 
become what Kierkegaard terms 'an isolation and hence imperfect' 
(Either/Or 2:220). Accordingly, Heyst was 'disenchanted with life as a 
whole' (2:1:67). He was 'moved by [the] sense of loneliness which had 
come to him in the hour of renunciation' undertaken at his father's 
bidding (2:1:68) and later 'was hurt by the sight of his own life, which 
ought to have been a masterpiece of aloofness' (3:1:149), sharing the 
existentialist view that life without a committed relationship to another 
leaves one unsatisfied, condemned to the shallows of inauthentic being. 
In Nietzschean terms, Heyst would have to 'go beyond the individual and 
idiosyncratic'. And the conflicting claims of these two opposing demands 
his father's injunction and his own desire for human connection -- led of 
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course, as H. M. Daleski points out, 7 to a sense of self-division in Heyst 
that would not surprise Kierkegaard and Sartre. 
Heyst's initial foray back into the world of merely contingent 
existents disturbed him. The Zangiacomos' orchestra repelled him with its 
clamorous music and vacuous sexuality: 'in the movements of the bare 
arms, in the low dresses, the coarse faces, the stony eyes of the 
executants, there was a suggestion of brutality -- something cruel, 
sensual, and repulsive' (2:1:69). Even more disturbing was 'the unnatural 
spectacle' of the spectators' 'indifference'. Heyst himself 'felt a 
shudder of pity' for the orchestra members, 'for these beings, exploited, 
hopeless, devoid of charm and grace' (2:1:70). 'Temperamentally 
sympathetic', he was concerned about them -- a concern that would grow 
into Heideggerian solicitude (augmented by sexual interest) for the girl 
who 'had captured Heyst's awakened faculty of observation; he had the 
sensation of a new experience. That was because his faculty of 
observation had never before been captured by any feminine creature in 
that marked and exclusive fashion. He looked at her anxiously, as no man 
ever looks at another man' (2:1:71). 
The girl too responded with 'alarm' (2:1:73); being-with-others, we 
recall Sartre saying, leaves us feeling threatened by those who share our 
contingent existence before we attain deeper relationship with them. 
Marcel feels that one can only overcome this Sartrean 'uneasiness' in the 
face of 'danger' by opening oneself to others, by fostering what he terms 
one's availability (disponibilite), one's willingness to be at the 
disposal of another through sympathetically viewing the other as a bodily 
presence that is not just an external object. In The Philosophy of 
Existence (26) Marcel remarks, 'The person who is at my disposal is the 
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one who is capable of being with me with the whole of himself when I am in 
need; while the one who is not at my disposal seems merely to offer me a 
temporary loan raised on his resources. For the one I am a presence; for 
the other I am an object'. Sadly, most people do not make themselves 
available but are closed, preoccupied with themselves in their anxiety to 
maintain themselves in what they see as a threatening world. Thus Marcel 
urges that each individual be fully present to the other. 'Presence 
denotes something rather different and more comprehensive than the fact of 
just being there; to be quite exact one should not actually say that an 
object is present' man alone has that potential (Homo Viator 15). 
The contrasting modes of treating others either as fully present 
co-existents or as brute objects Buber terms I-Thou and I-It relations, 
compound terms that have primary application to any situation, depending 
on its quality. 'The primary word I-It can never be spoken with the whole 
being' (I and Thou 3), and in such a relation whatever lies in one's field 
of concern is seen purely as an external instrument. In an I-Thou 
relation, by contrast, one's solicitude opens one to the other person to 
allow a fuller connection whereby he is not simply on hand as an object. 
8 As Macquarrie points out, each of the two forms can wander over into the 
other. They are not absolutely distinct, and the I-Thou relation can 
tragically degenerate into an I-It one when we turn a fellow being into a 
thing, an instrument, through exploitation, discrimination and prejudice 
as in the extreme cases of slavery and prostitution. On the other hand, 
the I-It can blossom into the I-Thou, marked by wholeness and openness. 
Heyst clearly demonstrated his potential for an I-Thou relationship in 
his sympathetic response to Mrs Zangiacomo's treating Alma/Magdalen as a 
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mere object when she pinched her. This initial sympathy was soon deepened 
by the girl's 'physiognomy' (2:1:74) -- and to Sartre and Marcel the 
physical is the very basis of any interpersonal relation, since the body 
is the self (which is also Zarathustra's view: 'Body am I entirely, and 
nothing more, and soul is only the name of something in the body' (4:32]). 
Because I dwell in a relationship with my body that 'resists being made 
wholly objective to the mind .•• ', says Marcel, 'I can properly assert 
that I am identical with my body' (Mystery 1:101). 9 As Sanborn notes, to 
me my body is not an external object like other objects, since I cannot 
separate myself from it. Thus I can relate to another only via my body and 
all its attributes, its opportunities for communication and wider 
knowledge, and we recall the biblical use (as at Genesis 4:1) of the verb 
to know as a synomym for sexual intercourse, I participate in my body as 
an incarnate being, feel myself to be my body and my sensations. And to 
Sartre sensation in neither wholly subjective nor objective: the warmth of 
water, for example, is a quality of an object, but it also gives 
information about the body that senses it, a means of apprehending both the 
object and one's own body. So too my touching another person reveals 
something both of myself and the person I touch. 
The existentialist emphasises also that we perceive the other's body 
as a totality, not as an assemblage of discrete parts. As Macquarrie 
expresses it, we say 'He raised his hand' rather than 'His hand went up'. 
The movement of the hand is viewed not in isolation but as part of a whole 
situation in which a body is not simply an item but a user of the world. 
Hence Sartre's contention that because 'I can not perceive any organ of the 
Other's body in isolation, ••• my perception of the Other's body is 
radically different from my perception of things' (Nothingness 345). The 
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other's body is not a mere thing: it is the other person. 'Pierre's body 
is in no way to be distinguished from Pierre-for-me' (346). Yet my body 
does in a sense become an object for the other person, and vice versa. The 
other has a view of me that I can never have of myself. 'My body is there 
not only as the point of view which I am but again as a point of view on 
which are actually brought to bear points of view which I could never take; 
my body escapes me on all sides' (352). 
This can lead me to feel alienated from my own body, a sensation that 
is expressed in such affective states as shame, shyness and embarrassment, 
in which I am aware of my body not as it is for myself but as it is for 
the other. And I attempt to escape being an object for the other through 
love, through a longing to assimilate him to myself. But for this to 
happen the other has to love me, and to make him love me I have 
paradoxically to become an object to excite that love. At times this may 
take the form of exciting his lust, whereby I lapse into the in-itself of 
brute flesh. Yet what I in fact strive for is to excite him as a total 
subjective individual with whom I desire union. Therefore, Sartre argues, 
desire is not to be equated with lust, since desire always goes towards 
something beyond the limits of my subjectivity -- which means that desire, 
properly defined, is for a transcendental object that engages the whole 
personality: 'I am the accomplice of my desire' (~othingness 388). 
Desire, however, reveals to me my sexuality, which is a necessary 
ontological part of my being-with-others and is a project of being, which 
precedes it, just as infantile sexuality precedes the physiological 
maturity of the sexual organs that mark each of us as a sexual existent. 
Berdyaev too stresses that human sexuality has an inescapable 
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ontological dimension and is not just a biological function. 'Man's sexual 
nature cannot be placed on the same level with other functions of his 
organism, . such as the circulation of the blood. In man's sexuality 
we perceive the metaphysical roots of his being •••• Sexuality is not a 
special, differentiated function of the human being. It is diffused 
throughout man's whole being, penetrates all his cells and determines the 
whole of his life' (Christian Existentialism 98-9). 
Accordingly, the narrator in Yictory does not evade the sexual nature 
of the lovers' relationship. Early on already we see their 'lips touch', 
albeit 'lightly' (2:2:85) in this the Victorian age, when George Eliot in 
Adam Bede is obliged to indicate coitus by a dropped handkerchief. 'The 
girl called Alma' was 'flesh and blood', not a disembodied 'dream' 
(2:3:87, 88). Later, 'while [Heyst] was looking into her eyes she raised 
her bare forearm [rather than 'her bare forearm went up'], out of the 
short sleeve, and held it in the air till he noticed it and hastened to 
pose his great bronze moustaches on the whiteness of the skin. Then they 
went in' (3:3:161) a modestly presented inception of foreplay 
implicitly leading to coitus indoors. With him she experienced the power 
of sexuality, 'swinging between the abysses of earth and heaven in the 
hollow of his arm' (3:4:176). 
The narrator repeatedly (though Cox thinks unsuccessfully)lO stresses 
their physical intimacy, but in terms that constantly highlight their 
desire for contact with the entire self of the other that Sartrean 
flavour whereby the lover seeks the being-for-itself of the beloved. In 
11 Stern's paraphrase of Sartre, through love I hope to possess the other in 
so far as he is a self, a subject, a freedom endowed with a gaze (and thus 
an individual perspective), for only as such did he possess my being. The 
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lover wants to possess not just an object but a subject, a living freedom. 
And this aspiration of the lover is expressed by sexual desire. Properly 
speaking, desire aims to possess the beloved's body not simply as 
physiological reality but as the incarnation of the other's freedom. This 
freedom, his being-for-itself, pervades the beloved's whole body even to 
its surface, hence Sartre's assertion that 'by touching this body I • 
finally touch the Other's free subjectivity. This is the true meaning of 
the word possession' (Nothingness 394). 
12 As Mary Warnock comments, Sartre explains love not as 'ownership' 
but as a lover's desire to possess his beloved's consciousness, his 
freedom. And he wishes to possess his beloved because both lover and 
beloved are in a sense created by each other through their voluntary choice 
of each other. The Sartrean lover 'wants to possess a freedom as freedom 
••• but demands that this freedom as freedom should no longer be free' 
(Nothingness 367). In love one makes oneself an object for another, but an 
object of special, limitless value, seeking to control his freedom to value 
any third person above oneself. Man, however, cannot absolutely attain 
this unconditional value he desires, so that in making himself an object 
for the other person he tries to overcome the subjectivity that precludes 
himself from being a sheer object, and love can then degenerate into 
masochism. Alternatively, one attempts to turn the other person into an 
object rather than a fully human individual, and love, as Sanborn 
13 
remarks, can then change into lust, masochism into sadism. In lust the 
other's subjectivity collapses, in that he is regarded as a physical object 
to be appropriated at will -- an attitude that is checked when the other 
reconstitutes himself as a subject by exercising his freedom. And Sartre 
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feels that the other's freedom always remains out of reach, so that every 
attitude is finally frustrated. Extreme frustration is then embodied in 
hate, resulting from the discovery that there is no way of uniting wholly 
with the other or of salvaging one's own freedom. 
These pitfalls of sexuality, as we shall see, were amply true of 
Jones, Ricardo and Schomberg. But they were less so of Heyst and Lena. 
Heyst may have experienced 'the flattered vanity of his possession of this 
woman', but at the same time Lena 'felt in her innermost depths an 
irresistible desire to give herself up to him more completely' (3:4:170). 
He in turn felt 'she would enslave him altogether by the sheer beauty of 
the sound' of her voice, 'suggesting infinite depths of wisdom and 
feeling' (3:4:176). Yet even their elevated form of mutual possession was 
tinged with the Sartrean insistence that one can never wholly possess the 
other as one longs to. As Heyst confessed to Lena, I "It is because I 
think so much of this possession of mine that I can't have it complete 
enough"' (3:4: 177). 
Sex and language, Macquarrie 14 imply that no individual is argues, 
complete without others, and even so-called casual acts of sex are not 
merely peripheral to existence but are bound to affect the persons 
concerned quite deeply, for in them too something of the totality of 
being-with-others is expressed, however badly. Of course there is in 
them an element of exploitation in which the exploiter regards the other 
as a Buberian It, in which the sexual act flows from less than the whole 
self, but even then some aspect of our totality is affected. And if it is 
the prime characteristic of an I-Thou relationship that the whole person 
is involved, then there is a sense in which the desirable form of the 
sexual act is the paradigm of such a relationship, since ideally it is 
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total ecstasis, total contact and total mutuality. Sartre falls short 
when inclining to view sex in isolation rather than as a series of acts 
that occur within a relationship between two people, a relationship which 
involves much more than the act of sex alone and which the act 
concentrates and nurtures as part of a broader, ongoing ecstasis whereby 
the two persons interpenetrate each other's existence in innumerable ways. 
Thus it is that Macquarrie considers truly human sexuality to be 'a highly 
15 
sophisticated existential phenomenon' that can lead to knowledge both of 
oneself and the other person and can promote a sense of authentic being-
with-others. 
This was the mode of Heyst's and Lena's sexual responses to each other, 
which were very different from Wilhelm Schomberg's towards Alma/Magdalen. 
The hotel keeper constantly 'prowled round her, mute, hungry, portentous 
behind his great beard, or else assailed her in quiet corners and empty 
passages with deep, mysterious murmurs from behind, which, notwithstanding 
their clear import, sounded horribly insane somehow' (2:2:77). To Schomberg 
she was just an object of lust, and his words to her imparted no sense of 
true communication -- unlike hers to Heyst, which 'seemed' to make 'the 
illusion of human fellowship on earth vanish before the naked truth of her 
existence' (2:2:78). Her voice, emanating from her physical presence, 
'seduced Heyst by its amazing quality ••• a voice which would have made 
silly chatter supportable and the roughest talk fascinating'. Even though 
their 'conversation' was 'perfectly insignificant' (2:1:74), it offered what 
Buber terms dialogue, which suggests the 'mutual' character of a 
relationship between people that entails genuine communication and can never 
be one sided, dominating or possessive. It demands openness and the 
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willingness to listen and receive as well as to speak and give, so that to 
Buber betweenness is the key element in any desirable interpersonal 
relationship. 
Such Buberian dialogue is central also to Marcel, who asserts that 
through communication the self and the other become mutual creations. A 
prime means of effecting communication is of course language, though not 
simply as speech for the sake of speech. 'When language is used without 
true significance', says Jaspers in Man in the Modern Age (119), 'it loses 
its purpose as a means of communication, and becomes an end in itself • 
it is verbosity in place of reality'. But in true communication I am 
revealed to myself, along with the other. The greater the failure to 
communicate, the less authentic one's being, increasing despair. Our 
individual well-being thus depends on caring engagement with others that 
promotes a full sense of Buberian betweenness of the kind the lovers in 
Victory achieved. Even in the early stages of their acquaintance 'the mere 
vibrating, warm nobility of the sound' of Alma/Magdalen's voice 'found its 
way into Heyst's heart', and he responded to the totality of her being and 
the 'good faith' it expressed (2:1:74, 75). In their openness towards each 
other, even a smile produced for the outside world could give Heyst 'a sort 
of ardour to live which was very new to his experience', 'the awakening of 
a tenderness, indistinct and confused as yet, towards an unknown woman' 
(2:2:79, 80). Already he was beginning to move beyond himself towards a 
transcendental object that properly defines desire in Sartrean terms. 
Another aspect of Heyst's self-transcendence was his commitment to 
helping Alma/Magdalen escape her life among the Zangiacomo crew: he 
'engaged himself' by a 'promise' that produced a new 'fulness of heart' 
(2:2:80, 81). As Nietzsche observes, man is the only animal capable of 
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making a promise, which points to his interconnectedness with other 
individuals and the community, a relation founded on fidelity, on 
faithfulness to the engagements we pledge ourselves to. For Marcel a 
person, engagement and community together form a continuity. Fidelity is 
an intrinsic human quality that makes genuine community possible, a 
transcending of oneself towards others through commitments to them. Such 
commitments involve at the same time the higher Sartrean purpose of one's 
striving to achieve the image one has of what humanity should be, so that 
fidelity becomes a treasured attribute -- particularly because, as Marcel 
puts it, the 'menace of betrayal overshadows our whole world'. 
'Faithfulness is ••• the exact opposite of inert conformism. It is the 
active recognition of something permanent ••• it refers invariably to a 
presence' (Existence 21-22). And such interpersonal fidelity is of course 
to Conrad among the supreme virtues. What is valuable in the temporal 
world, he asserts in his preface to A Personal Record (xxiii), 'rests 
notably, among others, on the idea of Fidelity'. 
To the existentialist, fidelity enhances both giver and receiver. In 
'sustaining' Alma/Magdalen, Heyst felt so 'changed' that he was surprised 
to find his outward appearance unaltered, 'a belittling of his recent 
experience' (2:2:83, 86). The girl he named Lena had become to him 'the 
most real impression of his detached existence' (2:3:88), an anchor in his 
aimless drifting -- not unlike the 'one piecee wife' of his Chinese 
servant, who 'had anchored Wang to the spot by her charms' (3:1:153, 154). 
Lena's charms produced in Heyst more than sexual longing: they awakened 
full care and concern, a Heideggerian solicitude that 'pleased and soothed 
her' (3:5:183). Her reciprocal 'infinite and tender concern for him' 
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(4:5:268) amid the dangers he faced 'warmed her heart, exalted her mind 
with a sense of an inconceivable intensity of existence' (4:9:293). 
As Alma/Magdalen her existence with the Zangiacomo troupe had clearly 
relegated her to an inauthentic life as a sheer object with no sustaining 
human contact, a life of 'sordid conditions and brutal incidents' among 
those who were 'anything but musicians by profession' (1:5:45), among 
prostitutes and pimps. When Davidson first heard of her running away with 
Heyst his immediate reaction was to think, 'with the air of a man who 
knows life' (1:5:47), of a merely sexual liaison -- all the more startling 
in a man like Heyst, the 'perfect gentleman' (1:5:48), who must have found 
her 'specially attractive' (1:5:50). 
She had certainly been sufficiently attractive to interest Schomberg, 
even though she was indeed ultimately 'nothing' to the hotelier (1:5:52). 
He was right in saying that he did not 'care' for her, an attitude that is 
all too often the dominant mode of being-with-others whereby, in Sartre's 
words, when I look at people 'I am fixing the people whom I see into 
objects; I am in relation to them as the Other is in relation to me' 
(Nothingness 266); we exist in a Buberian I-It relationship. The fact that 
Lena was formerly known indiscriminately as Alma or Magdalen heightened her 
reification, which in turn affected her own view of herself. She had 
become so self-effacing that she felt by living alone with Heyst she would 
not 'be in anybody's way • not even a dog's' (2:2:82). 
It was Heyst's love that eventually gave her a firm identity and a 
name (thereby 'creating' her, as Sartre claims all lovers do in choosing 
each other). This lent her a sense of what Buber terms confirmation, by 
which the full existence of each person involved in a relationship is 
confirmed by the other, imparting a feeling of personal worth that Sartre 
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considers to be 'the basis for the joy of love when there is joy: we feel 
that our existence is justified' (Nothingness 371). Though Sartre 
considers man's existence completely contingent, without any foundation, 
he feels that in love man attempts to discover a grounding for his being 
through becoming his partner's absolute choice, not just a relative, 
contingent choice. Lovers feel themselves created for each other and so 
no longer think themselves de trop. Indeed, Lena came to feel that Heyst 
alone gave her existence validity: '"If you were to stop thinking of me I 
shouldn't be in the world at all!'" (3:3:159). They had become available 
to each other in a fully Marcellian sense, whereby 'the person who is at 
my disposal is the one who is capable of being with me with the whole of 
himself when I am in need' (Existence 26). 
Heyst's love, then, turned Lena into 'a human being who counted; 
because she was no longer defending herself for herself alone' (4:2:239). 
Conrad depicts a similar situation of self-affirmation through love in an 
Indonesian setting in !lm~er's Folly, where, as Peter J. Glassman 
comments, 16 Nina discovered an escape from her inhibiting identity through 
Dain, who experienced a concommitant release from his constricting self, 
the kind of quickened sense of being which Aissa excited in Willems in An 
Outcast of the Islands -- though Willems (somewhat like Heyst) did to an 
extent use Aissa as a bulwark against experience. Once their love 
dissipated, Willems could not endure Aissa's staring at him, since he felt 
-- as Hunt Hawkins has remarked 17 -- that it transformed him into a mere 
object under her Sartrean 'look' (as at ~othingness 257ff.) 
The relationship between Heyst and Lena was not, however, so 
impossibly idyllic as to be devoid of Sartrean interpersonal conflict, and 
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Lena 'betrayed always a shade of anxiety' (34:3:159). But such anxiety was 
usually assuaged by the plenitude of their mutual presence. Even their 
silences in each other's company carried a fulfilling sense of 
communication. Lena 'was no chatterer. She was rather silent, with a 
capacity for immobility, an upright stillness'. Not that their Buberian 
dialogue provided utter self-revelation: 'in the intimacy of their life 
her grey, unabashed gaze forced upon him the sensation of something 
inexplicable reposing within her ••• reserving itself even in the 
moments of complete surrender' (3:3:164). This suggests Sartre's 
contention that no absolute interpersonal union is possible, but it also 
accords with Buber's demand that dialogue in its full sense not deny each 
partner the room to be himself or herself, to preserve unique otherness. 
There should be not absorption but mutuality. 
To Buber the fact of relation (a word he confines solely to 
relationship between persons, which is fundamental and primordial in human 
existence) implies the equally primordial fact of what he terms distance, 
which has the potential for slippage into a situation in which a genuine 
relation is lost or fails to be actualised -- so that there is a constant 
dialectical tension against which the drama of the interpersonal is played 
out. Any genuine I-Thou relationship contains an element of distance, 
since it is not sheer union but a condition in which each party retains 
his unique otherness, the room to be himself without merging completely 
into the other as happens in possessive affection or mystical love. 
Buber, Macquarrie reminds us, insists that we must have respect for the 
other and not try to change him to our idea of what he ought to be. 
The fact of such separateness in Heyst and Lena's love did not, 
however, prevent their feeling more authentically alive in each other's 
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presence, even when this sensation was tinged with disturbance. 'Heyst 
stood the frank examination' of Lena's Sartrean look 'with a playful 
smile, hiding the profound effect these veiled grey eyes produced --
whether on his heart or on his nerves, whether sensuous or spiritual, 
tender or irritating, he was unable to say' (3:3:164-5). But at least he 
had been lifted from the vapidity of his rootless existence. 'The girl he 
had come across, of whom he had possessed himself, to whose presence he 
was not yet accustomed, with whom he did not yet know how to live; that 
human being so near and still so strange, gave him a greater sense of his 
own reality than he had ever known in all his life' (3:3:169-70). 
Lena in turn was stimulated by 'that intense interest which his person 
awakened in her mind and in her heart' (3:4:171). 'He had given to life a 
savour, a movement, a promise mingled with menaces, which she had not 
suspected were to be found in it •••• She thought that he had opened her 
to the feelings of delicate joy, that the very uneasiness he caused her was 
delicious in its sadness' (3:8:204). Even that 'uneasiness' Sartre points 
to in interpersonal relationships is transmuted by love. With all its 
cross-currents, 'her love for this man' imparted 'something rapturous and 
profound going beyond the mere embrace' (4:4:250), beyond even the 
considerable sense of ecstasis Macquarrie perceives in bodily orgasm, 18 
which connotes the fulness of exsistere, of existence as suggestive of going 
out of oneself; the individual goes out from himself to the other in a unity 
of being-with-the-other (a unity Sartre says falls away into separate 
consciousnesses after orgasm). And the sexual act is not only ecstatic but 
also an intimation of a total sharing of being. 
Heyst's bond with Lena was clearly quite different from the kind of 
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association he had formed with Morrison when, Heyst said, "'I had, in a 
moment of inadvertance, created for myself a tie •••• One gets attached 
in a way to people one has done something for. But is that friendship? I 
am not sure what it was. I only know that he who forms a tie is lost'" 
(3:3:169). It required that greater openness of Marcellian availability to 
create the profound value of his relationship with Lena, who with a 
Sartrean sense of frustration wanted to bridge even Buber's desirable 
distance between them. '"I only wish I could give you something more, or 
better, or whatever it is you want"' (3:4:177). Certainly the lovers did 
grow closer and closer. 'He raised her hand to his lips, and let them rest 
on it for a space ••• feeling, in this moment of perfect quietness, that 
in holding her surrendered hand he had found a closer communion than they 
had ever achieved before. But even then there still lingered in him a sense 
of incompleteness not altogether overcome -- which, it seemed, nothing ever 
would' (3:4:178-9). As Sartre contends, the other's freedom is always 
ultimately elusive. Lena 'had the secret of individuality which excites 
and escapes' (3:4:181). 
The interplay of submission, possession and the longing for 
completeness recalled to Heyst his father's grim evaluation of love. "'Of 
the strategems of life the most cruel is the consolation of love -- the 
most subtle, too; for the desire is the bed of dreams'" (3:5:184). But 
even though Heyst feared that their love might one day dissolve into the 
insubstantiality of a dream, that fear did not render love worthless while 
it lasted, despite his being well aware of the Sartrean conflict love 
entails. '"I suppose"', he remarked to Lena, '"a certain amount of 
quarrelling is necessary for existence in this world'", a world, the 
narrator comments, 'in which love itself rests as much on antagonism as on 
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attraction' (3:5:186) -- a less virulent phrasing of Sartre's belief that 
love is perpetually fraught with insecurity and the danger that the one 
lover can change the other into an object. Also, love remains linked to 
sexuality, a fundamental structure of our being-for-others that (as Stern 
points out 19 ) is for Sartre the bedrock of 'collaboration, conflict, 
rivalry, emulation, engagement, obedience': they 'all include as their 
skeleton so to speak -- sexual relations' (Nothingness 407). In 
Nietzsche's opinion, too, sex involves 'perpetual strife with only 
periodically intervening reconciliations' (Tragedy 1:33). 
Regardless of the antagonistic aspects of their love, Heyst was 
none the less buoyed by the fulness of Lena's Marcellian presence, by what 
even Sartre concedes to be the sustaining power of love, which lends to 
lovers a sense of justification for their existence akin to Buber's notion 
of confirmation. Though Heyst was 'struck ••• by the physical and moral 
sense of the imperfections of their relations', this simply 'made him 
desire her constant nearness, before his eyes, under his hand, and which, 
when she was out of his sight, made her so vague, so elusive and illusory, 
a promise that could not be embraced and held' (3:5:186). "'There's that 
in you, Lena, which can console me for worse things, for uglier passages'", 
he told her -- and embraced her with a caress that 'warmed his heart' 
(3:5:187). His great longing was that they might "'live untroubled and 
learn to know each other'" (4:8:283). 
Though disturbed by 'the vague apprehension of a distant future, in 
which he saw Lena unavoidably separated from him by profound and subtle 
differences', Heyst recognised the Kierkegaardian transcendence towards 
another which she provided, that 'he no longer belonged to himself' alone; 
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'there was a call far more imperious and august' (3:8 203). In the same 
way, Lena had a sense of being impelled by a 'force that was outside of her 
and more worthy' (4:12:315). Amid the dangers posed by Ricardo she felt 
herself going beyond her own selfhood in her Heideggerian solicitude for 
Heyst, whom she sought to 'protect' in response to feeling herself 
'sustained' by the 'encircling and protecting pressure' of his arms 
(4:4:251). 'Exalted ••• with a sense of an inconceivable intensity of 
existence' (4:9:293) born of her devotion, she wished to take the 
'struggle' of resistance 'upon herself, in a great exaltation of love and 
self-sacrifice ••• altogether on herself, every bit of it' (4:5:257). 
Despite her doubts as to her ultimate value for Heyst she still placed him 
above herself, thinking that even if she were to die 'she would hold in 
herself the impress of something most rare and precious -- his embraces 
made her own by her courage in saving his life' (4:12:315). 
Likewise, Heyst saw Lena's image 'constantly before his eyes, with all 
the pathos and force of its appeal, august, pitiful, and almost holy to 
him' (4:11:309), a source of veneration beyond his circumscribed selfhood. 
Each was transported by the other through the mutuality of their 
togetherness -- unlike Mrs Schomberg, who lived a life of utter isolation 
with her husband among those who frequented their hotel, 'speaking to no 
one, and no one speaking to her. Schomberg himself took no more interest 
in her than may be implied in a sudden and totally unmotived scowl. 
Otherwise the very Chinamen ignored her existence' (1:5:45). When 
Davidson, 'easily sorry for people', tried to make conversation with her, 
'she was so unused to being addressed by customers that ••• she jumped 
exactly like a figure made of wood, without losing her rigid immobility • 
• • • One was inclined to think of her as an It' (1:5:46). 
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But even such a reified 'waxwork figure ••• without expression, 
without movement, without voice, without sight' (1:5:49) gained a brief 
moment of fuller being by moving beyond herself towards others through her 
resolve to aid Heyst and Alma/Magdalen in their elopement. Yet Davidson 
ignorantly put her action down to 'some interest of her own to serve. She 
was too lifeless to be suspected of impulsive compassion' (1:5:50). Her 
husband's view of her as simply an unappealing object is stressed by the 
narrator's remark that physically (especially 'in her night attire') she 
'looked the most unattractive object in existence -- miserable, 
insignificant, faded, crushed, old' (2:5:96), in dismal contrast to 'the 
feminine form' Schomberg 'had ever in his mind's eye' (2:5:97). He did not 
regard his wife as a Marcellian presence, relating to her instead in a 
degraded I-It way. In her dependence on him, however, 'his swollen, angry 
features awakened in the miserable woman over whom he had been tyrannizing 
for years a fear for his precious carcass, since the poor creature had 
nothing else but that to hold on to in the world' (2:5:97). 
Dependent though his wife was on him, Schomberg had no solicitude for 
her personal well-being, forcing her to rummage 'absolutely idiotic with 
fright' through Jones's luggage while he lounged 'in manly, careless 
attitudes on the veranda -- keeping watch' (2:5:97). His defence was that 
Jones 'wouldn't touch a woman', though for her the search was 'an awful 
job; but she did go in, because she was much more afraid of Schomberg than 
of any possible consequences of the act' (2:5:98). And her thanks for her 
labours was a muttered, "'Stupid female!"' (2:5:98). 
As Sartre would point out, Schomberg's frustration with his wife 
turned to hatred. For him she was simply an external instrument unable to 
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nurture any enhanced sense of his own personal worth. 'The possession of 
Mrs Schomberg was no incitement •••• Instead of caring for no one, he 
felt that he cared for nothing. Life was a hollow sham' (2:5:99). Clearly 
their relationship imparted no mutual justification whatsoever. Indeed, he 
longed to be rid of her: '"I wish'", he exclaimed to Ricardo, "'you would 
carry her off with you somewhere to the devil!"' (2:5:103). Nor was 
Schomberg's attitude towards Lena one of tenderness. She was purely a 
sexual object for whom he "'would have kicked everything to pieces"' 
(2:5:105). Yet she did at least awaken lust in him, animalistic though it 
was; Mrs Schomberg, on the other hand, was to him just a lump of 
unappetising flesh, as the graphic physical descriptions of her emphasise. 
Sexuality had no power to draw husband and wife together. 'Dressed for 
duty' in her nightgown, Mrs Schomberg would simply 'stare straight before 
her' (2:8:145), locked in isolation like her spouse. Focusing yet again on 
how bodily repulsive she was in her husband's view, the narrator comments 
that Schomberg felt his life to be 'blighted ••• and never with such 
force as when ••• he perceived that woman sitting patiently in a chair, 
her toes peeping out under the edge of her night-dress, an amazingly small 
amount of hair on her head drooping on the long stalk of scraggy neck, 
with that everlasting scared grin showing a blue tooth and meaning 
nothing -- not even real fear. For she was used to him. 
'Sometimes he was tempted to screw the head off the stalk ••• quite 
unaware that he had murdered the poor woman morally years ago •••• Her 
bodily presence was bitterly offensive, because of its contrast with a very 
different feminine image. And it was no use getting rid of her. She was a 
habit of years, and there would be nothing to put in her place' 
(2:5:107-8). 
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The narrator's stressing of the body continues in his depiction of 
'plain Mr Jones and Co.' Our first view of them is during Schomberg's 
meeting them at the mail-boat, eyeing (or in Sartre's term 'fixing') them 
-- as he did everyone -- as 'either the objects of scandalous gossip or 
else the recipients of narrow strips of paper with proper bill-heads 
stating the name of his hotel' (2:4:91-2). In an almost melodramatic way 
their very appearances connoted their characters. Jones had a 'handsome 
but emaciated' face, a body that was 'long and loose-jointed', with 
'slender fingers' (2:4:92), 'long feminine eyelashes' and an 'air of 
withered youth' (2:4:95) under his 'delicate and beautifully pencilled 
eyebrows' (2:5:101). Ricardo, whom Jones insisted 'must have the room 
next to mine' (2:4:92), was 'a muscular, short man with eyes that gleamed 
and blinked, a harsh voice, and a round, toneless, pock-marked face 
ornamented by a thin, dishevelled moustache' (2:4:93). 
Their factotum, Pedro, was 'a nondescript, hairy creature'; 'the 
lower part of his physiognomy was over-developed; his narrow and low 
forehead, unintelligently furrowed by horizontal wrinkles, surmounted 
wildly hirsute cheeks and a flat nose with wide, baboon-like nostrils 
he displayed a pair of remarkably long arms, terminating in thick, brown 
hairy paws of simian aspect' (2:4:92). He had a 'trained-animal manner' 
(2:4:93) and was 'more like a performing bear ••• than a human being' 
(2:4:95), obviously dehumanised and depersonalised by his inauthentic 
relationship with Jones and his secretary, to whom he was just "'like a 
sort of dog -- dashed sight more useful, though"' (2:7:124). Indeed, 
Ricardo 'had a propensity to talk about "his Pedro", as some men will talk 
of their dog' (4:9:292), and thought nothing of cracking him on the head 
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with a 'heavy piece of wood' (3:6:193), adding: "'If it wasn't that he can 
be made useful in one way or another, I would just as soon have let the 
governor shoot him'" (3:7:194). 
The 'physiognomy' (2:4:91) of all three was to have a firm bearing on 
the way they related to others. They certainly left Schomberg 
'disconcerted ••• utterly' (2:4:96), promoting in him that Sartrean 
sensation of uneasiness, of feeling oneself in danger, produced by the 
incontestable contingency of another person. Jones was venomous towards 
everyone, but particularly so towards women, whom he considered "'a perfect 
curse'"; "'I can't stand women near me. They give me the horrors'" 
(2:4:94). The very mention of Mrs Schomberg evinced in him 'a horrified 
recoil' (2:5:103); at the news of 'eighteen women' in the hotel orchestra 
he 'let out an exclamation of dismay' and 'swore violently' (2:5:105). As 
a misogynist, he clearly had no inclination to seek full relationships with 
women, particularly not relationships grounded in sexuality. Even in his 
suggested homosexuality he treated others as objects, like the "'ragged, 
bare-legged boy that he had picked up in the street"' of a '"one-horse 
Mexican pueblo'" (2:7:131). 
His secretary's attitudes to women clearly placed them in the position 
of objects for lust, with sadistic overtones. '"Not that I wanted to do 
them any harm; but I felt the power in myself"' (2:6:115). '"Take 'em by 
the throat or chuck 'em under the chin is all one to me"' (2:8:142). As we 
saw in chapter 3, Ricardo's view of Lena was simply as "'meat'" too good 
for "'tame"' Axel Heyst (4:3:244). Seeing her with 'her fingers busy with 
her dark hair, utterly unconscious, exposed and defenceless -- and 
tempting' (4:1:236), his response was one of sheer animality: 'the 
instinct for the feral spring could no longer be denied' (4:1:237). He 
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displayed none of the transcendental character of desire as defined in 
Sartrean terms. 
Ironically, Ricardo recognised this very attitude in Schomberg. As he 
told Lena, "'He was hot after you'" (4:2:242). And the thought of Heyst's 
physical contact with her fuelled 'the torment of his jealousy' (4:12:318), 
which 'started gnawing at his breast as the image of Heyst intruded itself 
on his fierce anticipation of bliss' (4:6:272). The power of Lena's sexual 
hold over him produced alternating bouts of sadism and masochism in 
Ricardo, which Sartre would recognise as the outcome of his viewing himself 
and Lena as no more than brazen objects for each other. Ricardo had 
sado-masochistically approached her 'with the delighted obedience of a man 
who could at any moment seize her in his hands and dash her to the ground' 
(4:12:316). "'I am dog-tired • "', he told her, '"as tired as if I 
had been pouring my life-blood here on these planks for you to dabble your 
white feet in •••• What you want is a man, a master that will let you put 
the heel of your shoe on his neck"' (4:12:317). 
There was obviously none of what Buber would consider true dialogue 
between them, just as Ricardo and Jones had none with any of the other 
characters. 'Ricardo displayed no conversational tone', and his employer, 
though he 'appeared communicative enough', had a 'hollow' voice that 
'sounded distant, uninterested, as though he were speaking from the bottom 
of a well' (2:5:100-1) with 'some sort of menace from beyond the grave' 
(2:5:102). Their 'wild' talk (2:5:102), full of bravado accounts of their 
cruelties, was designed to repel others rather than promote relations of 
mutuality. During their stay at Schomberg's hotel Jones in fact usually 
maintained a 'contemptuous silence' and 'never addressed himself to 
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Schomberg with any general remarks, never opened his lips to him unless to 
say "Good morning" -- two simple words which, uttered by that man, seemed 
a mockery of a threatening character' (2:6:108). 
Ricardo, the narrator wryly comments, turned out to be 'infinitely 
more communicative than his patron', exchanging 'at least twenty words 
every day' with Schomberg (2:6:110)! At one point he even let forth 'an 
unsuspected stream of loquacity' (2:6:112) as he related his meeting Jones 
for the first time, when Jones '"looked at me quietly in a slow 
way •.•. He seemed to touch me inside somewhere'" (2:6:113). To Jones, 
however, even Ricardo was ultimately just a mere creature, his satellite 
from 'the faithful-retainer class' (4:11:304) rather than a full partner in 
his life. Jones simply found 'a man of his sort extremely useful' 
(3:7:197). But he was none the less tinged with sexual jealousy when he 
discovered Ricardo's designs on Lena, enough to shoot the '"woman-lover 
the prevaricating, sly, low-class amorous cuss!"' (4:11:310). This 
jealousy, though, did not betray any sense of Jones caring for Ricardo as 
an object of transcendental concern, just as he did not care for any other 
living soul, 'friend or enemy' (4:6:271). Jones merely treated his 
secretary as a tool, in the same way as he did all '"the common herd 
one must make use of the brutes'" (4:11:311). In his fevered response to 
Ricardo's lust for Lena he branded them "'mud souls, obscene and cunning! 
Mud bodies, too -- the mud of the gutter!'" ( 4: 11: 314). His fellow 
beings-in-the-world were clearly nothing more than stark clay to Jones. 
Ricardo had similarly barren relationships with others. Talking to 
Schomberg, he remarked: "'Now, here we sit, friendly like, and that's all 
right. You aren't in my way. But I am not friendly to you. I just don't 
care •• You are no more to me one way or another than that fly there"' 
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(2:6:115). It is to state the obvious that Ricardo did not relate to 
Schomberg with Heideggerian solicitude, whereby men exhibit personal 
concern. And without solicitude, one is in the Mitwelt as a sheer 
contingent being. Indeed, both Ricardo and Jones actively despised any 
loving contact with their fellows. 'There was a similarity of mind between 
these two -- one the outcast of his vices, the other inspired by a spirit 
of scornful defiance, the aggressiveness of a beast of prey looking upon 
all the tame creatures of the earth as its natural victims' (3:10:220). 
This constant stress on Ricardo's animality, linked to his brutal use of 
others in terms of sheer instrumentality, shows how far he fell short of 
that more complex human sexuality which imparts knowledge of the other --
the kind of sexuality Heyst displayed in his very different response to 
Lena. 
The lack of full relationship with another produced in Jones the 
ennui that is his frequently mentioned hallmark. Even his suggested 
sexual encounters involved lassitude: having '''picked up''' a Mexican 
urchin, Jones simply "'lay all day long in a dark room"' (2:7:131), 
finding no sense of union with the boy. As for other races, both he and 
Ricardo (like Schomberg) regarded them as brute instruments not worth 
consideration. 'These white men looked on native life as a mere play of 
shadows. A play of shadows the dominant race could walk through 
unaffected and disregarded' (2:8:143). Heyst's treatment of his servant, 
Wang, was substantially more caring, though it did not of course approach 
the depth of his solicitude for Lena, his beloved possession whose entire 
self he longed to know. Even as she lay dying he was enthralled by 'the 
charm, the fascination, of that mortal flesh' (4:13:323); he was her 
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possession as much as she was his. '"Oh, my beloved -- all my own at 
last!"' she murmured (4:13:322). 
This is not the female possessiveness despised by D. H. Lawrence 
but possession characterised by solicitude to the point of self-sacrifice, 
Lena's 'tremendous victory, capturing the very sting of death in the 
service of love' (4:13:323). (The echo here of I Corinthians 15:55 is 
palpable: 'O death, where is thy sting? 0 grave, where is thy victory?' 
questions phrased in the context of love as resurrection and 
transformation.) 20 As Moser has commented, in Conrad's later characters 
love takes precedence over life. Lena's love, as Seymour Gross 
emphasises, was 'transcendent', and her 'beatific death' contrasted 
sharply with 'the desperate and despairing suicide of Jones-Ricardo'. 21 In 
her final moments she was buoyed by the vision of Heyst 'ready to lift her 
up in his firm arms and take her into the sanctuary of his innermost heart 
for ever! The flush of rapture flooding her whole being broke out in a 
smile of innocent, girlish happiness; and with that divine radiance on her 
lips she breathed her last, triumphant, seeking for his glance in the 
shades of death' (4:13:324). 
Heyst's relationship with her had also infused his own crabbed 
existence with a new radiance, awakening him -- albeit it too late -- to a 
new credo: '"Woe to the man whose heart has not learned while young to 
hope, to love -- and to put its trust in life!"' (4:14:326). There is a 
quality of existentially aware affirmation in this, as Palmer has 
22 
remarked, even though it is finally darkened by the very last word in 
the novel, Davidson's emphatic '"Nothing!"' 
* 
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The love relationship between Jim and Jewel in Lord Jim, written fourteen 
years before Victory, is not given quite the meticulous depiction accorded 
Heyst and Lena's, but its enhancing and self-transcending qualities are 
nevertheless unmistakable. Jim of course eventually left Jewel 'at the 
call of his exalted egoism' (45:312). Yet the sagely Stein accepted that 
"'he loved her very much'" (37: 261), and Jim himself remarked to Marlow, 
"'I love her dearly. More than I could tell'" (32:229). Jim and Jewel 
provided for each other those sublime moments in which 'our souls, as if 
freed from their dark envelope, glow with an exquisite sensibility that 
makes certain silences more lucid than speeches' (32:229). Even though 
she never understood him fully, there was a deep Marcellian communication 
between them that went beyond language. And as Jaspers asserts, 'Love is 
the substantial source of communicative self-being'; it is communication's 
'font and its luminary' (Philosophy 2:66, 64). By virtue of her 'vigilant 
affection' (29:214) Jewel became for Jim -- as Lena for Heyst -- an anchor 
in his roving existence, a transcendental object of his Heideggerian care 
and solicitude. Without such loving bonds (as we shall see in the final 
section of this chapter), men and women are consigned, as we remember 
Kierkegaard putting it, to lives that are 'an isolation and hence 
imperfect' (Either/Or 2:220). 
There is no doubt that Jim and Jewel did not, as Sartre insists no 
one can, attain total immersive union (which in any case Buber considers 
undesirable). But in Marlow's account Jim did experience that 
self-transcending quality existentialists recognise as an attribute of 
love. From his first mention of this love Marlow points to its 
extraordinariness, its superiority to most 'such stories', which are often 
not 'stories of love at all. For the most part we look upon them as 
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stories of opportunities: episodes of passion at best, or perhaps only of 
youth and temptation, doomed to forgetfulness in the end, even if they 
pass through the reality of tenderness and regret' (28:208) a view the 
narrator of Nostromo ascribes to Emilia Gould, who chose to look on love 
as 'only a short moment of forgetfulness, a short intoxication, whose 
delight one remembered with a sense of sadness, as if it had been a deep 
grief lived through' (3:11:431). 'This view mostly is right', comments 
the Marlow of Lord Jim, 'and perhaps in this case, too •••• Yet I don't 
know. To tell this story is by no means so easy as it should be -- were 
the ordinary standpoint adequate' (28:208). Despite Marlow's reminding us 
of the uncertainty inherent in any personal appraisal, he does emphasise 
the unusual profundity of Jim and Jewel's love. 
Marlow considered the emblem of this love to be the grave of Jewel's 
mother, on the 'rustic fence' of which Jim himself had worked 'with his own 
hands'. In this, the raconteur told his listeners, 'you will perceive 
directly the difference, the individual side of the story. There is in his 
espousal of memory and affection belonging to another human being something 
characteristic of his seriousness. He had a conscience, and it was a 
romantic conscience', which apprehended through Jewel her mother's 
suffering at the hands of Cornelius. 'For where is the man -- I mean a 
real sentient man -- who does not remember vaguely having been deserted in 
the fullness of possession by someone or something more precious than 
life?' (28:209) -- by an object, in Sartrean terms, of transcendental 
value. 
Jewel's value for Jim was signified by her very name, given to her by 
him, as Heyst gave Lena hers. Jim 'called her by a word that means 
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precious, in the sense of a precious gem', which he spoke 'with a marital, 
homelike, peaceful effect' (28:210). The word might suggest a treasured 
inanimate possession, but even if this were how Jim perceived her there is 
still, Sartre says, the value of the special link of possession that 
infuses something of myself in the object I own, since there is an ideal 
presence of the for-itself in the possessed in-itself. Jim, however, 
clearly did not see Jewel as a reified possession. Indeed, he felt himself 
gratefully indebted to her: '"You know ••• "', he told Marlow in his 
elliptical way, "'can't tell you how much I owe to her'" (28:210). 
Even the 'third-class deputy-assistant resident, a big, fat, greasy, 
blinking fellow' whom Marlow encountered en route to Patusan, had heard of 
Jim's jewel, which he naturally assumed to be a literal gemstone. The news 
had spread far and wide, along with the report of the woman whom 'the white 
man treated with great respect and care' (28:212), and who in turn adored 
him. Jewel's 'tenderness hovered over him like a flutter of wings. She 
lived so completely in his contemplation that she had acquired something of 
his outward aspect' (29:214). So profound was their Buberian betweenness 
that she displayed a propensity to merge with him, to surmount the constant 
dialectical tension between relation and distance that Buber (and, more 
stridently, Nietzsche and Sartre) observe in all personal relationships. 
In consequence Jewel feared losing Jim, as her perpetual watchfulness 
over him revealed. 'Her vigilant affection had an intensity that made it 
almost perceptible to the senses; it seemed • to envelop him like a 
peculiar fragrance •• He was jealously loved, but why she should be 
jealous, and of what', Marlow says, 'I could not tell. The land, the 
people, the forests were her accomplices, guarding him with vigilant 
accord, with an air of seclusion, of mystery, of invincible possession' 
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(29:214). Jealousy in love, Marlow suggests, is one of those 
'inexplicable' things -- as in the case of Selvin, one of his chief mates, 
who 'was the victim of such black imaginings that if he did not get a 
letter from his wife at the expected time he would go quite distracted with 
rage and jealousy ••• the man made a little hell on earth for himself' 
(14:121). The narrator of Nos~romo tends to follow Sartre's explanation 
that such jealousy arises from each lover's wishing to be the other's 
chosen object of special, limitless value, from a longing to control the 
other's freedom to place a higher value on any third person. Hence, Dr 
Monygham is described as having 'come to dislike heartily everybody who 
approached Mrs Gould with any intimacy' (3:11:421), and Nostromo himself, 
when thinking Giselle might marry Ramirez, as having felt 'the venomous 
fangs of jealousy biting deep into his heart. He was appalled by the 
novelty of the experience, by its force, by its physical intimacy' 
(3:12:440). 
Similarly, Jewel feared that Jim would value someone from the world 
beyond Patusan above herself. 'Her lover .•• came to her ••• gifted 
with irresistible seductions; but what would become of her if he should 
return to these inconceivable regions that seemed always to claim back 
their own?' Marlow felt that he himself was regarded by Jewel as part of 
that outside world ready to 'whisk Jim away out of her very arms; it was 
my sober conviction', he says, that 'she went through agonies of 
apprehension during my long talks with Jim; through a real and intolerable 
anguish' (32:232). Marlow could not bring himself to tell her why the 
outside world had no claim on Jim, but he did assure her that 'in the whole 
world there was no one who would need his heart, his mind, his hand' 
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(33:239). Yet her desire for him to value her above all others was so 
intense that she did not believe even Jim himself when he tried to reassure 
her. 
Marlow is not reticent about grounding the intensity of Jim and 
Jewel's love in the body. He 'more than once ••• saw her and Jim. 
come out together ••• the two forms very close, his arm about her waist, 
her head on his shoulder. Their soft murmurs ••• penetrating, tender' 
(29:214). It was widely known that 'they walked side by side, openly, he 
holding her arm under his -- pressed to his side -- thus -- in a most 
extraordinary way' (28:212-13). This would not surprise Berdyaev -- or 
Sartre, who feels that there is no other way to seek union with another's 
being-for-itself, the other self's free subjectivity that pervades the 
beloved's whole body even to its surface. It is a stress on the sexual 
dimension of love that appears again and again in Conrad, evident even in 
the early love of Charles and Emilia Gould in Nostromo: Gould 
'contemplated' his wife 'from the height of his long legs with a visible 
appreciation of her appearance. The consciousness of being thus 
contemplated pleased Mrs Gould' (1:6:89). Like many other 'businessmen', 
the narrator tells us, Gould was 'sanguine and imaginative' as a lover, 
kissing his wife 'very tenderly' (1:6:93, 100). Mongyham's love for 
Emilia too is presented in physical terms: aboard the Hermes his 'heart 
dilated within him' (3:11:418) at the sight of her as 'he devoured her 
stealthily with his eyes' (3:11:419). 
The physicality of the love between Nostromo and Giselle is portrayed 
even more graphically. The Capataz, 'broad shouldered, narrow hipped and 
supple', with a 'muscular neck and bronzed chest' (2:7:223), was 'an 
attractive young fellow ••• attractive to men, women, and children, 
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just by that profound quietness of personality which, like a serene 
twilight, rendered more seductive the promise of his vigorous form and the 
resolution of his conduct' (2:7:224-5). With Giselle's 'voice 
[enveloping] him like a caress' (3:12:441), he extolled the loveliness of 
her body, from her 'hair like gold' to her 'little feet' (3:12:442). 'The 
charm of her body' enthralled him as he 'breathed her ambient seduction in 
the tumultuous heaving of his breast' (3:12:443). 'He held her head in his 
two hands, and showered rapid kisses upon the upturned face that gleamed in 
the purple dusk. Masterful and tender, he was entering slowly upon the 
fullness of his possession ••• the man careless of loves became gentle 
and caressing •••• He called her his star and his little flower' 
(3:12:443-4). 
Thus, through physical love Nostromo at last had his humanity enhanced 
by the presence of another -- rather like Monygham, who as 'a concession to 
Mrs Gould's humanizing influence' wore the 'little white jacket' that was 
'the badge of his esteem for her' (1:6:70). ~ Likewise Father Ramon, 
admiring Emilia's 'earnest interest in the concerns of [the] people', also 
'felt his own humanity expand' (3:6:337, 338), that heightening of selfhood 
which Kierkegaard considers an outcome of human relationships marked by 
'conscience' and 'love' (Love 111). Giselle's love gave Nostromo the 
strength to cast off his silver shackles as 'he felt her warm, breathing, 
alive, quivering in the hollow of his arm. In the exulting consciousness 
of his strength, and the triumphant excitement of his mind, he struck out 
for his freedom' (3:12:445) and told her of the treasure he planned to 
overcome at last so as to embark on a new and open life. The words '"I 
love you" ••• cast a spell stronger than the accursed spell of the 
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treasure; they changed his weary subjection to that dead thing into an 
exulting conviction of his power' (3:12:446). 
This enhancing power of physical love so stressed by existentialists 
is also strongly evident in the account of Razumov and Natalia's 
relationship by the professor of languages in Under Western Eyes. Their 
intimacy was triggered when Razumov, by flinging both his hands out to her 
'with the greatest readiness and warmth', imbued Natalia with 'some of that 
hope, inspiration and support' once imparted by her dead brother (2:4:187). 
After this gesture, mused the professor, they 'would understand each other 
quickly' (2:4:188), discover that increase in knowledge about oneself and 
others which existentialists claim for genuine relationships. The power of 
a profound interpersonal bond did indeed promote a new openness in Razumov, 
unlocking his potential for authentic being. This of course took time. 
When next they met, he rested 'his gaze on Miss Haldin, but certainly did 
not look into her eyes which were so ready for him' (2:4:192), his guilt 
preventing an immediate acceptance of her Marcellian availability. 
The professor, taken with Natalia, was 'not disappointed' at Razumov's 
appearance either (2:4:192). In fact, he later thought him 'very 
good-looking' (4:1:299). Razumov 'had a line of the jaw, a clean-shaven, 
sallow cheek; his nose was a ridge, and not a mere protuberance ••• , 
his dark hair curled low on the nape of his neck; in the ill-fitting brown 
clothes there were sturdy limbs; a slight stoop brought out a satisfactory 
breadth of shoulders'. He was 'studious -- robust -- shy', with 'a 
muscular, firm ••• handshake' (2:4:192). His eyes, 'of a clear brown 
colour and fringed with thick black eyelashes', were 'not at all 
unpleasant' (2:5:195). 
The physicality of Ramumov's and Natalia's mutual feelings was clearly 
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a significant element in their response to each other. Razumov took her 
'hand in its black glove, which closed on his, and held it -- detained it 
quite visibly ...• He ••• raised his head, and was looking straight 
into her face now, while she held his hand. They stood like this for a 
long moment' (2:4:193). Again we recall Sartre's contention that we come 
under another's 'look' as a body, and that 'by touching this body I ••• 
finally touch the Other's free subjectivity' (Nothingness 394). 
Yet sexuality that renders the other simply an object is a barren 
affair, as in the case of Jhe Secret Agent's Adolf Verloc, purveyor of 
'photographs of more or less undressed dancing girls' as items of lust 
(1:45). It was also primarily as an instrument of gratification that he 
viewed his wife. With her 'full bust ••• and broad lips' (1:46); 'her 
youth; her full, rounded form; her clear complexion', Winnie provided 
'wifely attentions' (1:47) to Verloc with his 'heavy-lidded eyes [that] 
rolled sideways amorously and languidly. and ••• his thick lips 
capable of much honeyed banter' (1:48). Eventually, of course, not even 
'the usual remedies' offered by an 'experienced wife' held any appeal for 
Verloc amid the pressures of Vladimir's demands. Somewhat like Schomberg 
in Victory, 'he beheld his wife ••• get into bed in a calm, business-like 
manner which made him feel hopelessly lonely in the world' (3:85). 
Winnie was unsettled by this lack of sexual interest in her: '''You 
are tired of me'", she remarked to Verloc in obvious hope of contradiction 
(9:185), since he was vital to her 'practical existence' (9:189). Her 
welfare and Stevie's, after all, depended on him. Consciously turning 
herself into an object for his lust in a way Sartre would clearly 
recognise, she attempted to dissuade her husband from his notion of 
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emigrating by giving him 'a glance of which the Winnie of the Belgravian 
mansion days would have been incapable, because of her respectability and 
her ignorance'. He would never leave, she told him, because "'you would 
miss me too much'" (9: 186). 
In her loneliness after murdering Verloc, Winnie was quick to clutch 
at Ossipon when he unexpectedly encountered her. Ossipon, of course, was 
always ready to exploit women as sexual instruments, particularly when 
they 'put some material means into his hands' (12:266). He preyed on 
'silly girls with savings-bank books' (3:81), and he had 'shamelessly 
inviting eyes, whose glance had a corrupt clearness sufficient to 
enlighten any woman not absolutely imbecile' (11:220). Not recognising 
Winnie, he thought her merely another sexual prospect. 'Comrade Ossipon 
was not afraid of strange women, and no feeling of false delicacy could 
prevent him from striking an acquaintance with a woman apparently very 
much intoxicated. Comrade Ossipon was interested in women. He held up 
this one between his two large palms, peering at her in a business-like 
way', evaluating her potential for prostitution (12:240). When he 
eventually recognised her, he was 'attentive not to discourage kind fate 
surrendering to him the widow of Comrade Verloc' and at once began his 
sexual ploy: '"I've always thought of you -- ever since I first set eyes 
on you'" (12:240). 
Winnie's warm response surprised him; a dash of intimacy could enable 
even Ossipon's self to grow. Her calling him Tom 'thrilled [him] with 
pride', for 'it was a name of friendship -- of moments of expansion' 
(12:243). Yet to him Winnie ultimately remained primarily a thing of 
'material considerations, such as the business value of the shop, and the 
amount of money Mr Verloc might have left in the bank' (12:242). Thus she 
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was even more 'welcome' to him when he discovered 'she had all the money' 
(12:248). 
In spite of his purely 'practical' intentions (12:245), however, 
Ossipon did provide a human stay for Winnie in her distress as 'she sank 
against his breast' (12:248). About to repeat her past mistakes, she in 
desperation turned herself -- as Sartre would point out -- into an object 
for him, promising to '"love"' him, '"slave"' for him, if he would help her 
escape the gallows. '"I've no one in the world. • Who would look at me 
if you don't!'" She would give him sex without any demands for conventional 
respectability: '"I won't ask you to marry me", she breathed out in 
shamefaced accents' (12:253). 
But Ossipon had no wish for any long-term connection. Indeed, 
Winnie's desperate clinging produced in him Lawrentian visions (as in 
Women in Love) of her 'twined round him like a snake, not to be shaken 
off' (12:255), a tie that would make him her possession rather than she 
his. 'Fixing' her, as Sartre would say, into a purely material object, 
Ossipon 'gazed scientifically at that woman' and imagined he saw 
Lombroso's 'murdering type' (12:259), whom he lost no time in abandoning. 
Jim, too, ultimately abandoned Jewel, but in the full anguish of 
leaving a transcendental object of love, not one of brute lust. Like 
Heyst towards Lena, he responded initially to her condition of misery 
rather than just her physical allurement. 'He sympathized deeply with the 
defenceless girl, at the mercy of that "mean, cowardly scoundrel'", 
Cornelius (30:217). 'It was more than pity; it was as if he had something 
on his conscience, while that life went on' (30:219). Not until their 
mutual escape did Jim discover that they were in fact 'fond' of each other 
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(32:229), discover her 'devoted readiness' to watch over him even in his 
sleep (31:224) -- which left him 'remorseful, touched, happy, elated' 
(31;225). She provided him with an anchor for his contingent existence, 
that sense of 'justification' which we recall Sartre regarding as 'the 
basis for the joy of love' (Nothingness 371). 'He realized that for him 
there was no refuge from that loneliness which centupled all his dangers 
except -- in her. "I thought"', he told Marlow, "'that if I went away 
from her it would be the end of everything somehow"' (31:226). 
Such Buberian 'confirmation' for a previously drifting life surfaces 
time and again in the major novels -- even in the early days of the 
Goulds' love in Nostromo: the 'splendour of hopeful love' gave an 'idea 
of rehabilitation' to 'their life' (1:6:92). Dr Monygham in turn 
discovered rehabilitation through his love for Emilia, living as he did 
'on the inexhaustible treasure of his devotion' (3:11:418). In much the 
same way Decoud found justification for his existence through Antonia's 
love. 'Turned journalist for the sake of Antonia's eyes' (2:5:189), he 
now had a greater sense of purpose (even though he did not espouse her 
cause). As he affirmed to Emilia, '"There is nothing I would not do for 
the sake of Antonia. There is nothing I am not prepared to undertake. 
There is no risk I am not ready to run"' (2:6:198). 
For all his scepticism about human relationships, Decoud placed great 
value on the power of love, viewing his stirring address to the 'sort of 
Junta of Notables' as the product of 'the passion of [his] love for 
Antonia. For if ever man spoke well, it would be from a personal feeling, 
denouncing an enemy, defending himself, or pleading for what really may be 
dearer than life' (2:7:213). This is very much the position taken by 
Nietzsche, who, as Michael Hamburger reminds us, insists that only what is 
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personal remains for ever incontrovertible. 23 Indeed, Decoud felt that 
Antonia's love alone made life worth living, approaching Marcel's 
contention that 'fundamentally, I have no reason to set any particular 
store by myself, except in so far as I know that I am loved by [another 
being who is] loved by me' (Mystery 2:9). In the initial stages of the 
silver escapade Decoud had felt his existence buoyed by the thought of his 
beloved, his rowing acquiring 'an ideal meaning from his love for Antonia, 
••• whence he drew his strength and inspiration' (2:7:234). When 
suddenly he perceived his bodily distance from her in the darkness of the 
gulf, he felt his existence to be utterly without justification -- and so 
chose death in his isolation on the Great Isabel. 
Nostromo too found self-justification in the promise of love, 
experiencing a new sense of purpose as he 'thought of Giselle' while 
rowing his small boat out to the island to ask Giorgio Viola for her hand 
(3:12:437). She became the very reason for his decision to give up the 
silver for ever -- and hence became the very means by which he might have 
achieved authenticity, just as Natalia Haldin in Under Western Eyes became 
Razumov's means to fuller selfhood. By the same token Tekla's devotion to 
Razumov gave her existence new purpose. In her resolve 'to take care of' 
him (4:5:343) she at last 'found work to do after her own heart' 
(4:4:341), sitting with him in hospital, determined never to 'abandon him' 
(4:5:343). Later, in their 'little two-roomed wooden house' in the suburb 
of a small town in southern Russia, she 'tended him unweariedly with the 
pure joy of unselfish devotion. There was nothing in that task to become 
disillusioned about' (4:5:347); her life had worth. 
Even the acerbic Peter Ivanovitch eventually found new meaning for his 
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Well, it is a trust, too •••• I believe I am equal to it"' (32:229). As 
Marcel comments in Being and Having (132), 'The more I am, the more I 
assert my being, the less I think myself autonomous'. Though this might 
sound like a refutation of Sartre's view that one is ultimately thrown 
back on one's own resources in whatever one does, we remember Sartre's 
insistence that one is none the less obliged to take cognisance of others 
when formulating one's sovereign values. Accordingly, Jim felt profoundly 
his responsibility to Jewel and the wider community. 
Yet, for all the love and devotion he found in Jewel and the populace, 
and though he did feel '"satisfied ••• nearly"' (32:21), Buberian 
distance remained between them. Even his beloved confidante could not 
provide Jim with ultimate, lasting fulfilment in a world of flux, and this 
manifested itself in her fear that he would one day leave. Marlow, on the 
other hand, was convinced that 'nothing ••• could separate Jim from 
her', as Jim himself had sworn (33:233), in spite of her encouraging him to 
go away in order to save himself. 'She was unselfish when she urged Jim to 
leave her, and even to leave the country. It was his danger that was 
foremost in her thoughts' (33:234) as -- like Lena -- she elevated the 
transcendental Sartrean object of her love above her own self. 'By nothing 
but his mere presence he had mastered her heart, had filled all her 
thoughts, and had possessed himself of all her affections' (33:234). 
Indeed, Marcel would regard Jim's 'presence' as more than 'mere': it was 
full 'availability'. 
Nevertheless, Jewel filled herself with 'incertitude and fear •••• 
She should have made for herself a shelter of inexpugnable peace out of 
that honest affection' (33:236), have drawn on her belief that he '"was 
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life when he discovered love after the death of Madame Eleanor de S----, 
perceiving again the value of human relationship he had once glimpsed as a 
czarist prisoner, when the most profound incident in his life had been his 
meeting the 'quiet, pale-faced girl [who] ••• had come out to the mines 
to join one of his fellow convicts , •• with the hope of helping him to 
escape. But she arrived too late. Her lover had died only a week before' 
(2:2:147). The 'quiet, sad face of the heroic girl' and her devotion to 
her lover had sustained Peter Ivanovitch during his own 'hunted existence' 
in chains (2:2:148), as had his subsequent encounter with a second woman, 
whose 'unexpected cry of profound pity ••• restored him to the ranks of 
humanity' (2:2:150). 
Despite the deleterious influence of life with Madame de S----, Peter 
Ivanovitch's latent potential for a caring relationship was momentarily 
revealed when he responded existentially to Natalia as a full co-existent, 
to 'the harmonious charm of her whole person, its strength, its grace, its 
tranquil frankness' -- only to turn from her in his stern belief that 'the 
beauty of women and the friendship of men were not for him' (2:4:183). He 
ultimately forsook the sterility of this attitude, of course, and "'united 
himself to a peasant girl"' whom he "'simply adore[d]"', returning to 
Russia at '"tremendous risk ••• all for [her] sake"' (4:5:349). Yet 
again Conrad shows love giving a Sartrean sense of justification to a 
formerly pointless existence. 
In a similar way (and like Heyst to Lena), Jewel lent to Jim an 
exultant feeling that his life had worth: '"You take a different view of 
your actions ••• "', Jim told Marlow, '"when you are made to understand 
every day that your existence is necessary you see, absolutely 
necessary -- to another person. I am made to feel that. Wonderful. 
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more true than any other man'" (33:237). And certainly her fears were 
lightened by the joy of their mutual presence, which -- as in Victory --
the outside world eventually broke in on. With Marlow's departure from 
Patusan, the beetles prevailed over Jim's butterfly self. 'The shadow of 
impending separation', Marlow relates, 'had already put an immense space 
between us, and when we spoke it was with an effort' (35:249); the 
threatened loss of mutual solicitude brought a diminution of communication 
as the spectre of distance intervened. Yet even with the grim prospect of 
separation Marlow thought with 'a gratitude, an affection', of the 
'straggler' whose kinship had given his life too a Sartrean sense of 
'justification' amid 'the ranks of an insignificant multitude' (35:251). 
The Marlow of Heart of Darkness encountered no such firm bonding with 
anyone in his 'isolation' among men with whom he 'had no point of contact' 
(1:61). 
Thus Jim -- as we shall see more fully in a moment -- had given to 
Marlow a sense of personal value just as he had to Jewel, who was left 
inconsolably bitter when he left her to follow the stronger 'call of his 
exalted egoism' (45:313), of his self-assertion in the face of the danger 
Brown posed. Deep though his love for her was, Jim forsook it for what he 
felt driven to regard as a truth more powerful to him -- the laying to rest 
of his Patna self through confrontation with a man whose being-with-others 
lacked any redeeming aspects. Brown was a man known for 'the arrogant 
temper of his misdeeds and vehement scorn for mankind at large and for his 
victims in particular' (38:265). His gang were 'the nondescript spawn of 
the South Seas. None of them cared' (38:268). Brown tore apart 'the 
social fabric of orderly, peaceful life, when every man was sure of 
tomorrow, the edifice raised by Jim's hands' (40:281). He despised the 
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'joy' that Jim produced in the community he had wrought (40:284), 'the 
trust, the love, the confidence of the people' (41:286). 
The ardour of these feelings between Jim and the populace may well 
have waned in time, but at his death they were still in full flower, 
crowned with Jewel's 'passion, her anger, and, above all, her fear and her 
unforgiving love', as well as with Tamb' Itam's 'fidelity and a belief in 
his lord so strong that even amazement is subdued to a sort of saddened 
acceptance of a mysterious failure', preserving to the end his 'air of 
guardianship, of obedience, of care' (42:293). To them Jim's loss was 
beyond evaluation, an 'eternal separation' that produced 'a great grief' 
amid their 'ardent and clinging affection' (43:296). As Marcel comments 
in The Mystery of Being (1:181), 'When I put the table beside the chair I 
do not make any difference to the table or the chair, and I can take one 
or the other away without making any difference; but my relationship with 
you makes a difference to both of us, and so does any interruption of the 
relationship make a difference'. 'A man's more intense life', comments 
Marlow, 'makes his death more touching than the death of a tree' (21:170). 
To the people of Patusan and to 'her who loved him best', Jim's 
ultimate loneliness was 'a cruel and insoluble mystery' (43:296). 'People 
had trusted him with their lives • ; and yet they could never, as he 
had said, never be made to understand him' (45:307). Although this accords 
with Sartre's insistence that there can be no absolutely authentic 
being-with-others, it also upholds his belief that personal relationships 
are nevertheless not to be shunned, since they can heighten sense of self 
and make us 'feel our existence is justified' (Nothingness 371). In this 
world such brightness might indeed come quick to confusion, but it is still 
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worth the striving for. 
Certainly Jewel's love had expanded Jim's humanity. The early Jim 
'felt he cared for nothing' (3:21), particularly during his sensation when 
adrift in the Patna's lifeboat that he and the other officers 'were like 
men walled up quick in a roomy grave. No concern with anything on earth • 
• • • Nothing mattered' (10:95). They were as indifferent to the fate of 
the pilgrims as the colonials in Heart of Darkness were to that of the 
soldiers and clerks who 'got drowned in the surf': 'nobody seemed 
particularly to care' (1:60-1). In the wreck of the Patna, Marlow 
commented, 'there was something abject which made the isolation more 
complete -- there was a villainy of circumstances that cut these men off 
more completely from the rest of mankind' (10:95-6). 
During the trial Jim looked on other people primarily as threats, 
which is Sartre's view of how we regard other contingent beings when we 
lack firm interpersonal bonds. This was initially Jim's attitude even 
towards Marlow, who he thought had called him a 'cur', though in fact of 
course Marlow showed sympathetic concern for the young man so 'fair of 
face, big of frame, with young, gloomy eyes' (4:29). At first skirting 
his response to Jim's physical attractiveness, Marlow ascribed his 
interest in him to his seaman's code as 'a member of an obscure body of 
men held together by a community of inglorious toil and by fidelity to a 
certain standard of conduct' (5:43-4), by a 'bond' which is so 'close' 
that 'besides the fellowship of the craft there is felt the strength of a 
wider feeling -- the feeling that binds a man to a child' (11:101). 'The 
bond of the sea', Marlow says in Heart of Darkness, holds sailors' 'hearts 
together through long periods of separation' (1:45). The interpersonal 
bond of life aboard ship manifested itself even in Marlow's relationship 
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with the helmsman who guided him up the Congo. 'It was a kind of 
partnership', Marlow recounted. 'He steered for me -- I had to look after 
him, I worried about his deficiencies, and thus a subtle bond had been 
created, of which I only became aware when it was suddenly broken. And 
the intimate profundity of that look he gave me when he received his hurt 
remains to this day in my memory -- like a claim of distant kinship 
affirmed in a supreme moment' (2:119). 
Conrad speaks poignantly in his preface to The Nigger of the 
'Narcissus' (xlii) about his desire to 'awaken' a sense of fidelity among 
men, 'the solidarity in mysterious origin, in toil, in joy, in hope, in 
uncertain fate -- which binds men to each other and all mankind to the 
visible world'. Hence the presiding aridity of the worlds of Nostromo and 
Under Western Eyes where such Marcellian fidelity is all but absent, which 
is even more the case in !he Secret Agent, Conrad's depiction of what 
Seymour-Smith calls 'a society in which loyalty does not exist 1 • 24 There 
is indeed painfully little evidence of fidelity in Verloc's world, despite 
Adam Gillan's general claim25 that in Conrad man displays a profound 
affinity for his fellow beings-in-the-world, a brotherhood that transcends 
economic, political, national, social or racial differences. This is more 
the exception than the rule -- an appalling situation, since in Conrad's 
view (as Fredric Mashack among others has stressed) 26 man's only hope lies 
in faithful solidarity with his fellows. 
In Lord Jim Marlow feels that 'the real significance of crime is in 
its being a breach of faith with the community of mankind' (14:121), a 
sentiment Emilia Gould in Nostromo would readily have endorsed, given her 
compassion for one's fellow beings-in-the-world so prized by Kierkegaard. 
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With her 'simplicity and charm' she 'was highly gifted in the art of human 
intercourse'. The men of the surveying camp, 'from the youngest of the 
young men to their mature chief' (1:5:70), spoke frequently of her, and 
'the ladies of Sulaco adored' her (1:6:87). Mindful of others, 'she was 
able to appreciate the great worth of the people' (1:7:103) and concerned 
herself with their welfare. As Decoud observed, 'She thinks of her 
schools, of her hospitals, of the mothers with the young babies, of every 
sick old man' (2:5:179). Her Kierkegaardian 'civic self' (Either/Or, 
2:220) was clearly engaged by '"those poor people'" (2:6:205). 
Marlow's interest in Jim, however, went beyond this broad sense of 
communal concern: it deepened into personal solicitude (though, as Watt 
27 
remarks, reciprocity between them was sometimes difficult). By the time 
of Jim's departure for Patusan there had developed between them a 'real 
and profound intimacy' (23:183). The growth of this solicitude was 
triggered in part by Marlow's response to Jim's physical appearance; the 
body, after all, is to the existentialist man's only means to intercourse 
with others and the world (with all its codes, mores and pressures). 
Marlow constantly recalls Jim's 'broad shoulders and his head outlined in 
the light' (6:57), 'the red of his fair sunburnt complexion. the 
clear blue of his eyes' (6:61), 'the down on his cheek, • the smooth 
skin of his face' (13:119), the 'capable shoulders, the open bronzed 
forehead with a white line under the roots of clustering fair hair, this 
appearance appealing at sight to all my sympathies' (7:64). 
Yet despite this pleasing bodily presence there was to start with 
little depth of communication between them. During the trial Jim found 
'that speech was of no use to him' (4:31), and he was predisposed to 
misconstrue Marlow's tentative conversation. But at a certain crucial 
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point when Marlow faltered trying to explain his interest in him, Jim 
responded with warmth. 'I said hurriedly that I couldn't think of leaving 
him under a false impression of my -- of my -- I stammered. The stupidity 
of the phrase appalled me while I was trying to finish it, but the power 
of sentences has nothing to do with their sense or the logic of their 
construction. My idiotic mumble seemed to please him' (6:62), and it 
provided a new openness in their acquaintance. They came under each 
other's Sartran 'look' -- 'all the time I had before me these blue, boyish 
eyes looking straight into mine' -- and there was also the physical touch 
of intimacy when Jim 'darted his arm across the tablecloth, and clutching 
my hand by the side of my plate, glared fixidly' in a 'display of 
speechless feeling' that 'caused two well-groomed male globe-trotters at a 
neighbouring table to look up in alarm from their iced pudding' (7:64). 
Marlow's listening ear enabled Jim to look into himself in an attempt to 
articulate his inner disturbance to another, and so to himself. '"You are 
an awful good sort to listen like this," he said. "It does me good. You 
don't know what it is to me. You don't ••• "words seemed to fail him' 
(11: 100). 
The balm of open friendship is stressed also by Decoud in Nostromo, 
for whom Antonia was 'the one exception' to his mistrust of interpersonal 
relationships, to his 'absolute rule' that 'no friendship was possible 
between man and woman', unless they were brother and sister. This, to his 
credit, was because of the high existential value Decoud placed on the 
meaning of the word friendship, understanding by it 'the frank unreserve, 
as before another human being, of thoughts and sensations; all the 
objectless and necessary sincerity of one's innermost life trying to react 
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upon the profound sympathies of another existence' (2:7:205) with 
Marcellian availability, in a desire to be a full presence to the other 
that allows for the sense of betweenness that Buber emphasises. Decoud 
felt that 'no one could understand him so well as his sister', and his 
letter to her was marked by 'intimacy of ••• intercourse', by 
communication that enabled him to express openly his 'feelings of a great 
solitude' (2:7:210). In Under Western Eyes too we find Razumov pointing 
to the value he found in Natalia's '''having talked with me -- opening your 
heart'" (4:4:333). 
Marlow's solicitous friendship with Jim did not mean that he 
shouldered Jim's problems for him. Rather, he helped him to identify his 
burden and work it through himself. This calls to mind Heidegger's 
distinction in Being and Time (158-9) between the 'two extreme 
possibilities' in which personal solicitude manifests itself in 'its 
positive modes'. In one case we 'leap in' for the other person; 'this 
kind of solicitude takes over for the Other that with which he is to 
concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he 
steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he 
can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or 
disburden himself of it completely'. The second mode is that in which we 
'leap ahead' of the other person, 'not in order to take away his "care" 
but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first 
time'. One helps open up for the other his own possibilities of being, 
'helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his career and to 
become free for it'. In this framework, Marlow did not take over Jim's 
Hedeggerian Sorge but produced a situation whereby Jim appropriated it 
fully himself and thus discovered what his true imperatives were. Jim 
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'got to the heart of it at last' (7:68), wrestling with it in a way that 
helped him 'become free' for authentic being. 
Marlow also provided catharsis in letting Jim relate the Patna 
episode aloud while the members of conventional humanity sat by with their 
'pale blotches of faces' (8:80), the nameless others from whom Jim felt as 
isolated as he had from the pilgrims, to whom he had appeared 'too 
hopelessly separated from themselves to be worth an appealing word, a 
glance, or a sign' (9:83). The gulf between Jim and his fellow beings-in-
the-world was bridged only by his kinship with Marlow -- a fellowship that 
later found even fuller form in his love for Jewel. In Patusan Jim 
created a rich (if ultimately incomplete) life for himself, not only in 
his intimate togetherness with Jewel but also in a wider social sense. 
The solidarity he felt with the populace was a far cry from his desertion 
of his fellow beings aboard the Patna, and this Kierkegaardian 'civic 
self' was a considerable part of his 'achievement'. In his ease with 
himself Jim developed a mode of relation to others that allowed him to 
stand out in freedom and responsibility, able to become the unique 
individual he had wished to make of himself. 
Of course, as Marlow says again and again in a sentiment Sartre would 
uphold, he and Jim did not get to know each other completely through their 
friendship. But though Jim remained enigmatic to the end, their 
togetherness did elicit glimpses, as when Jim recounted his desire to swim 
from the lifeboat to the foundering Patna so as to assuage 'the created 
terror of his imagination'. His words provided 'one of those bizarre and 
exciting glimpses through the fog. It was an extraordinary disclosure' 
(10:90). Jim's torment at having forsaken the ship was revealed in an 
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uncontrolled contracting of 'the muscles around his lips ••• into an 
unconscious grimace that tore through the mask of his usual expression 
something violent, short-lived, and illuminating like a twist of lightning 
that admits the eye for an instant into the secret convolutions of a 
cloud' (10:94). Marlow's closeness to Jim allowed such self-revelation 
and, more important, self-recognition; as Sartre contends, 'Each Other 
finds his being in the Other' (Nothingness 252). 
Such was the case too with Natalia and Razumov in Under Western 
Eyes. '"The possibility of being loved by that admirable girl'" (4:5:347) 
brought him the '"discovery"' that nothing could '"cover up the ignominy of 
the existence before him'" (4:5:347-8). As Heidegger would put it, Natalia 
had 'become the "conscience" of the other' (Time 344). Her Marcellian 
presence impelled Razumov towards the 'momentous resolution' (4:3:325) to 
unburden himself of his alienating secret, to put an end to the 
'desolation' of having 'no one to go to' (4:3:327). 
Although Razumov's 'atrocious confession' initially left Natalia 
devastated -- her 'heart ••• like ice' (4:3:329) -- he himself felt 
(4:4-: 3)0) 
'washed clean~, his feelings magnified. It was through her that he 
discovered an inner knowledge of what was best for him to do: to make a 
clean breast to himself and others of his role in the Haldin affair. He 
was 'baffled by the novelty and the mysteriousness of that side of our 
emotional life to which his solitary existence had been a stranger' prior 
to his meeting Natalia, who cast 'the sovereign ••• power of her person 
over his imagination' (4:4:330), thereby freeing him for himself -- for 
the self-knowledge that permitted him to live at peace with himself. As 
28 Christopher Cooper remarks, Razumov's moral wholeness and thus 
redemption came as a direct result of his falling in love with Natalia. 
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Addressing her in his journal, Razumov asserted: '"You were appointed to 
undo the evil by making me betray myself back into truth and peace'" 
(4:4:331). 
This is very much what the 'beautiful' (2:3:150) Antonia Avellanos 
with her gleaming 'blue eyes' (2:3:151) in Nostromo did for Decoud by 
offering him an avenue to overcoming his 'barren indifferentism' 
(2:3:152), his impersonal view of his fellow Costaguaneros as participants 
in some 'opera bouffe'. She had castigated him for 'the aimlessness of 
his life' (2:3:154), and it was her physical presence, the 'frank' 
pressure of her hand and the 'approving warmth' of her voice, that induced 
him to remain in his 'native country' and be of service to others 
(2:3:155). Through her he felt 'a marked change' in himself (2:3:156), a 
new sense of expanded selfhood. Antonia had in Heidegger's terms become 
Decoud's means to 'freeing' himself 'for his own possibilities' for 
committed engagement; she had become his 'conscience' (Time 344). 
Similarly, Natalia and Razumov enhanced each other through their 
Marcellian availability in openness and solicitude. '"For days"', Razumov 
confessed in his journal, '"you have talked with me -- opening your heart • 
• • • It was as if your pure brow bore a light which fell on me, searched 
my heart and saved me from ignominy, from ultimate undoing. And it saved 
you too. • I felt that I must tell you that I had ended by loving you. 
And to tell you that I must first confess. Now I have done it; and as 
I write here, I am in the depths of anguish, but there is air to breathe at 
last air!"' (4:4:333). 
The entire episode indeed "'saved'" Natalia as well. She was left 
'matured by her open and secret experiences', giving the professor 'a new 
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view of herself ••• the perfection of collected independence. The 
strength of her nature had come to surface because the obscure depths had 
been stirred' (4:5:342). Through her relationship with Razumov she had 
embraced a new sense of hope for the future, become 'wedded to an 
invincible belief in the advent of loving concord' that would heal the 
anguish of men's hearts (4:5:345). Such is the power of love that in 
Conrad's view can spring from Heideggerian solicitude. 
Natalia, Razumov remarked, was the first person to have expected 
'tenderness' from him -- an expectation of solicitude he initially felt he 
could not rise to: she had 'come too late'. But to the professor, 'the 
silent spectator, they looked like two people becoming conscious of a 
spell which had been lying on them ever since they first set eyes on each 
other', parties to 'some hidden sentiment they shared together' (4:3:320). 
Wrestling with his guilt, Razumov suddenly looked as if 'he had stabbed 
himself', eliciting a cry of 'tenderness' from Natalia, at which 'he only 
stared at her in that complete surrender of all his faculties which in a 
happy lover would have had the name of ecstasy' (4:3:325). 
. 
Such solicitous tenderness also marked Dr Monygham's attitude to Emil~ 
A 
Gould in Nostromo. The doctor 'settled ••• on Mrs Gould's head' the 
whole of the 'great fund of loyalty in [his] nature. He believed her 
worthy of every devotion' (3:4:320) including his risky mission to 
Sotillo, on which he embarked with the added impulse of her having 'pressed 
both his hands' (3:7:346). He was appalled at how San Tome had deprived 
Emilia of her husband's love. "Was it for this that her life had been 
robbed of all the intimate felicities of daily affection which her 
tenderness needed as the human body needs air to breathe?' (3:11:423-4). 
Her happiness rather than his own mattered most to him in his response to 
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her as the transcendental Sartrean object of his desire. He was a 
remarkable instance of a man existentially going beyond himself in the 
service of another without any unrealistic expectation of being requited. 
He was 'exalted by a spiritual detachment from the usual sanctions of hope 
and reward', 'all his scruples vanishing in the proud feeling that his 
devotion was the only thing that stood between an admirable woman and a 
frightful disaster' (3:8:362). When during their meeting in the Custom 
House Nostromo charged off heedless of Monygham's attempts to have him help 
in his plans for the mine, the doctor 'threw himself recklessly into the 
pursuit. At the bottom of the charred stairs he had a fall, pitching 
foward on his face with a force that would have stunned a spirit less 
intent upon a task of love and devotion. He was up in a moment, ••• 
possessed by the exaltation of self-sacrifice' (3:9:385), in an echo of 
Lena's response to Heyst in Victory. 
Marlow's solicitude for Jim is not presented with this degree of 
intensity, but it was none the less a cardinal element in Jim's achieving 
fuller selfhood -- just as Jim in turn enhanced Marlow's existence. He was 
'of the sort whose appearance claims the fellowship of these illusions you 
had thought gone out, extinct, cold, and which, as if rekindled at the 
approach of another flame, give a flutter deep, deep down somewhere, give a 
flutter of light ••• of heat!' (11:100). Marlow's words here put one in 
mind of Marcel's contention that 'when somebody's presence does really make 
itself felt, it can refresh my inner being; it reveals me to myself, it 
makes me more fully myself than I should be if I were not exposed to its 
impact' (Mystery 1:205). This Jewel too did for Jim, whom Marlow found 
'fresh' during his visit to Patusan (27:204). Similarly, Mongyham's 
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'withered soul had been refreshed after many arid years' by Emilia Gould 
(3:4:315). 
In their mutual solicitude Jim and Marlow also eventually achieved a 
measure of that Buberian dialogue which connotes true togetherness. Even 
though Jim's self-revelatory talk unsettled Marlow, it invigorated him as 
well -- unlike the blague of the French lieutenant, which left him and 
Marlow facing 'each other mutely, like two china dogs on a matelpiece. 
The blight of futility that lies in wait for men's speeches', Marlow 
comments, 'had fallen upon our conversation, and made it a thing of empty 
sounds' (13:115). The Frenchman spoke with the 'passionless and definite 
phraseology a machine would use, if machines could speak' (14:123), 
offering no genuine communication. As we recall Jaspers remarking in Man 
in the Modern Age (119), 'When language is used without true significance, 
it loses its purpose as a means of communication and becomes an end in 
itself • it is verbosity in place of reality' like 'the absurd 
chatter of the half-caste' ship's master 'derived from a dictionary 
compiled by a lunatic' when Jim took leave of Marlow for Patusan (23:183, 
182). Their own talk, in contrast, had by this stage reached true 
communication. As Marlow recalls, 'The sort of formality that had been 
always present in our intercourse vanished from our speech; I believe I 
called him "dear boy", and he tacked on the words "old man" to some 
half-uttered expression of gratitude' (23:183). Later, Jim found similar 
depth of communication in even the most ordinary of verbal exchanges with 
Jewel: '"Hallo, girl!" he cried cheerfully. "Hallo, boy!" she answered 
at once •• 
'This was their usual greeting to each other, and the bit of swagger 
she would put into her rather high but sweet voice was very droll, pretty, 
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and childlike. It delighted Jim greatly' (34:242). 
Antonia and Decoud's conversation in Nostromo had a yet more 
intoxicating quality. 'He drank the tones of her even voice, and watched 
the agitated life of her throat, as if waves of emotion had run from her 
heart to pass out into the air in her reasonable words' (2:5:175). 'The 
precious sense of intimacy, the slight contact of their arms, affected him 
softly; for now and then a tender inflection crept into the flow of his 
ironic murmurs' (2:5:179). 'With a touch of penetrating tenderness in his 
voice he assured her that his only aspiration was to a felicity so high 
that it seemed almost unrealizable on this earth' (2:5:181). 
This tenderness also marked the conversation of the Goulds in the 
early days of their love, when even the mine had been a subject for 
animated talk, since 'the sentiment of love can enter into any subject and 
live ardently in remote phrases', making 'these discussions ••• precious 
to Mrs Gould in her engaged state' (1:6:82). As we recall Jaspers 
asserting, love is the 'font' of true communication (Philosophy 2:64). 
Others discussing San Tom~ rendered Emilia 'impatient and uneasy, whereas 
she could talk of the mine by the hour with her husband with unwearied 
interest and satisfaction' (1:6:89). But as the years passed and Charles 
Gould increasingly gave himself to 'material interest' rather than 
interpersonal intimacy, their lives withered and grew empty of mutually 
sustaining communication -- the loss of which, as Marcel stresses, 
promotes a diminution of being and an increase in despair. '"Why don't 
you tell me something?" she almost wailed' in the midst of the deepening 
political crisis and her growing isolation from her husband, who 'seemed 
to dwell alone within a circumvallation of precious metal, leaving her 
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outside' (2:6:193, 205). 
There was a similar lack of enhancing communication between husband 
and wife in The Secret Agent; 'silence' was 'nothing startlingly unusual 
in [the Verlocs'] household' (2:71). When after Stevie's death Verloc 
finally did attempt 'openness of statement' in words that 'went far beyond 
anything that had ever been said in this home', 'Mrs Verloc made no reply' 
(11:231). Such muteness existed also between him and Stevie. Verloc 
found that he 'positively ••• did not know how to speak to' Winnie's 
brother (3:83). 
He never overcame this lack of communication -- unlike Jim, who for 
so long had appalled Marlow by imposing on himself a 'sentence of exile' 
from fuller fellowship with other people (14:123). Which was why Marlow 
responded with such pleasure to Jim's finding both personal love and a 
sustaining kinship with the community in Patusan, where he 'captured much 
honour and an Arcadian happiness' (16:135) through the Marcellian 
betweenness that marked his relationship with the populace. 'The land, 
the people, the friendship, the love, were like the jealous guardians of 
his body' (26:199). Immediately on producing Stein's ring he had been 
'received, in a manner of speaking, into the heart of the community' 
(25:196), and he quickly grew close to Dain Waris, later describing him to 
Marlow as "'the best friend (barring you) I ever had. What Mr Stein would 
call a 'war comrade"" (26:198). 'Dain Waris', Marlow recounts, 'the 
distinguished youth, was the first to believe in him; theirs was one of 
those strange, profound, rare friendships between brown and white, in 
which the very difference of race seems to draw two human beings closer by 
some mystic element of sympathy •••• He not only trusted Jim, he 
understood him' (26:198-9). 
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Jim and the people of Patusan related to each other as co-existents, 
not as objects to be dominated. He provided them with tender leadership, 
and they in turn afforded him the means to Kierkegaard's 'higher form' of 
selfhood, 'not merely a personal self but a social, a civic self' 
(Either/Or 2:220), through which he transformed 'every relationship 
into a relationship of conscience and thereby also a relationship of love' 
within his society (Love 138). Jim did not misuse the power his victory in 
war gave him in the community; the 'moral effect' of his accomplishment, 
Marlow says, 'was in truth immense. It had led him from strife to peace, 
and through death into the innermost life of the people'. His relationship 
with them invigorated Jim: Marlow found it 'extraordinary how very few 
signs of wear he showed' (27:204). 
Though Marlow speaks of Jim as having been in 'total and utter 
isolation[,] ••• the unsuspected qualities of his nature had brought 
him in such close touch with his surroundings that his isolation seemed 
only the effect of his power' (27:206). Certainly he had not forfeited 
that 'isolation, alone of his own superior kind' (16:135) which Nietzsche 
admires and which Buber deems essential in even the closest of 
relationships. But Jim's newfound sense of communion with his fellow 
beings-in-the-world left him 'in complete accord with his surroundings 
with the life of the forests and with the life of men'. It was a great 
'success' on his part (16:136), particularly in a world that Marlow, like 
Sartre, looked on as precluding any ultimate authentic being-with-others. 
'It is as if loneliness were a hard and absolute condition of existence; 
the envelope of flesh and blood on which our eyes are fixed melts before 
the outstretched hand, and there remains only the capricious, unconsolable, 
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(18:143-4). Jim's next employer, Mr Denver, also 'liked' him and 'slipped 
his hand' under his arm; Jim in turn, Denver reported, '"was familiar with 
me"' too (18: 145). 
But these men (who spoke of Jim as they would have of a girl) did not 
provide the sort of relationship that made them solicitous confidants. 
Not even Stein developed a truly close relationship with him. Yet, being 
'benevolently ready to lend you his ear', Stein did appear to Marlow 'an 
eminently suitable person to receive my confidences about Jim's 
difficulties as well as my own' (19:155). And through Stein's concern for 
him Jim was left free for the experience of Patusan, for the fuller life 
that came through personal love and through fidelity to the wider world of 
men. 'We exist only in so far as we hang together', Marlow remarks 
(2:170), anticipating E. M. Forster's imperative that we 'only connect'. 
Jim's reponsiveness towards Marlow left his mentor 'almost alarmed by 
this display of feeling, through which pierced a strange elation' (17:141). 
Marlow lent Jim 'confidence' (17:142), that 'resolve' which Heidegger 
considers necessary to enable onself to 'be summoned out of one's lostness 
in the "they"', becoming the 'conscience' of others and making it 'possible 
to let the Others ••• "be" in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and 
to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and 
liberates' (Time 345, 344). As Schrag elucidates, 29 resolve brings the 
self to a personal concern -- solicitude -- for others, which makes the 
authentic self the conscience of the other and frees each for his own 
unique possibilities. Accordingly, Marlow gave Jim the resoluteness to 
remake himself: '"I' 11 show yet. • I always thought that if a fellow 
could begin with a clean slate'", Jim effused, taking his leave with 'the 
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unhesitating tread of a man walking in broad daylight' (17:142). Marlow of 
course comments wryly that no one can ever start with a wholly 'clean 
slate', implying that the past selves which have influenced one's character 
can never utterly be ignored. And character determines fate; it is 'the 
initial word of each our destiny ••• graven in imperishable characters 
upon the face of a rock' (17:143). What is crucial to the existentialist 
as we saw in the preceding chapters -- is to take charge of one's future and 
assume full repsonsibility for it. 
This Marlow's solicitude gave Jim the courage to do. But not by 
taking over Jim's troubles for him. 'It's giving you what you had made for 
yourself,' Marlow insisted when Jim protested at Stein's letting him have 
the 'house and the stock of trading goods, on certain easy conditions' 
(24:188). It was ultimately Jim's own conquest of his inauthenticity, 
facilitated by Marlow's solicitude, that endowed him with his sense of 
plenitude as 'he looked with an owner's eye at • the life of the old 
mankind, at the secrets of the land, at the pride of his own heart' 
(24:188-9) in the fulness of his love for Jewel. 
* 
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In piercing contrast to these depictions of love's plenitude, Conrad gives 
constant evidence of the existential emphasis on how impoverished 
existence is when it lacks authentic relationships with one's fellow 
beings. Hence in Nostromo the Goulds, pinning their faith to 'material 
interest' (1:6:100) rather than interpersonal bonds, led a barren life 
together. Emilia, bereft of any deeply personal attachment to give her 
life a sense of worth, failed to embrace Dr Monygham's offered affection, 
consigning herself instead to the 'great wave of loneliness that swept 
over her head' and the apprehension 'that no one would ever ask her with 
solicitude what she was thinking of. No one. No one, but perhaps the man 
[Monygham] who had just gone away. No; no one who could be answered with 
careless sincerity in the ideal perfection of confidence' (3:11:431). Her 
life, in Kierkegaard's familiar words, was 'an isolation and hence 
imperfect' (Either/Or 2:220). By accepting rather than surmounting this 
condition, she denied herself the Buberian I-Thou relationship that lay 
open to her. 
And so she deepened her isolation, with its concommitant sense of a 
meaningless future. 'An immense desolation, the dread of her own 
continued life, descended upon the first lady of Sulaco. With a prophetic 
vision she saw herself surviving alone the degradation of her young ideal 
life, of love, of work -- all alone in the Treasure House of the World' 
(3:11:431). Though she was 'wealthy beyond great dreams of wealth, 
considered, loved, respected, honoured', in her lack of any close personal 
relationship she remained 'as solitary as any human being had ever been, 
perhaps, on this earth' (3:13:457). 
Such intense isolation was also the hallmark of The Secret Agent's 
Winnie Verloc in her sterile marriage with its lack of any I-Thou 
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dimension. Her husband looked on her chiefly as a provider of sex, and she 
on him as a provider of material needs. Being 'sensible', she had cast off 
her beloved 'son of a butcher ••• with whom [she] had been walking out 
with obvious gusto' (1:72), betraying their love for the sake of the 
quotidian comforts Verloc could supply. There was plainly no Buberian 
mutuality, no true dialogue, in the Verlocs' life whereby they sustained 
each other against the world's buffetings and gave each other a Sartrean 
sense of personal justification. At one point Verloc did consider 'making 
a clean breast of it all to his wife', but their estrangement prevented 
him; she was not a true partner in his life, merely his 'chief possession' 
(8:174). He did not accord full humanity to her or to Stevie, towards whom 
he 'extended as much recognition as a man not particularly fond of 
animals may give to his wife's beloved cat; and this recognition, 
benevolent and perfunctory, was essentially of the same quality' (1:72). 
The 'brutal treatment' Stevie had received from his father was at least 
passionately motivated by 'sufferings' that 'were perfectly genuine' as a 
result of his having had 'a very peculiar boy for a son' (1:72). To 
Verloc, Stevie and his mother with her 'motionless being' (1:48) were 
objects of tedious care rather than of personal solicitude -- mere 
Heideggerian 'Ones' he had 'to provide for' (3:83). 
Winnie's prime matrimonial function was to service Verloc with 'her 
charms', rather than to stimulate any wider mutual enhancement. She did 
not even expect from him 'in the daily intercourse of their married life a 
ceremonious amenity of address and courtliness of manner' (9:182). When 
she later felt her sexual usefulness slipping, she suddenly apprehended 
the sheer emptiness of her conjugal state. The 'abode of her married life 
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and elusive spirit that no eye can follow' (16:138). 
Yet even though this existential sentiment suggests that no one is 
ever wholly knowable by another, Jim went a long way to overcoming his 
individual alienation. And Marlow's role in that achievement was not 
insignificant, thanks to his attempts to make himself available to him in a 
Marcellian way, offering his solicitude, his help, his desire to be 
'unreservedly responsible' for him. Jim was not unresponsive: '"Jove!" he 
gasped out. "It is noble of you!" ••• His eyes shone. He became 
another man altogether' (17:141), such is the power of a Buberian I-Thou 
relationship whereby 'the person who is at my disposal', as Marcel puts it, 
'is capable of being with me with the whole of himself when I am in need' 
(Existence 26) -- just as Jim later was to Jewel. He 'lifted her up •••• 
Strong arms, a tender voice, a stalwart shoulder to rest her poor lonely 
little head upon. The need -- the infinite need of all this for the 
aching heart, for the bewildered mind' (33:235). Natalia and Razumov were 
similarly present to each other in Under Western Eyes: he 'had 
discovered that he needed her -- and she was moved by the same feeling' 
(4:3:322). 
Once beyond Marlow's presence, Jim had no one -- until Patusan -- to 
offer him solicitude, though such personal concern might well have flowed 
from Marlow's 'middle-aged bachelor' friend with whom Jim had gone to 
live, had Jim not abruptly left (18:143). The friend had described 
himself as 'not having been able so far to find more in my heart than a 
resigned toleration for any individual of my kind', but it seemed to 
Marlow 'that there were the beginnings of active liking' in him for Jim, 
whose crossing a room to open a door for him had left Marlow's friend 
feeling 'more in touch with mankind than [he] had been for years' 
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appeared to her as lonely and unsafe as though it had been situated in the 
midst of a forest' (9:189). 
But what brought home most vividly the shallowness of Winnie's 
feelings for Verloc was his news of Stevie's death. In Stevie she had 
'found an object of quasi-maternal affection' (1:49), even if he was to 
her also 'an object of care and fears' (3:86), just as he was to his 
mother, whose 'heroic ••• love for both her children' drove her to 
consign herself to charity 'as an act of devotion' in order to 'settl[e] 
her son permanently in life' (8:161, 162). However, her relationship with 
her children was one of 'maternal anxiety' (8:163) that had no mutually 
supportive quality, unlike the bond between brother and sister. Winnie 
provided for Stevie 'a heaven of consoling peace' in 'the black, black 
misery of [his] soul' (8:165), and he in turn 'was connected with what 
there was of the salt of passion in her tasteless life' with Verloc, whose 
'taciturnity • had been lying heavily upon her' since Vladimir's 
demands on him (8:170, 173). 
Accordingly, Winnie felt Stevie's absence keenly during his supposed 
holiday with Michaelis. 'Her devoted affection missed' him; 'her only real 
concern was Stevie's welfare' (9:185). She had grown 'to love him with a 
militant love' (11:223), and her bond with him was far closer than that 
with her husband, as Paul Wohlfarth stresses. 30 Thus Verloc himself sensed, 
with 'the greatest shock', that Stevie's death would destroy Winnie's 
'marital affection'. 'He needed all her assistance and her loyalty' more 
than ever (11:212), but, negligible before, these supportive qualities were 
now utterly absent. Instead, as Sartre would not find surprising, the 
sight of Verloc filled Winnie with hate, which the insensitive man sought 
to overcome by attempting to 'press her to his breast' with a mixture of 
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sexual 'impatience and compassion' (11:213). So little knowledge of each 
other had their vapid connection given them that Verloc actually 'imagined 
himself loved by that woman' (11:216) -- whereas their life had in fact 
simply been a bland arrangement, 'congenial to Mrs Verloc's incuriosity and 
to Mr Verloc's habits of mind, which were indolent and secret'. There was 
'a certain element of vagueness [in] their intimacy •••• Mr Verloc 
presumed that his wife had understood him but he would have been glad to 
hear her say what she thought' (11:222). 
It was this bland lack of communication that was deadening, rather 
than any passionate maliciousness in either of them. Indeed, Conrad --
with his usual appreciation of the ironic -- terms Verloc 'a humane man' 
(11:213 with 'a fund of loyalty in him' (11:217), though loyalty of a sort 
that merely perpetuated the inauthenticity of both his own existence and 
his wife's. Despite his desire not to trouble Winnie with his problems 
and despite his 'sincere concern' for her in the wake of Stevie's death 
(11:223), Verloc had no passionate commitment to her. For seven years he 
had merely been there, as Heidegger would put it, rather than a full 
Marcellian presence, 'carelessly generous' 'in his affairs of the heart • 
• • • He had grown older, fatter, heavier, in the belief that he lacked 
no fascination for being loved for his own sake' (11:226). However 
unattractive he may have been, Verloc was a pathetic figure in this 
belief: it was his 'one single amiable weakness' (12:252). 
Winnie in turn truly loved only her brother -- and 'it was Mr Verloc 
who [had taken] Stevie from her' in a betrayal of her trust (11:223). 
Verloc's account of Stevie's death, in what was his 'first really 
confidential discourse to his wife' (11:225), revealed how little her 
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husband actually meant to her. She had simply been tied to him, and she 
now felt her 'contract' with him 'at an end. She was a free woman' 
(11:226), and she used her freedom to murder the man whom she realised she 
in truth hated. Verloc, she later told Ossipon, '"cheated me out of seven 
years of life'", seven years spent providing sexual services during which 
'"he loved me till I sometimes wished myself ---- "' (12:244). 'Dead' is 
presumably the word left unuttered, as Seymour-Smith suggests. 31 She had 
given only what was required of '"a good wife"'; she did not '"love him"' 
(12:243). Indeed, Ossipon 'even began to wonder whether the hidden causes 
of that Greenwich Park affair did not lie deep in the unhappy 
circumstances of the Verlocs' married life' (12:245). 
Having for so long been 'at the mercy of mere trifles, of casual 
contacts' (11:229), Winnie finally discovered a depth of passion in her 
that had been anaesthetised for so long by their tepid life together, with 
its 'accord of prudent reserve without superfluous words, and sparing of 
signs, which had been the foundation of their respectable home life. 
undisturbed by unseemly shrieks and other misplaced sincerities of conduct' 
(11:235). But her passionate moment of self-assertion in murdering Verloc 
left Winnie even more hopelessly without personal interconnectedness. 
'Murderers had friends, relatives, helpers ••• she had nothing. She was 
the most lonely of murderers that had ever struck a mortal blow' (12:240). 
The victim of a similarly barren marriage, Emilia Gould's only means 
to an authentic life lay in extricating herself from the husband who had 
become thoroughly 'blighted' by the mine (1:6:79), his devotion to which 
eventually desiccated his relationship with all his fellow beings-in-the-
world. Initially, 'theirs was a successful match'; as Gould told his wife, 
'"The best of my feelings are in your keeping, my dear" ••• and there 
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was so much truth in that obscure phrase that he experienced towards her at 
the moment a great increase of gratitude and tenderness' (1:6:91). But 
their mutually enhancing love ultimately degenerated into an I-It 
situation. 'The silver mine, which had killed his father, had decoyed him 
further than he meant to go; and ••• he felt that the worthiness of his 
life was bound up with success' of a material kind rather than success in 
personal relationships (1:6:101). He expended his passion on an 
overriding material object, not on people -- holding to his mine (in 
Decoud's phrase) '"as some men hold to the idea of love or revenge"' 
(2:7:218). 
To Decoud the later Gould deferred to Emilia primarily because '"he 
wished to make up for some subtle wrong, for that sentimental 
unfaithfulness which surrender[ed] her happiness, her life, to the 
seduction of an idea'" (2:7:219). The narrator continues this strain of 
presenting Gould's devotion to the mine in terms that show transference of 
consideration from the personal to the impersonal: San Tom~ had ensnared 
Gould's affections, and his concern for it replaced his solicitude 
for his wife, who 'discovered that he [lived] for the mine rather than for 
her' and who sought 'to save him from the effects of that cold and 
overmastering passion, which she [dreaded] more than if it were an 
infatuation for another woman' (2:7:219). 
The mine's supplanting of Emilia in her husband's affections is 
stressed again in Gould's determination to blow up San Tome mountain rather 
than let it fall into his enemies' hands. 'This resolution expressed 
the remorse of that subtle conjugal infidelity through which his wife was 
no longer the sole mistress of his thoughts' (3:4:312). The mine had 
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dehumanised him, just as it had the labourers, whose 'confidence and 
belief' it had appropriated. They had pinned all their faith to it, 
investing it with 'a protecting and invincible virtue as though it were a 
fetish' (3:6:336). San Tome held them as firmly as it did Gould, whom it 
had in 'a grip as deadly as ever it had laid upon his father' (3:6:338). 
By the end it had made him a 'stony fiend of a man' who -- having clearly 
ceased to view others as full co-existents -- spoke in 'a cold-blooded 
manner which made one shudder' (3:6:341). Thus Conrad, with his penetrating 
insights into the dehumanising character of industrial and commercial I-It 
responses, tends to use the mine in what Northrop Frye would likely regard 
as a metonymic way, letting it stand allegorically and emblematically for an 
inauthentic mode of life. 
Gould's lack of true concern for others spawned by a sense of 
isolation manifested itself also in Monygham, Decoud and Nostromo himself 
prior to their redemption by love. The Capataz's apprehension of his 
isolation was particularly pronounced after his return to Sulaco and his 
devastating realisation that he had no true I-Thou bond with anyone. 
Though his reputation was that of a successful lover, he had been 
altogether cavalier in his treatment of women until his genuinely loving 
commitment to Giselle. 'Magnificent and carelessly public in his amours', 
he had openly kissed and teased the 'pretty Morenita' who halted his horse 
in the street (1:8:134); as Dr Monygham slyly reminded him, '"You 
never say 'no' to a pretty face'" (2:7:229). Even Decoud remarked to him, 
"'Everybody knows of your good luck with women'" (2:7:235). This 
Nostromo accurately put down to simple hearsay: '"As to those girls that 
boast of having opened their doors to my knock, you know I wouldn't look at 
any one of them twice except for what the people would say'" (2:8:258). 
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Before meeting Giselle he had cared for no one, and no one had truly cared 
for him. 
Thus, likable though he was, Gian' Battista had no self-surpassing 
bond with anyone to lend a sense of authenticity to all his attractive 
attributes -- and his death cut short the authentic being-with-others 
promised by his incipient love relationship with Giselle. There was 
certainly a tie between him and Teresa Viola, who had had high hopes of 
Nostromo as 'a friend and defender' for her daughters. But theirs was 'an 
intimacy of antagonism', devoid of openness and mutual enrichment, even 
though it was 'as close in its way as the intimacy of accord and affection' 
(2:7:224). Indeed, Mongyham observed that "'she was in a way ••• in love 
with him •••• No, no, I am not absurd. I may have given a wrong name to 
some strong sentiment for him on her part, to an unreasonable and simple 
attitude a woman is apt to take up emotionally towards a man. 
something important in her life"'. Not surprisingly, Nostromo's 
desertion of her drove her "'into despair'" (3:1:276). 
• He was 
However, even Teresa (like almost everyone else) saw Nostromo in 
terms of his usefulness, 'fixing' him, as Sartre would say, into an 
external instrument through her desire to 'annex that apparently quiet and 
steady young man, affectionate and pliable', for the benefit of the Viola 
family ( 2: 7: 224). And this exasperated him. "'Did you think you could 
put a collar and chain on me as if I were one of the watchdogs they keep 
over there in the railway yards?'" (2:7:227). 
Though Teresa looked on Nostromo's having fetched 'the English doctor' 
for her as 'a proof of his friendship' (2:7:235, 225), she ultimately 
meant very little to him, so that the lure of the fame he would earn as 
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saviour of the silver was stronger than her request for a priest. Like 
Charles Gould, Nostromo put 'material interest' above concern for a fellow 
existent. 'She felt a despairing indignation. The supreme test had 
failed' (2:7:226). Her ensuing sense of abandonment indubitably hastened 
her death, which plunged her husband 'into the open abyss of desolation 
amongst the shattered vestiges of his past'. In marked contrast to the 
cavalier Nostromo, Giorgio discovered in 'the deep, passionate sense of his 
bereavement ••• all the extent of his dependence upon the silenced voice 
of that woman •••• And the old man ••• sat through the day in 
immobility and solitude' (3:9:390) 
Yet even as Nostromo refused to fetch a priest for Teresa he had 
'felt oppressed for a moment' (2:7:226)--had felt, as he told Decoud 
aboard the lighter, "'this cursed silver growing heavy upon my back'" 
(2:7:235). Even as he deserted her he had an apprehension of the powerful 
claims of the personal that Heidegger illustrates in the Roman myth of 
Care, by which every man exists in an inescapable relation with others, 
who lay claim to his concern. Nostromo could not bring himself to hurl 
Hirsch overboard, despite the fact that the stowaway posed a threat to 
their very lives were he to fall into the wrong hands, as indeed he did. 
Decoud, in his usual impersonal manner, considered Hirsch as merely being 
'in the way, like an inanimate and useless object -- like a block of wood' 
(2:8:240). Nostromo, however, responded humanely towards Hirsch, feeling 
that he could not take his life after having seen Decoud '"holding up the 
can to his lips as though he were your brother •••• Your compassion 
saved him'" (2:8:248), revealing that man's existential bond with his 
fellow beings-in-the-world constantly asserts itself. 
Yet the tie between Nostromo and Decoud was chiefly one as between two 
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Sartrean contingent existents; no greater value informed their 
relationship. During their struggle to keep the lighter afloat following 
their collision with the steamer, 'each of them was as if utterly alone 
with his task. It did not occur to them to speak. There was nothing in 
common between them but the knowledge that the damaged lighter must be 
slowly but surely sinking •••• There was no bond of conviction, of 
common idea' (2:8:257). Thrown together in a venture that was inimical to 
the achievement of authentic being, they lacked the mutual solicitude 
Heidegger deems fundamental to self-fulfilment, without which men are 'lost' 
in the bondage of inauthenticity (Jime 166). 
The perception that his life was empty by virtue of the very fact 
that he had no vital connection with any other living soul struck Nostromo 
more forcefully than ever as he returned in stealth to Sulaco harbour. 
Decoud, abandoned on the Great Isabel, 'was the only one who cared whether 
he fell into the hands of the Monterists or not, the Capataz reflected 
bitterly. And that merely would be an anxiety for his own sake. As to 
the rest, they neither knew nor cared' (3:8:349), leaving him without any 
Heideggerian solicitude from anyone that might have given him a Sartrean 
sense of justification for his life. 
In this apprehension Nostromo 'beheld all his world without faith and 
courage' amid its 'silence and solitude' (3:8:351, 354). 'No one waited 
for him; no one thought of him; no one expected or wished his return. 
No one cared' (3:8:355). In a Marcellian world overshadowed by the 
'menace of betrayal' (Existence 22), Nostromo's tone during his unexpected 
encounter with Monygham was one of wounded cynicism, born specifically of 
the Capataz's emotional isolation. A 'sense of betrayal and ruin floated 
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upon his sombre indifference as upon a sluggish sea of pitch' (3:8:358) in 
his resentment at what he considered to be the lack of concern exhibited 
by the doctor and his circle for his personal safety. '"You did not care 
none of you caballeros on the wharf -- once you got off a man of flesh 
and blood like yourselves on a fool's business that could not end well"' 
(3:8:361). "'You fine people are all alike •••• All betrayers of the 
poor who are your dogs'" (3:8:379). "'I say that you do not care for 
those that serve you'" (3:9:380). 
And in truth Monygham did think of Nostromo primarily as a useful 
object, in terms of how 'he would be of the greatest use in the work of 
saving the San Tom~ mine' (3:8:362). 'Nostromo's return was providential. 
He did not think of him humanely, as of a fellow-creature just escaped from 
the jaws of death' (3:8:362). Though 'he esteemed highly the intrepidity 
of that man, he valued [him] but little' (3:8:363). Aware of being 
regarded as an object rather than a full co-existent, Nostromo 'felt 
himself of as little account as the indistinct, motionless shape of the 
dead [Hirsch] whom he saw upright on the beam, ••• disregarded, 
forgotten, like a terrible example of neglect' (3:8:365). Hirsch had 
indeed been treated savagely by Sotillo, as if he were a mere piece of 
meat. 'For many hours he remained apparently forgotten, stretched 
lifelessly on the floor. From that solitude, full of despair and terror, 
he was torn out brutally, with kicks and blows, passive, sunk in hebetude' 
(3:9:374), to be tortured before the coup de grace from Sotillo's revolver. 
'The body of the late Senor Hirsch dwelt alone ••• in the dismal 
solitude of the unfinished building' (3:9:378). 
Again Conrad gives a graphic instance of the absence of that personal 
solicitude which Heidegger considers crucial to uplifting man's existence 
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in its inescapable condition of 'Being with Others' (Time 162). In the 
presence of the dangling corpse Nostromo saw anew his lack of human 
connection, sharing Marcel's view that 'I have no reason to set any store 
by myself, except in so far as I know I am loved by other beings who are 
loved by me' (Mystery 2:8). '"I am nothing! ••• '", Nostromo lamented. 
"'Nothing to anyone'" (3:9:380). 
This sense of nullity through lack of human solicitude afflicted 
Razumov just as strongly in Under Western Eyes, where (as in The Secret 
Agent) Conrad offers a devastating dissection of how political intrigue 
militates against I-Thou relationships and authenticity, much as 
industrial activity does in Nostromo (though there are of course 
distinctions in the ways they do so). Kirylo Sidorovitch Razumov, we are 
told by the professor of languages, 'was as lonely in the world as a man 
swimming in the deep sea. The word Razumov was the mere label of a 
solitary individuality' (1:1:61). And so it remained, until his love for 
Natalia Haldin brought the promise of redemption from his inauthentic 
existence in yet another Marcellian world that contained 'the menace of 
betrayal' (Existence 22). 
Redemption might have come much earlier, but Razumov let slip his 
intitial opportunity for a self-affirming relationship when he betrayed 
Victor Haldin, who had come to him in openness and utter trust, confiding 
his murder of de P---- in the hope of finding human solicitude and support. 
Instead, Razumov chose to abuse this 'confidence' (1:1:67). Indeed, he 
feared intimate ties with anyone: people 'endangered' 'the safety of his 
lonely existence', which he entrusted to 'the present institutions' of 
society. But the existentialist would demand that the individual defy 
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established values as a first step towards mutually fulfilling 
relationships with others, which have the potential to free him for 
authentic selfhood. Razumov, however, elected to side with 'the very 
officials' who if he ran foul of them would in their lack of solicitude 
for anyone have sentenced him 'some morning', only to 'forget his existence 
before sunset •••• Others had fathers, mothers, brothers, relations, 
connections ••• he had no one' (1:1:69). An orphan, like Nostromo, his 
single confidant was not a flesh-and-blood human being but his 'written 
journal', 'the pitiful resource of a young man who had near him no trusted 
intimacy, no natural affection to turn to' (4:1:293). Again like Nostromo, 
he had no caring relationship with anyone -- and in this mode of being, 
Heidegger reminds us, 'neither the Self of one's own Dasein nor the Self of 
the Other has yet found itself' and is 'lost' (Time 166). 
Razumov 'hated the man' (1:1:69) who had offered him that open trust 
so valued by Marcel. 'A terrible fury -- the blind rage of 
self-preservation -- possessed Razumov' (1:2:76) as he went looking for 
Ziemianitch to help Haldin 'vanish' (1:1:68), and he treated the drunken 
sledge-driver as if were merely some 'inert' object (1:1:76) rather than a 
full co-existent, savagely kicking and beating him -- much as Ricardo 
treated Pedro and Sotillo treated Hirsch. 'Locked' in Eliotian 'selfhood' 
Razumov at this stage had no compassionate consideration for any living 
soul, and he returned to his abode with 'lowered head, making room for no 
one' (1:2:80). Reasoning that he had no 'moral bond ••• of common 
faith' with Haldin, he resolved to "'give him up"' (1:2:82); he had not, 
after all, "'provoked his confidence"' or "'accepted his trust'" (1:2:82). 
Yet, like other men, he had a great longing '"to be understood." The 
universal aspiration with all its profound and melancholy meaning assailed 
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heavily Razumov, who, amongst eighty millions of his kith and kin, had no 
heart to which he could open himself'. For a moment he entertained an 
existential vision of 'flinging himself on his knees beside Haldin' and 
pouring out 'a full confession in passionate words that would stir the 
whole being of that man to its innermost depths; that would end in embraces 
and tears; in an incredible fellowship of souls' (1:2:83). But he could 
not bring himself to such Marcellian availability, whereby someone 'is 
capable of being with me with the whole of himself when I am in need' 
(Existence 26). Instead, Razumov's subservience to the values that 
condemned him to inauthentic being overcame this vision of union, and he 
turned to Prince K---- and General T----
' 
whom he loathed (1:2:87), and 
eventually to Councillor Mikulin, his 'mistrust' of whom was 'acute' 
(1:3:120). They of course saw him simply as an instrument of 'usefulness' 
(4:1:292) -- just as the revolutionary circle in Geneva would later wish to 
use him for their ends. 
That Razumov none the less had the potential for a Buberian I-Thou 
relationship was clear in the torment of his emotions at betraying the 
fellow being whose eyes 'gazed upwards at [him] with wistful gratitude for 
this manifestation of feeling' that he divined when Razumov's 'hand fell 
lightly on Haldin's shoulder' (1:2:98, 97). Razumov, however, ignored his 
own emotions and desperately reasoned that his fealty belonged to the 
state rather than to any individual human self. "'You might have gone to 
a man with affections and family ties"', he told Haldin, blaming his 
upbringing for his lack of personal consideration in a way Sartre would 
not excuse, since it is encumbent on one to fight the external forces that 
mangle one's better imperatives. "'You know I have been brought up in an 
264 
educational institute where they did not give us enough to eat. To talk 
of affection in such a connection •• As to ties, the only ties I have 
in the world are social"' (1:2:100). 
Haldin's response to this impersonal rationalisation was to consider 
(1:2: 101) 
to Razumov, with that sense of alienation 
/I 
'"person loathsome"' his 
from himself which existentialists identify with one's reducing oneself to 
an object for another person. And Sartre would insist that Haldin alone 
was responsible for this view of himself. It may be, he argues, that 'I am 
a Jew, an Aryan, handsome or ugly ••• for the Other ••• with no hope 
of changing it. • I am something which I have not chosen to be'. But 
'a Jew is not a Jew first in order to be subsequently ashamed or proud; it 
is his pride of being a Jew, his shame, or his indifference which will 
reveal to him his being-a-Jew; and this being-a-Jew is nothing outside the 
free manner of adopting it •••• Whether in fury, hate, pride, shame, 
disheartened refusal or joyous demand, it is necessary for me to choose to 
be what I am' (Nothingness 523-4, 529). All hinges on how one responds to 
one's unchangeable aspects; by considering himself unappealing to Razumov, 
Haldin freely chose this attitude and thereby obstructed intimacy. 
'Looking up for a moment' in the hope of connection, he swiftly turned 'his 
gaze on the floor', 'evidently waiting for a word. Razumov remained 
silent' (1:2:101), consigning them both to isolation. 
This lack of an interpersonal bond left Razumov too with a self-
alienating sense of insignificance. He experienced his body as 'an 
unrelated organism ••• walking, breathing, wearing these clothes'; it 
'was of no importance to any one, unless maybe the landlady'. His 
'existence ••• seemed no longer his own' (1:3:113). His fellow student 
'Madcap Kostia' had a like apprehension. 'What was his life? 
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Insignificant; no good to any one' (1:3:115). Kostia, however, resolved 
to alter that by some sort of 'sacrifice' through aiding Razumov in his 
supposed need to escape abroad. And such resolve, we recall Heidegger 
contending, is a potential means to authentic being -- both for the agent 
and the other person. 'Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in 
resoluteness can people authentically be with one another -- not by 
ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the 
''they''', but through resolve that makes them the 'conscience' of others 
(Time 344). 
Yet Razumov perpetuated his self-alienating isolation by rejecting 
Kostia's offer with 'disdain' and 'contempt' (1:3:117), spurning his 
attempt at forming a relationship of solicitude that Kostia felt would have 
enhanced his own self, hitherto 'a mere festivity' (1:3:115). Razumov may 
have acknowledged that '"to cut oneself entirely from one's kind is 
impossible. To live in a desert one must be a saint"'. Yet he still found 
human intimacy in general unpalatable, akin to "'a drunken man [who] runs 
out of the grog-shop, falls on your neck and kisses you because something 
about your appearance has taken his fancy'" (1:3:128). 
Or so Razumov thought until he met Natalia Haldin. The professor of 
languages tells us that he himself had been aware from the first 'how 
attractive physically her personality could be to a man capable of 
appreciating in a woman something else than the mere grace of femininity. 
Her glance was as direct and trustful as that of a young man yet unspoiled 
by the world's wise lessons. And it was intrepid. She was • 
very capable of being aroused • by a person' (2:1:132-3). She was 
thus clearly open to human contact, now that her single close human 
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connection had ended with Victor's death, which had filled her with 'the 
anguish of irreparable loss ••• there is no life so lonely as to be safe 
against that experience' (2:1:140). Lacking a close human bond, she 
wondered what she had '''to look for in the future''' (2:1:141), while her 
bereft mother sat by in 'terrible immobility' (2:1:144), in her 
'lifeless', 'indifferent' manner (2:4:191). Though Natalia's 'relations 
with her mother were of the tenderest and most open kind', Mrs Haldin 
'maintained a heroic reserve' that precluded true Buberian dialogue, so 
that Natalia's 'was a solitary existence for a young girl'. In the wake 
of her brother's death 'she felt herself abandoned without explanation' 
(2:3:162). In Heidegger's terms, she was 'lost' (Time 166). 
Thus, the only thing Natalia had '''to look for in the future''' was the 
possibility of a new attitude engendered by an authentic relationship with 
another human self that would end her isolation. The professor had hoped 
to provide that relationship himself, longing for her confidence, her 
request for advice; without them, he felt like 'a dumb helpless ghost, 
••• an anxious immaterial thing that could only hover about without the 
power to protect or guide' (2:2:151). He, too, ached for deeper human 
connection, and was 'not ashamed of the warmth of [his] regard' for 
Natalia, which he (rather like Dr Monygham in Nostromo) considered to be 
'an unselfish sentiment, being its own reward' (2:4:181). 
Natalia elicited similar warmth of regard from Razumov, whose 
feelings for her were obviously complicated by his guilt over his part in 
her brother's death. There initially seemed little prospect of her 
freeing him for the resoluteness that would bring him authentic being, or 
of his helping her to overcome her despondency. He had 'even recoiled a 
pace' when she first offered him her hand, had 'positively reeled' on 
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discovering who she was (2:4:186, 187). But eventually, as we have seen, 
each "'saved'" (4:4:333) the other from what Kierkegaard considers the 
imperfection of the solitary self. 
Even Sophia Antonovna had her humanity expanded by Razumov. At first 
'the very spirit of ruthless revolution' (3:3:257), who put a cause above 
personal relationships, she eventually moved beyond her impersonal credo 
that '''in regard of that task nothing else matters''' (3:3:251) and 
compassionately forgave Razumov -- just as the other revolutionaries 
ultimately did, outraged as they were at Nikita's brutal treatment of him. 
Nikita, 'nicknamed Necator', was 'the very pseudonym of murder' 
(3:4:260, 261), a walking example of the destructive outcome of man's 
eschewing solicitude. Utterly lacking reciprocal bonds with anyone, he 
indiscriminately killed members of 'both camps' (3:4:261). Though Nikita 
had 'a charming wife, devoted to the cause, and two young children' 
(3:4:261), the professor makes no mention of the assassin showing any 
affection for them. He was despised by his cohorts, as was Madame de 
S----, with whom Peter Ivanovitch lived simply 'for her money' (3:2:221). 
The revolutionaries, too, regarded her merely as someone with 'positive 
uses' (3:3:247), as did her relatives, who at her death looked on her as a 
pile of money to be fought over like 'vultures' (5:5:349). 
In her lack of genuine human relationships, Madame de S---- treated 
others as ciphers, through which she herself became depersonalised. 
Razumov felt for her an 'abhorrence that may be caused by a wooden or 
plaster figure of a repulsive kind. She moved no more than if she were 
such a figure; even her eyes, whose unwinking stare plunged into his own, 
though shining, were lifeless, as though they were as artificial as her 
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teeth' (3:2:228). The acerbity of her life extended also to Peter 
Ivanovitch, 'that hairy and obscene brute' (3:2:224); only after her death 
did he again find true companionship, and thus salvation from a 
dehumanising life. 
Salvation through adoration of another came also in the end to the 
once pitiful Tekla. Treated as a mere functionary, she was 'not 
consulted' on anything by the inhabitants of the Chateau Borel (2:4:167), 
who accorded her as much consideration as the furniture around her, so 
that she came to regard herself as unable 'to be anything' other than 'the 
blind instrument of higher ends' (2:4:168, 169). Her earlier life too had 
been thwarted, endurable thanks only to the solicitude of her 'old friend 
and teacher, the poor saintly apple-woman', without whom her 'spirit would 
have perished miserably' (2:4:170). 
Like her employers, Razumov also initially looked on the 'forlorn 
creature' simply as an object of potential use to him: "'She may be worth 
cultivating'" (3:2:223), he had thought to himself in that mode of viewing 
others as exploitable commodities which prevailed in him before his love 
for Natalia stirred his authentic humanity. Tekla responded to what she 
termed Razumov's "'human manner •••• I have been starving for, I won't 
say kindness, but just for a little civility, for I don't know how long"' 
(3:2:234). She was all too ready to become his object, so conditioned had 
she become by her inauthentic being-with-others at the ch~teau. 
Considering herself no better than 'the tables and chairs' that Madame de 
S---- and Peter Ivanovitch spoke in front of, 'she ••• seemed to beg mutely 
to be • given a word of encouragement for her starving, grotesque, and 
pathetic devotion' (3:2:235). '"No one is told my name. No one cares. No 
one talks to me, no one writes to me •••• I have no use for a name, and I 
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have almost forgotten it myself'" (3:2:236). 
Tekla of course ultimately surmounted this condition by devoting 
herself to Razumov, an achievement never managed by anyone in The Secret 
Agent. We have already seen how the emptiness of the Verlocs' marriage 
drove Winnie to murder the husband who treated her as little more than a 
useful possession and who viewed mankind in general with disdain. His 
associates he 'scornfully' regarded as 'hopelessly futile' (3:81), and 
they in turn -- like everyone else Verloc had dealings with -- similarly 
'fixed' people 'into objects' in the way we have seen Sartre deplore 
(Nothingness 266). Vladimir, for example, with his 'mocking, cynical 
watchfulness' (2:57, 58), considered Verloc as just a 'fat ••• animal' 
to be 'chucked' once his 'usefulness' was over (2:64). Karl Yundt shared 
this lack of personal concern for anyone, fanatical as he was in his dream 
of 'a band of men absolute in their resolve to disregard all scruples', 
with 'no pity for anything on earth' in their ruthless service of 
'humanity' in the abstract (3:74). 'Nursed by a blear-eyed old woman, a 
woman he had years ago enticed away from a friend, and afterwards had 
tried more than once to shake off into the gutter' (3:81), Yundt brazenly 
made use of others for his own benefit, giving nothing in return. 
Such too was the attitude of Chief Inspector Heat. Though disturbed 
by an 'unpleasant sensation in his throat' at the news of the 'heap of 
nameless fragments' to which Stevie had been reduced by the Greenwich 
bombing, he was a man whose 'trained faculties' impelled him to be 
impersonal (5:107). Working for 'a department', which the narrator 
considers 'a dispassionate organism' (5:109), Heat was a product of the 
same 'machine' (5:110) that produced 'the world of thieves', a world which 
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worked 'by routine' (5:111). It operated 'under perfectly comprehensible 
rules. There were no rules for dealing with anarchists' (5:114) -- and 
this was unsettling to his 'vulgar love of domination over [his] fellow 
creatures' (6:132-3). Nietzsche would swiftly categorise this 'average 
married citizen' (6:132) as a mechanical member of the 'herd', which 
defends itself both against those who (like criminals) are decadents from 
its ranks and those who rise superior to its mediocrity. 'Though what is 
called a man', Heat -- unlike Nietzsche's laughing Zarathustra -- 'was not 
a smiling animal' (6:133) but viewed his 'fellow citizens' with 'an 
attitude of doubt and suspicion' (9:194) 
Neither he nor anyone else in the novel besides Winnie and Stevie even 
approached Kierkegaard's difficult injunction that one transform 'every 
relation between man and man into a relationship of conscience and thereby 
also into a relationship of love' (Love 138). To Heat, people had value 
only in so far as they were useful 'tools' (7:145). His superior, the 
nameless Assistant Commissioner, took a like view; those he encountered at 
his place of work he 'fed' on as 'human material' (6:129). He lived devoid 
of any close human connection. Although (like Winnie and Emilia) he had 
made a good marriage 'from a worldly point of view' (5:116), it was a cold 
enchainment to a woman whose 'delicacy of ••• nature ••• and tastes' 
had its 'limitations' (6:125). His only habitual acquaintances were those 
at his club, whom he never met 'except at the card-table' and with whom he 
approached his daily whist party 'in the spirit of co-sufferers' (5:118). 
Michaelis too had no close bond with anyone. 'Annexed by his 
wealthy old lady' (3:81), he looked on mankind from a distance in 'his 
solitary reclusion' (3:75), speaking with bland equanimity of the 
'cannibalistic' economic conditions that fostered human misery in the 
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abstract. His harsh mouthings left him wholly unperturbed, In Stevie, on 
the other hand, they produced an 'audible gulp' (3:80) through his horror 
at suffering; his compassion was easily 'wrought ••• to the pitch of 
frenzy' by 'tales of injustice and oppression' (1:50). Michaelis in 
contrast had no such feeling of personal involvement. 'He talked to 
himself, indifferent to the sympathy or hostility of his hearers, 
indifferent indeed to their presence' (3:75). Forsaking strong ties with 
others, he embraced instead the 'confined space, seclusion, and solitude' 
of his 'small four-roomed cottage •••• It was like being in prison' 
(6:131). 
Indeed, Conrad presents the majority of his characters as trapped in 
isolation cells of their own making, remorselessly pointing to the 
bleakness of inauthentic being-with-others, the Kierkegaardian danger 
inherent in one's choosing 'to isolate oneself too much' (Journals 28) 
rather than striving for 'a relationship of conscience and thereby also 
of love' (Love 138). It is a bleakness Conrad makes even more 
deadening by depicting so lustrously the enhancing joy of Sartrean 
justification engendered by solicitous love that offers self-transcendence 
through the mutuality of full Marcellian presence. Thus, as we have seen, 
Conrad shares the existential conviction -- especially as articulated by 
Camus in The Rebel -- that man can pass beyond nihilism to fashion his own 
private sense of worth by virtue of his individual response to what, in 
itself, is an indifferent and absurd universe. Through his moral efforts 
to create his own unique in-itself amid his utter freedom of choice for 
action that entails responsibility both to himself and others, man has the 
potential to overcome the Sartrean weight of the world that induces 
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anxiety and alienation. Like Victory's Lena, man is able through his 
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